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# RJSH

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**RANGSIT JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES (RJSH)**  
**Volume 4, Number 1, January – June 2017**

**Editor's Note**

This latest issue of the *Rangsit Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities* (RJSH) is a special dedication to our late Majesty Bhumibol Adulyadej. One of the concepts brought upon by the late Majesty is about 'Sufficiency Economy'.

Sufficiency means moderation and due consideration in all modes of conduct together with the need for sufficient protection from internal and external shocks. To achieve this, the application of knowledge in prudence manner is essential. In particular, great care is needed in the application of theories and technical know-how and methodologies for planning and implementation. At the same time, it is essential to strengthen the moral fiber of the nation, so that everyone, particularly public officials, academics or theoreticians, businessmen and financiers, will adhere first and foremost to the principles of honesty and integrity.

(*Thaiwaysmagazine*, 2007)

The above excerpt is quoted from the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej's royal speech, quoted from an article written by the *Thaiwaysmagazine* (2007). During the late King's life, he fought tirelessly to make people understand the concept of Sufficiency Economy. The journal is trying to absorb the courage and enthusiasm brought upon by the late King so that in life people will do their best to live abreast. The same thing applies to the academic scholars, who need to write with such honesty and integrity. Henceforth, the output yielded will be worthwhile and of higher distinction.

The first article reflects some elements of the King's concept. It is about the effort to restore the bond between the old and the young generation. Sometimes age difference makes people less friendly and becomes anti-social, especially when the age is reaching the golden era. Rungnapa Theppar and Hideharu Uemura newest article is about developing an age-friendly community in rural areas. They selected Hua-Ngum, a vicinity within the province of Chiang Mai as their research location. They discovered that for nearly to a decade, the Hua-Ngum Sub-district Administrative Organisation and its partner had initiated key age-friendliness activities in the sub-district. They perceive the fact that establishing an age-friendly community there is not only for the sake of the older people, as it is also considered to be a community development process for all age members since a herd of deer is better than a lonely wolf.

The reader will then turn to the article by the trio of Ektewan Manowong, Darmp Sukontasap, and Witchayanee Ocha regarding the defence diplomacy in Thailand. The focus is on the contributions of the defence diplomacy, as observers want to certify that the defense sector is performing responsively in the rapid changing of the world. The study aims to investigate the contributions made by the defence diplomacy of Thailand towards the integration efforts of the ASEAN Community. The role of the defence diplomacy is assessed and analyse further to see how such a role can be expanded further.

There are lots of women out there who face sexual harassment in the workplace, mainly in the workplace dominated by the men. Thus, Sasiphattra Siriwato comes up with an article on a case study of female police officers in the Royal Thai Police, whether the latter face sexual harassment or not. Both retired, and current officers were part of the interviewee. The result is quite the reverse, as most participants did not face any physical sexual harassment. To explain further on this matter, they established two reasons why these participants reported zero sexual harassment. One is that Thai women do not discuss this sexual harassment matter with other people, and the second is that the term sexual harassment is a vague term where these women do not know the real meaning of the phrase.

Moving near the eastern part of Asia, an article written by Yuka Matsumoto explore the differences in perception towards the progress of recovery between metropolitan and coastal areas in the

event of the Great East Japan earthquake. Two (2) cities in Miyagi district, Sendai City, and Shiogama City were selected, and the comparison is made based on two aspects. The first is in the economic conditions of the place and the second is qualitative and is based on interviews conducted with the residents to verify how such disparities are influencing the people's thoughts toward the recovery process. They found out that there are clear differences in the levels of the recovery in the two location, and that gap has significantly influenced the resident's perceptions on the progress of the recovery as well as their well-being.

Next, an interesting topic brought upon by Fabio Calzolari regarding the social insight about the migration in the European countries. The author evaluates the role of multiculturalism in Europe and its impact on social practices. Migration is something that kind of an unavoidable reality as referred to the multicultural counseling literature. The paper is thrusting upon the literature review of the topic, discussing the European migration models in a thorough manner, without furthering the study to any specific places or population.

Then, we arrive at the penultimate article written by Jirajoj Mamadkul. The author touches on the Saudi Arabia-Iran's foreign policy crisis, using the execution of a Shia believer of Saudi citizen name Shaikh Nimr al-Nimr. The issue kind of re-ignite the conflict that both countries are having since the Iran Revolution in 1979. In the discussion, the author establishes three (3) factors that shape the relationship between the two nations which are about the Sunni-Shia clan disagreement, the rivalry of becoming the regional power in the Middle East, and the politics in the OPEC. Through the execution of the cleric, Saudi Arabia immediately cut down the diplomatic ties with Iran to react to the burning of Saudi's diplomatic places by a group of Iranians.

Last but not least, an article was written by a concerned citizen with regards to the concept of biopower that could be used as a political tool to instill terror to control and govern citizens. Preechaya Kittipaisilpa comes up with the article mainly to examine what biopower adds to the analysis of the use of terror and power as being exercised over bodies and populations.

In a nutshell, the late King's philosophy is not merely an idea; it is actually an endeavour for people to understand the world better. At RJSH team, we like to dedicate the hard work of this whole publication unit to our King. We could not follow his footstep with regards of leading a country, but all of us could follow his journey to make this country a better place for people to live in by providing not only good, yet quality academic materials for readers all around the world. The concept is upheld to blend in with all the themes of the listed journals, where lots of problems or research issues arise here. Thus researchers step in to provide the possible solution, and sometimes the ultimate cure.

After all, that is why journals such as RJSH exist: to connect knowledge-seekers (learners) with producers of knowledge (researchers). As the editorial team, we see this as our job: sharing new knowledge, including alternative ways of perceiving the complex issues that all of our societies face on a day-to-day basis.

We welcome your comments – and, of course, your manuscripts. Links to our manuscript submission site can be found at RJSH Online Submission and Review System: <http://rjsh.rsu.ac.th>. We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,



Anek Laothamatas  
Editor-in-chief

**RANGSIT JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES (RJSH)**

**Volume 4, Number 1, January – June 2017**

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## Developing an Age-Friendly Community in Rural Area: A Case Study of Hua-Ngum, Chiang Rai, Thailand

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### Abstract

The study aims to investigate the situation of an aging society and age-friendly community in Hua-Ngum Sub-district, Chiang Rai, Thailand, which is defined as a rural community and to identify the process to create an age-friendly community in the sub-district. The age-friendly community concept is employed as analysis framework. Both qualitative and quantitative research are adopted in the study. The results indicate that for approximately a decade, the Hua-Ngum Sub-district Administrative Organization (SAO) and its partner have launched key age-related activities in the sub-district. Those activities contribute several social opportunities encouraging age-friendliness features in Hua-Ngum, such as opportunities for learning, participating, connecting isolated elderly people to the rest of the community, integrating with younger generations, contributing, and being valued and respected. Therefore, establishing an age-friendly community in Hua-Ngum is not a project only for older people, but is also considered to be a community development process for all age members. There are four key steps for developing an age-friendly community in Hua-Ngum: raising awareness to build consensus, establishing partnerships to develop an age-friendly community, implementation, and creating social space and public acceptance. Those community development processes are not just a linear steps; in contrast, they are dynamic processes which need to be developed continuously. The lessons learned from the Hua-Ngum age-friendly community experience indicates the importance of the power of the local community to tackle its aging society with regards to the social capital and social participation of all community members.

**Keywords:** *Age-friendly community, Thai aging society, rural development, older person in rural area*

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### 1. Introduction

Currently, the increasing number of older adults worldwide is an important challenge to deal with. The World Health Organization (WHO) reported that the number of older people who are 65 years old and over is projected to increase from approximately 524 million in 2010 to nearly 1.5 billion in 2050, equal to 16% of the world's population (WHO, 2011). In noting the world's aging situation, WHO initiated the Global Age-friendly Cities Project in 2005 in 33 cities worldwide (WHO, 2007). The experiences from those 33 age-friendly cities have contributed to a new concept, known as the "age-friendly cities/communities concept," to deal with aging and aged societies across the world. Therefore, such a concept has been acknowledged widely since WHO's publication of "Global Age-friendly Cities: A Guide," which provides the age-friendly feature checklist as a tool for a city's self-assessment and a map to chart its progress (WHO, 2007). After that WHO project, there has been considerable interest on the part of policy-makers in the concept and movement to establish cities and communities as better places for older people (Menec & Nowicki, 2014). Particularly in the West - the United States, Canada, and Europe - the concept has flourished. In the United States, for example, Scharlach et al. (2012) indicate that there are 292 age-friendly community initiatives.

The concept indicates eight domains that are fundamental age-friendly cities and communities. These domains are: 1) outdoor spaces and buildings; 2) transportation; 3) housing; 4) respect and social inclusion; 5) social participation; 6) civic participation and employment opportunities; 7) communication and information; and 8) community support and health services (WHO, 2007; Plouffe & Kalanche, 2010). WHO presents the concept of age-friendly cities and communities as one approach to promote an active aging framework that refers to the processes that optimize opportunities for health, participation, and security to enhance the quality of life as people age (WHO, 2007).

Furthermore, there are several definitions of an age-friendly community, identified depending on the viewpoints or framework that the scholars are employed. The age-friendly community is considered as social interaction and independence of older people (Clark & Glicksman, 2012), as a community designed to promote and ensure health, security, and participation among older people (Everingham et al., 2009). It also serves as processes to promote positive health behaviors and physical health (Cherry et al., 2011), and a way to promote healthy aging identified by life satisfaction and self-perceived health (Menec & Nowicki, 2014). Based on Green (2012), age-friendly cities act as processes to ensure healthy aging in terms of raising awareness of older people as a resource to society, personal and community empowerment, accessibility of the full range of services, and supportive physical and social environments.

Additionally, the age-friendly community concept is viewed as a new discourse on gerontology. The concept views the elders as significant contributors to society and their communities, rather than as passive, dependent recipients of benefits and services (Austin et al., 2009). This statement marks a shift in the discourse about aging population from viewing them as a problem towards the viewpoint that considers older people as those who can flourish (Eales et al., 2008). Moreover, the age-friendly community regards older people as productive and contributing members of society, as opposed to the negative perspective, which views elders as passive and powerless seniors (Alley et al., 2007; Lui et al., 2009). This shift of paradigm leads itself towards a positive perspective of the elderly that emphasizes their values and abilities.

In the case of Thailand, the study of the National Statistical Office (NSO) indicates that Thailand became an aging society in 2005 (NSO, 2008). Although the percentage of the older population of the entire Thai population is not high when compared with other developed countries, such as France, which took more than 100 years for the shift of the population aged 65 and over from 7% to 14%. However, in Thailand, it took only 20 years. Consequently, Thailand has been facing with rapid aging. The rapidity of population aging in Thailand means that the country has a shorter time to deal with the new challenges related to an aging society (Jitapunkun et al., 2008). In the future, the aging society in Thailand will be a critical situation when the aging rate increases to 29.8% of the total population (estimated to be in 2050). At the same time, Thailand is experiencing a myriad of limitations, such as a lack of finance, a lack of manpower working in the healthcare system for the elderly, and constraints on healthcare facilities for older people (TGRI, 2009; Jitapunkun, et al., 2008; TGRI, 2011) while changes in the socio-culture, economic, and political context are also taking place.

The age-friendly cities and communities concept in Thailand seems to be a new idea. According to the ThaiLIS database<sup>1</sup>, there are only four studies that have used the words “age-friendly,” most of which are in the field of public health. Moreover, the age-friendly built-environment, including specially designed age-friendly buildings, was launched by the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security in 2012, and in April 2014, the first project on age-friendly cities was introduced in Thailand by the Department of Health at the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH).

With awareness of the Thai aging situation, therefore, the present study is focusing on the development of an age-friendly community in rural Thailand with the important assumption that the age-friendly community concept has the potential to be one model for community-based welfare. Such a concept can lead to a rural development process, which does not only benefit the elders themselves but members of the community of all ages as well.

Moreover, the study has defined the rural community by using the type of local government as criteria. In the Thai local government system, the Sub-district Administrative Organizations (SAOs) refers to local government in rural areas, while other local governments, such as city municipalities, town municipalities, and sub-district municipalities, refer to the local governments in urban areas.

As a significance of the study, a review of previous studies illustrates the need for the study of age-friendly communities in rural areas. There currently exists a major gap in the literature, namely that the discourse around age-friendliness has tended to focus on cities (Menec & Nowicki, 2014). Therefore, the present study will lead to extending the knowledge boundary of age-friendly communities in rural

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<sup>1</sup> Thai Library Integrated System (ThaiLIS) is the database that gathers research reports, research and review articles, Masters thesis, and Doctoral dissertations from the network. The ThaiLIS's network refers to university libraries and other organizations that are connected and working in cooperation. (Searched August 3, 2016)

communities. In Thailand in particular, the age-friendly community concept has not yet been introduced widely and deeply. Thus, this study will be a pioneering study that introduces and establishes the age-friendly community concept and movement in Thai academic society.

## **2. Objectives**

The study has two main objectives: to study the situation of an aging society and age-friendly community in Hua-Ngum Sub-district, Chiang Rai, Thailand; and to identify the process to create an age-friendly community in the sub-district.

## **3. Materials and Methods**

### **3.1 Research Site**

The study focuses on rural communities in northern Thailand. The northern region (according to the four-region grouping system commonly used in Thailand) refers to seventeen provinces located in the northern part of Thailand (Chiang Rai is one of these provinces in the northern region). Northern Thailand has several significant problems that unavoidably affect the aging society of the region. For instance, it has become a rapidly aging society faster than any other regions. Since 1990, the old age population in the northern region has increased dramatically, such that in the year 2000, it reached 1,278,965 people (11.2%). Additionally, the population projector has revealed that in 2025, the number of elderly living in northern Thailand is expected to be 3,013,000, or 24.2% of the entire population of the region (Tangyongthakun, 2010). Furthermore, the ratio of poverty within the region is higher than that of the national level (second in rank, next behind the northeastern region). In 2008, the northern region had a poverty rate of 13.3%, while the national level was 8.9% (NRCT, 2010). When considering health aspects, northern residents have the highest rate of problems with their health status (27.3%), especially respiratory diseases, mental health problems, and suicide. Moreover, the highest rate of HIV-infected patients exists within this region (NRCT, 2010). Therefore, the aging society in northern Thailand will present a critical situation when combining these conditions.

Using one sub-district in northern Thailand, the researcher has selected the Hua-Ngum sub-district for its case study. Hua-Ngum sub-district is an old, rural sub-district of Chiang Rai province. It is an agricultural community that was established in 1915 (B.E. 2458). The Sub-district is located 739 kilometers north of Bangkok. It covers mainly a lowland area of 62.1 km<sup>2</sup> and contains thirteen villages. Hua-Ngum sub-district has already become an aged society, based on the information from 2016's census of Basic Minimal Needs (BMN). The census reveals that there are 1,823 households with a total population of 5,165, of which 50% are of working age (26-60 years). Older persons (over 60 years) account for 24.84%, which is considerably higher than the national average of 16.4%. To cope with the high rate of elderly people and the problems faced by the Hua-Ngum elderly, the Hua-Ngum SAO and its partners instituted several activities based on social participation and social capital, to establish an age-friendly community for the people of Hua-Ngum. Although they faced an array of limitations and challenges, such as a limited finance, staff, and a high percentage of elderly residents, the community is trying to establish effective practices for elderly care and development in their community for dealing with their aged society. Thus, the experience of Hua-Ngum sub-district has the potential to be studied and implemented in other communities, particularly in northern Thailand.

### **3.2 Research Method and Data Analysis**

Both qualitative and quantitative research are employed in the study. As qualitative research, several methods are being conducted, such as documentary study (documents include hardcopy/printed versions, visual media, e.g. YouTube, websites, news), the interviewing of key informants involved in age-related activities in Hua-Ngum sub-district, (e.g. administrators and related staff of the Hua-Ngum SAO, Buddhist monks, elderly people who participate in the activities, etc.), and participatory and non-participatory observation. Regarding the quantitative method, survey research is also conducted by using questionnaires as a research tool. 188 elderly people are selected as research samples, with a total research population of 1,226, by employing possibility sampling using a systematic sampling technique. Interview

guidelines and questionnaires are approved by the Research Ethics Committees of Japan College of Social Work (No.15-0304, Date 6-8-2015).

In term of data analysis, content analysis (inductive approach) is adopted for qualitative research, while descriptive statistics is used to explain the data gained from survey research such as percentage, means ( $\bar{X}$ ), and S.D.

#### 4. Result

##### 4.1 Situation of an Aged Society in Hua-Ngum Sub-District

Hua-Ngum sub-district has already become an aged society<sup>2</sup>. The results from the survey research on the Hua-Ngum elderly contributes important data related to the aged society situation in Hua-Ngum sub-district. The study mainly collects data from the elderly (96.8%), with a small portion (3.2%) collected from the relatives of the elderly, e.g. daughters, younger sisters. More than half of the samples (53.7%) are the early-old elderly group (60-69 years of age), followed by the middle-old (70-79 years of age; 25.5%) and the old-old (80+ years of age) elderly groups at 20.8%, respectively. More than half of the participants (53.7%) are female. Almost three-fourths of them (70.2%) graduated at the elementary education level, follow by those who never enrolled in formal education (27.7%). The majority of the participants (64.9%) are married or living together, while more than one-fourth of them (29.8%) are widowed.

Health Status and Access to Care of the Elderly: Regarding access to primary health care services, almost all of them (99.5%) access annual health examinations, e.g. blood examinations to look for diabetes and measure cholesterol levels and blood pressure. Moreover, all of them (100.0%) access care and treatment when ill and have no limitations to gain access to care and treatment (100.0%). However, almost three-fourths of the elderly population (73.4%) has health problems, such as hypertension (48.4%) and diabetes (10.6%). Regarding exercise, more than half of them (61.2%) exercise at least three days a week (Table 1).

**Table 1** Percentage of Health Status and Access to Care for the Elderly

Items	Yes % (N)	No % (N)
1. Last year, did you access an annual health examination? (e.g. blood examination to look for diabetes, measure cholesterol and blood pressure, and have a urine and stool examination)	99.5(187)	0.5(1)
2. Last year, did you access care and treatment when ill?	100.00 (188)	-
3. Last year, did you exercise <sup>1</sup> at least three days a week?	61.2 (115)	38.8 (73)
4. Do you have any health problems now?	73.4 (138)	26.6 (500)
5. Do you have limitations to access care and treatment?	-	100.0 (188)

<sup>1</sup>means movement or exercise to moderate exertion at least three days per week and 10-30 minutes a day.

Elderly Housing Conditions: Most of the Hua-Ngum elderly (89.9%) are living with families, with only 10.1% of the elderly living alone. In the latter group of elderly living alone, all of them (100.0%) stay near their children's and relative's houses. However, the majority of them have small families or "nuclear families," – 1 or 2 generation families. The "1-generation family" refers to the family that includes only the spouse, sister, or brother living together (36.5%), while the "2-generation family" refers to the family where the elderly live with their children or grandchildren (37.1%). (Table 2).

<sup>2</sup> An aging society is defined as a population in which over 10% of the total population is 60 years old or more (or 7% of the population is 65 years old and over), while an aged society or a completed aged society is one which 20% of the total population is 60 years old or more (or 14% of the population is 65 years old or more) (TGRI, 2016: 24).

**Table 2** Percentage of the Elderly Living Alone and the Size of the Family of the Elderly

Items	N	%
Do you live alone?		
-Yes	19	10.1
- No	169	89.9
Size of family		
- 1 generation, e.g. spouse, sister, brother	62	36.5
- 2 generation, e.g. elderly and their children, elderly and their grandchildren	63	37.1
- Three generations e.g. elderly, their children and grandchildren	45	26.5

Regarding the condition of the current residence or house of the elderly, the majority of the samples state that they have good conditions for living. The top three most essential housing conditions as stated by the samples have enough lighting at 98.4%, followed by having non-slippery floors at 95.7% and having safe stairway railings outside the house, at 86.1%. In contrast, few samples have handrails inside the house (0.5%) and the bathroom (3.2%) (Table 3).

**Table 3** Percentage of Conditions of Current Residence/House of the Elderly

Items	N	%
1. Safe stairway railings outside the house	136	86.1
2. Enough Lighting	185	98.4
3. Handrails inside the house	1	0.5
4. Handrails inside the bathroom	6	3.2
5. Non-slippery floors	180	95.7
6. Non-step floors	137	72.9
7. Flushing toilets/western toilets	111	59.0
8. Other, e.g. assistance buzzer/bell	1	0.5

Informative Learning of the Elderly: More than three-fourths of the samples (77.7%) attended training, seminars, meetings, or other educational activities held by the organizations in the community in the past year. This data shows a high level of opportunity for informative learning. Seminars and meetings are important channels that support the acknowledgement of rights and social welfare among the elderly (74.5%). In contrast, other channels seem to have a low potential to support such acknowledgement among the elderly, e.g. books, newspapers, magazines (1.1%), television (0%), radio (0%), and volunteers (0.5%) (Table 4).

**Table 4** Percentage of Informative Learning of the Elderly and Media Supporting the Elderly Rights/Welfare

Items	Yes % (N)	No% (N)
Last year, did you attend in training, seminars, meetings, or any educational activities that were held by the organizations or senior citizen clubs?	77.7(146)	22.3(42)
Last year, did you access news or information on elderly rights or social welfare through the following media channels?		
1. Books, newspapers, magazines	1.1 (2)	98.9 (186)
2. Television	0.0 (0)	100.0 (188)
3. Radio	0.0 (0)	100.0 (188)
4. News broadcasting tower in community	0.0 (0)	100.0 (188)
5. Seminars/meetings	74.5 (140)	25.5 (48)
6. Volunteers	0.5 (1)	99.5 (187)
7. Other	0.0 (0)	100.0 (188)

Employment and Income of the Elderly: More than half of the elderly (59.6%) have no paid work. Most of the participants (98.9%) had sufficient income to cover their expenditures last year (Table 5).

Moreover, some of them explain that although they earn little money each month, they try to manage their budget by planting vegetables to lower their cost of living. Furthermore, many of them say that because their children support their food and other necessities, e.g. electric and water bills, they can manage their small income and do not need to borrow money from others.

The majority of the participants (93.6%) have savings. Only 6.4% of them have no savings (Table 5). Qualitative data reveals that the participants mainly save their money in financial institutions in the community such as microcredit groups. Those financial institutions are located close to the elderly. Thus they feel more familiar with those than the commercial banks run by the government or the private sector, which are located outside the community and are not easy to access. Therefore, the financial institutions operated by the local residents can be considered social support that promotes economic security for the rural elderly.

There are three main sources of income for the elderly, which include a monthly allowance by the Thai government (received by 100.0% of elderly people), work (income for 59.0% of the elderly), and their children (31.4% of the elderly). The average income per month is 3,620.21 THB (Table 6). Compared with the national average, half of them (50.0%) have an average income per month below the poverty line at the national level, 2,412 THB per month (NESDB, 2015) (Table 7).

**Table 5** Percentage of Employment, Sufficient Income and Savings of the Elderly

Items	N	%
Are you working (paid work)?		
Yes	112	59.6
No	76	40.4
Last year, did you have sufficient income to cover your expenditures?		
Yes	186	98.9
No	2	1.1
Do you have savings?		
Yes	176	93.6
No	12	6.4

**Table 6** Percentage of Main Sources of Income and Average Income per Month of the Elderly

At present, what is your main source of income?	Yes (%)	No (%)	$\bar{X}$	SD.	Max.	Min	Total (N)
Monthly Allowance for the Elderly	100.0	0.0	668.62	95.482	1,000	600	100.0 (188)
Monthly Allowance for People with disabilities	6.4	93.6	51.06	196.082	800	0	100.0 (188)
Children	31.4	68.6	673.67	1,272.124	5,000	0	100.0 (188)
Work	59.0	41.0	2,236.97	3,808.266	27,200	0	100.0 (188)
Average Income			3,620.21	3,770.504	27,800	600	100.0 (188)

\*Unit: THB (1 USD =35 THB, approximately)

**Table 7** Percentage of the Average Income of the Elderly Compared with Poverty Line at National Level

Average Income	N	%
Lower than poverty line at national level	94	50.0
Higher than poverty line at national level	94	50.0

In conclusion, the data mentioned above implies an important aging situation in Hua-Ngum sub-district, where the majority of elderly people have low educational levels, and faced with poverty as well as having health problems. The families still have major roles in providing care for the elderly. However, the majority of them live in nuclear families and encountered challenges like skip-generation households<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> Refers to families with only grandparent(s) and grandchild(ren) in residence.

Therefore, age-related activities by local communities are needed to support the families and to prepare for a change shortly.

#### 4.2 Key Age-Related Activities Established in Hua-Ngum

Results are based on analysis of five age-related activities in Hua-Ngum sub-district – the TanTod social assistance program for the elderly with difficulties, a One-day One-baht community welfare fund, a Goodness Bank, a Little Doctors activity, and the School for the Elderly, both at the sub-district and the village level. The study indicates that over nearly a decade, the Hua-Ngum SAO and its partners have introduced significant age-related activities.

In 2006, the “TanTod” social assistance program for the elderly with difficulties, e.g. elders living in poverty, living alone, and bedridden was introduced to assist the elderly who are in difficult situations. In order to deliver the service, the SAO is the main player, operating the activity, coordinating with the head of each village to select three qualified elderly people to participate in the activity, and then delivering assistance to the selected participants in each village (a total of 13 villages). Such activities provide social assistance for the three chosen elderly people to receive every month both cash (at least 1,000 THB per person per time) and in-kind support.

In the same year (2006), the “One-day One-baht” Community Welfare Fund for disadvantaged people was launched to encourage local residents to participate in, and be aware of, assistance and support for people in difficult living situations in the sub-district. Due to the budget constraints, leaders from the sub-district advocated that the sub-district need to have its own fund on the basis of participation (donations from villagers). This inspires a mutual sentiment of solidarity among the community and raises awareness among villagers to support one another. Thus, money is donated continuously into the fund every month. The fund is given to TanTod participants as well as students as scholarships (Primary school – Higher Education). Moreover, the balance of the fund’s account is reported at monthly community meetings at the sub-district (on the 7<sup>th</sup> of every month). From 2012 to 2016, there have been 195 elderly persons who have benefited from the fund or 39 recipients per year.

In 2007, a significant community development process the “Goodness Bank” was introduced with two main purposes: 1) to encourage local people to participate in community affairs, and 2) to establish and strengthen the community’s social capital. The Hua-Ngum Goodness Bank, located at the SAO office, was started on December 28<sup>th</sup> 2007. By September 2015, the Bank had a total of ~2,304 members (approximately 44% of the total population) with 1,524,434 goodness points.

As its management system, the SAO and its partner have applied general banking management systems to their own processes. The Goodness Bank provides goodness savings and withdrawals. When members do good deeds, they can record the points in their account and withdraw those points for credit when they are in need. Goodness withdrawal means exchanging goodness points for necessities.

At the Goodness Bank office, which is located at the SAO, there are several goods for which the members can exchange their points. For instance, 20 goodness points can be exchanged for a pack of UHT milk and a pack of dried noodles in cups, whereas 500 points can be exchanged for a blanket or a set of goods to be used as an offering dedicated to Buddhist monks.

The Goodness Bank has several “goodness menus,” which refer to programs that promote and encourage local people in specific objectives. On the menu, the list of activities and points are presented. For example, the “*Goodness menu on social and civic participation*,” promotes and encourages local people to participate and get involved in community affairs, such as receiving 15 points per time when participating in monthly community meetings, meetings held by the SAO or other community organizations, or participating in activities, programs, projects, events, and festivals held by the SAO. Another example is the “*Goodness menu on health*” that fosters and encourages local people to decrease the risk factors that adversely affect their health and well-being. Individuals receive 50 points when reducing their waistline by 1 inch, yet they receive 300 and 500 points if they stop drinking alcohol and smoking. In addition, during the Buddhist Lent Day period (a total of 3 months), they receive 300 points for controlling their diabetes and blood pressure for six months continuously, and they receive one point per CC of blood donated.

In 2009, the “Little Doctors” activity was started by Padaeng Wittaya School (a primary - junior high school). The activity aims to raise public awareness and the volunteer spirit of students and to create a system to support bed-ridden elderly patients. The school provides healthcare training for junior high school students by professional nurses and public health officers. Also, they learn and practice healthcare services at the Hua-Ngum Tambon Health Promoting Hospital (THPH) on Saturday mornings and do fieldwork in the afternoon. This practical application provides real opportunities for learning such skills as the likes of blood pressure measurement, dressing wounds, Thai massage, and other health care concerns. In the next step in the students’ training, they deliver services to the targeted elderly by setting up name lists of elderly bed-ridden patients and making home visit schedules. They provide service on Sundays (5 students per group). Each group is responsible for taking care of five patients at a time for 24 weeks. Their services include measuring blood pressure, giving physical therapy and foot massages, Dharma storytelling, and doing house cleaning.

In 2010, **the School for the Elderly** was established with the aim to respond to age-related problems, including physical and mental health problems, abandonment, loneliness among the elderly, and especially suicide case among Hua-Ngum elderly. In 2013, the administrative committee of the School decided to extend the school to “*the School and University*,” to respond to increasing student enrollment. Moreover, the university could continue to work with the elderly students after finishing school to continue their involvement in school activities for as long as possible. Currently (2016), there are 267 elder students, both in the school and university level.

The school and university aim to provide social space and promote the learning process and capability for development among older people. It provides weekly classes every Thursday, from 8.30 a.m. – 4.00 p.m., taught by ten volunteer teachers. These teachers include retired government officers, schoolteachers, Buddhist monks, administrators of the SAO, and the THPH director. The schedule is divided into morning and afternoon sections. During the morning section, there are three main subjects: Buddhist knowledge, health care knowledge, and social science and cultural knowledge. During the afternoon session, all of the students participate in activities of individual interest, including cooking, crafts, yoga, Thai massage, academic skills (e.g., Thai language, English, computer training, traditional drumming, folk singing, musical groups, traditional dancing, petanque, and Thai traditional sports).

As well as increasing accessibility to the School for the Elderly in 2014, they initiated another activity, namely **the School for the Elderly at the village level**. This activity was launched in every village in the sub-district – a total of 13 villages. Because only 20% of the elderly in the sub-district participate in the School for the Elderly at the sub-district level, the Hua-Ngum SAO and its partner seek to expand its coverage to other parts of the community. The school operates once a month on the government “pay-day” (lasting approximately 2 hours), which is the day that elderly residents receive their monthly pension, according to the government’s policy. Staff members at the Hua-Ngum SAO are volunteer teachers who provide interesting and useful information to the older people. This activity covers 70-80% of the elders in the sub-district.

In conclusion, in one year, approximately 80% of the entire older population in the sub-district can benefit from these age-related activities. These activities establish opportunities for social participation for the elderly that reflect the friendliness towards the older people in the community, which in turn fosters social connectivity between the elderly and the community as a whole.

### 4.3 Features of Age-Friendliness in Hua-Ngum Sub-District

Based on analysis of the five age-related activities mentioned above, the findings reveal that there have been several social opportunities established in the sub-district. Those opportunities indicate the features of age-friendliness in Hua-Ngum, as follows:

#### 4.3.1 Opportunities for lifelong learning

Elderly people obtain useful knowledge that leads them to be peaceful and healthy, such as information on healthy living, ways to exercise, healthy foods to eat and overall nutrition, and learning about behaviors for a good death according to Buddhist principles. Moreover, the elderly are given opportunities to develop public speaking skills, enhance their self-confidence, and express their opinions in

a public forum. Some of the elderly who had never been to school at all and could not read or write were taught at the School for the Elderly simply to write their names, something that they had never been able to do before they enrolled in this school.

I never enroll to the school because my family is very poor. When I was young, I had to help my father and mother to look after my brothers and sisters and work in the rice field. During the past life, I always make a fingerprint for signature. After I joined the School for the Elderly, I had the opportunity to learn and practice to write my name. The first time that I held the pen I was so excited. At present, I can write my name, and I can sign without making a fingerprint. I am so proud of myself.

(An elderly student at the School for the Elderly, interview, October 10<sup>th</sup>, 2015)

#### **4.3.2 Opportunities for participating in community activities**

As “Goodness Bank” members, elderly people are supported and encouraged to become involved in community activities. Individuals can accumulate goodness points in their goodness passbook. Such participation directly encourages older people to become part of their community by maintaining social connectivity with others in the sub-district. For instance, elderly who participate in a “Temple Cleaning Day” gain 15 points. Community meetings in which they actively participate earn them points as well. In the beginning, the points gained were a tool to motivate the elderly to take part in community affairs. Nowadays, getting the points is not the end of their participation in the Goodness Bank, because they participate in the activities voluntarily and realize that taking part in the community's affairs stems their commitment and responsibility as a member of the sub-district. Some of them do not record the points into their Goodness account even though they still participate frequently in the activities.

I, sometimes, don't record goodness points into my account because when I help the community affairs, e.g. to attend a community meeting, donate into the One-day One-baht fund, or help others in the community, I feel very happy that I have the opportunity to contribute to others and my community. I don't need any rewards; I just want to do good things for my community.

(An elderly member of the Goodness Bank, Interview, September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2015)

#### **4.3.3 Opportunities for connecting the isolated elderly to the rest of the community**

According to the “Tan Tod” activity, the isolated elderly people need to feel connected to the community. Home visits by core community leaders provide not only social support but also spiritual support. These visits produce meaningful interaction between the community and the otherwise isolated elderly. Buddhist monks act as important spiritual leaders, community leaders are representatives of the community, and schoolteachers represent people of high social status in the community. Therefore, home visits by those people demonstrate caring for the isolated elderly. Moreover, it emphasizes the community's recognition of the elderly as valued community members. The ties of social connectedness between the community and the isolated elderly are further developed and woven.

I don't have relatives here (in the sub-district). In fact, I have a brother and sister. Both of them are rich persons while I am very poor, so it is a long time that we never contact each other. They don't think I am their brother. We (interviewee and his wife) live in Hua-Ngum more than ten years without the relatives who have the same blood relationship. One day I received the assistance in TanTod activity. That day many people, such as monks, administrators of SAO, schoolteachers, community leaders, Director of THPH, neighbors, visited my house. It was the first time that many people came to my very old house. I was very delighted. I could not say anything. Tears were in my eyes. Only words “thank you so much” that I could say. They are not my blood relatives, but they express their kindness to my family. I really appreciate. I am happy to be Hua-Ngum people and live here. And every month I donate money into One-day One-baht Fund. I want to help others because I can receive from them, so I want to return.

(An elderly resident who receives assistance from TanTod, Interview, October, 10<sup>th</sup>, 2015)

#### 4.3.4 Opportunities for integrating the younger generations

For example, the “Little Doctors” activity illustrates the social connectedness between the isolated elderly and the youth. “Little Doctors” are not only acting as representatives of the community at present but will be growing into quite such significant roles as they become adults of working age who have the power to determine and influence the ways in which the community develops in the future. When positive attitudes towards the elderly are learned and constructed through the “Little Doctors” activity, those health care workers will grow with warm feelings towards the elderly. In other words, the “Little Doctors” activity is a socialization process of elderly care and respect for younger generations that will lead to elder-friendliness preparation for the future.

In the past, I don't like my grandma because she was grumbling. So I wanted to stay far away from her. However, when I have participated in Little Doctors activity and experienced as Little Doctor, my mind has already changed. When I did a home visit and took after the target elderly, it seems to be a good lesson to learn and understand the elderly. Some of them were living alone; some were being with illness. I really sympathized and understood their feeling. They need love and caring. So when I went back to my house, I provided Thai massage to my grandma. Firstly, she was surprised but finally we love to spend time together. And now I love my grandmom so much.

(Junior high school student “Little Doctor”, Interview, September 20th, 2015)

#### 4.3.5 Opportunity for contribution

The opportunity to contribute to the community and society is vital for the dignity of the elderly because it empowers the elderly to be “givers” and not only “receivers.” For example, one of the elderly ladies in the community is very poor. However, she is actively involved in contributing to the “One day, One-baht” community welfare fund, which has important aims of helping disadvantaged people and supporting scholarships for children in Hua-Ngum sub-district (donation to the fund is one of the social activities under the Goodness Bank umbrella. When people donate 5 baht, they receive 1 “goodness point”). Moreover, elderly people have opportunities to contribute to the community as cultural experts and volunteers in community affairs, e.g. teaching students about traditional arts and crafts, folk songs and music, and other local wisdom. Furthermore, it is the elderly students who participate and drive the School for the Elderly. Their participation and cooperation are necessary for the achievements of the School. At the beginning of 2015, the school was rewarded for the excellence of the project on the development of quality of life for older people. Consequently, the SAO received a four million baht award (approximately 18% of the yearly budget the SAO received from the government). Not surprisingly, the elderly students were extremely proud of their participation.

I'm very glad that our School won the prize and got 4 million baht. This shows obviously the importance of the elderly's role in the community. I'm so happy to be part of the School.

(An elderly student, interview, October 5<sup>th</sup>, 2015)

I can't move well because I'm elderly and have a problem with my back while my husband is blind. We can't work. Every month we receive the allowance from the government both as the elderly and people with disability so we can survive. However, even though we are very poor, we donate into the One-day One-baht Fund almost every month. Although, just small money donated, but we're happy that can make a good thing for others. It is a way for making a merit.

(An elderly resident who receives assistance from TanTod activity, Interview, October 10th, 2015)

#### 4.3.6 Opportunities for being valued and respected

The establishment of opportunities to be valued and respected seems to be the ultimate result of the activities. For example, goodness points recorded in each elderly person's passbook give them a feeling of happiness and pride. The points reflect the worthiness of the older people. Furthermore, in 2015, at the learning center of the School for the Elderly, where several communities and organizations across the nation came to visit and learn, there were 59 groups with 2,734 visitors who visited and learned at the School. Thus, the elderly students are very proud of their school and themselves because they are part of a famously beneficial school for the elderly in Thailand. Their reputation and the acknowledgement of the

school for the elderly in Hua-Ngum sub-district encourages local people to realize the power and value of the elderly as people who can play a significant role in community development.

I really respect the cooperation from the elderly. They actively participate in community affairs. They have an important role to drive our community development. Without their good participation, the sub-district cannot launch the important development activities, like Goodness Bank and School for the Elderly.

(A member of SAO Council, Interview, October 11<sup>th</sup>, 2015)

Look...Look (showing her Goodness Bank passbook). I never withdraw my goodness points because I'm so proud of them. And I want to keep and show them to others, especially my children and grandchild. They are also proud of me.

(A Goodness Bank member, Interview, September 20<sup>th</sup>, 2015)

I had never enrolled in the school. The first time I sang the national song at the School (for the Elderly), I felt very delighted. It was the first time in my life. I never thought that I would have the opportunity to do that before. Moreover, when I graduated from the School (3 years participated as an elderly student) and got the certificate from the SAO, I was very happy. My children show my certificate and pictures from the graduation ceremony day on the wall in our house.

(An elderly student, Interview, September 20<sup>th</sup>, 2015)

Those social opportunities reveal positive outlooks toward the older people. Such opportunities, moreover, indicate the power of the elderly as one key stakeholder who drives the community development process and demonstrates the achievement of meaning in the later life of the Hua-Ngum elderly. Furthermore, these findings lead the researcher to establish the definition of an age-friendly community in the rural northern Thailand context, as follows:

An age-friendly community means the community which establishes opportunities for social participation of the elderly, e.g. opportunities for lifelong learning, participating, contributing. These opportunities are based on participation of local people and regarded as the community's social capital. Such opportunities foster social connectivity both among active and isolated older people. Opportunities for social participation encourage older people to achieve a higher quality of life.

#### **4.4 The Process to Create an Age-Friendly Community in Hua-Ngum Sub-District**

Hua-Ngum's experience, moreover, reveals key four steps to developing age-friendliness within communities. Those community steps are not linear steps; in contrast, they are dynamic processes that need to be steadily developed.

##### **4.4.1 The 1<sup>st</sup> step: raising awareness to build consensus**

This step is considered to be the 'starting point' of the whole process. The step for raising awareness to build consensus is mainly aimed at raising awareness among villagers to comprehend the elderly's issues. This is the central element for building a sense of belonging and commitment to deal with problems. In this regard, the Hua-Ngum SAO and its partner have implemented the following important activities:

a) To conduct the learning process by sharing relevant data, such as that which the SAO presents on the aging society, (e.g. the percentage of the elderly in the population, services for the elderly, problems and needs of the elderly, etc.). The Tambon Health Promoting Hospital (THPH) mainly exchanges the data related to the health status of the elderly.

b) To set up a platform where the core community leaders from related units can gather and exchange information among themselves. Such core leaders, namely "the first-row community leaders," include Buddhist monks, the administrator of the SAO, schoolteachers, and the Director of the THPH.

c) To extend and relay the ideas and results of the meeting to "the second-row community leaders," such as the village leaders, the members of the SAO council, community health volunteers, and

etc. In the sub-district, the monthly meetings at the sub-district level are conducted on the 7<sup>th</sup> of every month, with approximately 70-90 members attending. The SAO acts as the meeting moderator and chair. Such meetings benefit the local community as a public forum in order to promote the learning process and exchange relevant information.

#### **4.4.2 The 2<sup>nd</sup> step: strengthening partnerships and networks**

This step emphasizes the significance of “partnership” to develop an age-friendly community. The Hua-Ngum SAO, as a facilitator, realizes that an age-friendly community cannot be developed and maintained by a single actor. According to this strategy, several activities are conducted, as follows:

a) To establish a “Sub-district Board Committee” as the main instrument to drive the process of an age-friendly community. The committee is composed of Phrakhru Sujina Kunlayanadham (a Buddhist monk and spiritual leader), the Chief Executive of the SAO and two Deputies, three SAO consultants, three School headmasters, a schoolteacher from Padaeng Wittaya School, village headmen and two assistants in every village, members of the SAO Council, and the THPH director.

b) To extend the ideas and communicate with villagers through each community meeting of the 13 villages.

c) To utilize the monthly meeting at the sub-district level as a platform to listen to local resident’s voices, discuss the working process and any problems, and give feedback to them.

#### **4.4.3 The 3<sup>rd</sup> step: implementation**

As the implementation step, it is the process that turns strategies and plans into actions through activities and projects.

a) To plan and launch activities by developing “social innovations<sup>4</sup>,” or initiatives to meet the needs of the elderly. The innovation must be compatible with existing social capital. In this regard, Hua-Ngum sub-district has created social innovations for the aged, as follows: the “TanTod” activity, the One-day One-baht community welfare fund, the “Little Doctors” program, and the School for the Elderly.

b) To integrate those age-related activities (social innovations) with the Goodness Bank. In the sub-district, the Goodness Bank is established as a key community development mechanism, which is carried out under the merit system, according to Buddhist ideology. In other words, each activity conducted can gain points for the participant from the Goodness Bank system. For instance, 15 points are granted when an elderly person participates in activities for the School for the Elderly, 1 point is granted when 5 THB is donated to the community welfare fund, and 15 points are granted when the “Little Doctors” take care of elderly, bed-ridden patients.

#### **4.4.4 The 4<sup>th</sup> step: creating social space and public acceptance**

This step is focusing on extending the age-related activities and experiences toward the society. Strategies for creating social space and public acceptance include showcasing lessons learned and sharing experiences with others from the community level to the national level. This process is significant in a way that it empowers the elderly with pride and dignity from their efforts and commitment, which renders the process sustainable and self-maintaining.

a) To build good relationships with the media by providing the utmost assistance to the media. The media publicizes the work of Hua-Ngum – the Goodness Bank, the School for the Elderly, and the Little Doctors activity, via their outlets, (e.g. TV channels, printed-version newspapers, online newspapers, YouTube channels, and radio stations).

b) To provide study visits for other organizations across the country. For instance, in 2015, there were 59 groups (2,734 visitors) that made study visits to the School for the Elderly.

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<sup>4</sup> This refers to new ideas on dealing with an aging society in each area, and not relying on a government policy that is based on the idea of “one size fits all.”

c) To support other communities, Hua-Ngum sub-district has provided assistance and suggestions to those interested in applying the concepts to their communities, such as being a monitor for establishing a School for the Elderly in Weang sub-district, Phang district, Chiang Mai province, and in Chiang Khong, Chiang Rai province.

d) To attend national contests to officially attain recognition from other organizations. In 2009, for example, the Hua-Ngum SAO won a two million THB award for the “Local Government with Good Governance Prize,” distributed by the Office of Decentralization to the Local Government Organization Committee. In receiving such a prize, the Goodness Bank is presented to the Committee as a way to encourage and achieve participation by the local residents. In 2015, the School for the Elderly won a four million THB award for the same prize, this time focusing on “the development of quality of life of older people.” Winning the prize not only contributes additional money for community development but also leads to greater acceptance from the local residents in particular and society in general. Prizes won from legitimate organizations are significant social symbols that lead to other needed resources, such as budgets, cooperation, and participation.

## 5. Discussion

### 5.1 Key Factors Contributing to Success in Creating an Age-Friendly Community in Hua-Ngum

The age-friendly community established in Hua-Ngum is a process, not a project. The word “process” implies dynamism, participation, learning, and sustainability. These three key factors deemed to be crucial in establishing age-friendliness within Hua-Ngum. Firstly, leadership is one important element contributing to the success in building an age-friendly community in the sub-district. Phrakhru Sujina Kunlayanadham and the Chief Executive of the Hua-Ngum SAO are key leaders who drive all processes in Hua-Ngum sub-district.

Phrakhru Sujina Kunlayanadham is a Buddhist monk who is a significant spiritual leader and has community development in mind. He does not only play an important role in teaching Buddhism, which is his core duty but also leads development in the sub-district. At present, he is studying in a doctoral program in social development to obtain further academic knowledge, which will in turn benefit community development in Hua-Ngum. By being in an important position among local people, he can reach to the faith and trust of the local residents. Therefore, when he introduces new ideas, the local residents, particularly the elderly, are likely to cooperate.

The Chief Executive of the SAO is a significant policymaker in Hua-Ngum sub-district. He was born in Hua-Ngum and has spent his life in the sub-district. He won elected office and had worked as the Chief Executive of the SAO since 1996. Thus he has opportunities to continue his community development policy and processes. He graduated with a Master’s degree in social development, so he is considered by the local residents as someone of the younger generation with high education within the rural context. Combining the good relationship between the two key leaders, which refers to the Buddhist monk and the Chief Executive of the SAO, such new ideas related to age-friendly community development (and other aspects of community development affairs) are usually accepted more easily by the local people. The monk is often the first person to introduce new ideas, followed and supported by the Chief Executive of the SAO. With a good vision on age-friendly community development by the Chief Executive, consequently, there is a strong support from the Hua-Ngum SAO. The SAO is the core organization to drive the age-related activities at the sub-district level and plays an active role in the whole process. It supports both policy and practical application, such as place, budgets, staff, supplies, and transportation.

Secondly, there are strong local partnerships within the sub-district. The Hua-Ngum SAO is an important local organization that contributes to elder-friendliness in the sub-district. However, the SAO cannot run the activities without help. Support and cooperation from the other organizations, designated as partnerships, is necessary. In Hua-Ngum, good relationships and great cooperation among the SAO, Buddhist monks, the staff of the THPH, school teachers, community leaders, elderly people, and their organizations, and other related stakeholders (e.g. village health volunteers) are developed and maintained. One strategy for the maintenance of this healthy relationship is the establishment and conducting of

monthly meetings. Such meetings are conducted on the 7<sup>th</sup> of every month, with approximately 70-90 members attending, (e.g. community leaders, elderly people, women's groups, and representatives of external organizations) with the SAO acting as the meeting moderator and chairperson. These meetings benefit the local community as a public forum to exchange information, acknowledge the progress of activities, discuss problems that have occurred and suggest how to overcome any problems or limitations.

Thirdly, the sub-district utilizes the local mechanisms and channels to achieve civil participation. Community leaders at the village level are a significant mechanism that encourages participation among residents. In Hua-Ngum, there are at least 65 formal community leaders (which include the village headman and two of his or her assistants and two members of the SAO Council, or five formal community leaders in each village). The monthly meeting at the sub-district level (on the 7<sup>th</sup> of each month) is a strategy to enhance the mechanism of community leaders. Community leaders play important roles in promoting and encouraging residents to become involved and participate in the age-related activities by using the monthly meetings at the village level to inform the residents of relevant information, as well as listening to residents' voices and receiving feedback from the residents to the SAO and other organizations. Also, community radio stations are additional channels by which to inform community members about age-related activities for residents.

## **5.2 The Difference between Age-Friendliness in Urban and Rural Areas**

When considering the difference between urban and rural communities, the study reveals the features of the age-friendly rural community, which differs from the age-friendly community in an urban area. According to the WHO's age-friendly city concept (WHO, 2007), eight domains constitute the features of such a city, especially the physical aspects, such as outdoor space, transportation, and buildings indicated by the urban context. In a rural context, the age-friendly community focuses on an "age-friendly social environment" due to limitations of the budget. However, the social environment seems to be the key fundamental feature of age-friendly communities, both in rural and urban areas. Without a friendly social environment, meaning a lack of respect towards the elderly or few opportunities for social participation among older people, suitable buildings have little value towards the human dignity of elderly people.

## **5.3 Age-Friendly Communities and the Shift of Paradigm**

The results of the study reveal that the development of an age-friendly community leads us to shift the paradigm view towards the elderly. Such a concept views the elderly as significant contributors, rather than as passive, dependent recipients of benefits and services (Austin et al., 2009), believes they can flourish (Eales et al., 2008), and sees them as productive and contributing members of society, as opposed to the negative perspective, which views elders as passive and powerless older people (Alley et al., 2007; Lui et al., 2009). The case of the elderly who are members of the Goodness Bank and who donate into the One-day One-baht Community Welfare Fund, demonstrates their action as contributors or givers who are not passive, even though they are elderly and faced with certain difficulties, such as poverty. Meanwhile, for the case of the elderly student at the School for the Elderly who learned to write her name first time later in her life shows the flourishing of the elderly.

## **5.4 Establishing Age-Friendly Communities and Community Development**

The development of the age-friendly community is one model of the community development process, especially in rural areas, because the process is based on the social capital of the local community and on the social participation of the local residents who endeavor to achieve a sense of belonging among all members of the community. The result of the features of age-friendliness, based on Hua-Ngum's experience, reveals that not only do the elderly benefit from the process to establish an age-friendly community in the sub-district but that other ages also benefit from such a process. For instance, the elderly can assist the community in receiving additional funding for community development projects, encourage younger residents to participate in community affairs, and establish the spirit to be a volunteer among residents. Building a good relationship between the younger generation and the elderly is important in

establishing a friendly community for both; they can learn from each other. Therefore, the friendly community is a good place for all, not only the elderly.

Lessons learned based on the Hua-Ngum age-friendly community can benefit other communities becoming aging and aged societies. However, there might be certain conditions that need to be considered, as follows.

a) It is necessary first to analyze and evaluate what causes problems within the community and then consider the existing social capital to find proper resolutions that meet the needs of the people. To illustrate, as a Buddhist community, activities conducted in Hua-Ngum are based on Buddhist principles, such as the Goodness Bank. TanTod is also a case in point that traditional practices can be revived to solve problems. Moreover, the School for the Elderly in the village takes advantage of existing elder routines and activities.

b) Leaders with social welfare and community development mentalities are critical for establishing age-friendly communities. The lessons learned from Hua-Ngum indicate that the significance of both formal and informal leaders is the key to driving the process. Therefore, good cooperation between two types of community leaders should be created in other sub-districts where they would like to implement such processes.

c) The partnership is important. Strong partnerships among Buddhist monks, the SAO, the THPH, schools, the elderly, the group of village health volunteers, and other community organizations is vital to drive the process to create age-friendliness within the community. Therefore, strategies to establish and maintain such relationships should be heavily supported. In the case of Hua-Ngum, monthly sub-district meetings is an effective strategy and mechanism to develop and maintain partnerships.

## 6. Conclusion

Building an age-friendly community based on Hua-Ngum's experience reveals the power of the local community in dealing with an aged or aging society in its own community. Over the past decade, the SAO and its partner have established significant age-related activities, for tackling their aged society and developing the community as a whole. Six keys opportunities, which indicate features of age-friendliness in the sub-district, contribute to those significant age-related activities. Such key opportunities express positive views toward the elderly, e.g. as contributors or givers and valued and respected persons. Furthermore, there are four steps to creating the age-friendly community in Hua-Ngum sub-district, including steps for raising awareness to build consensus; strengthening partnerships and networks; implementation; and creating social space and public acceptance. These community steps are not just a linear steps; in contrast, they are dynamic processes that need to be continuously developed.

## 7. Acknowledgements

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## Investigating the Contributions of Thailand's Defence Diplomacy for ASEAN Community Integration

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### Abstract

Defence diplomacy is receiving greater public attention as observers want to ensure that the defence sector is performing responsively in the changing world. ASEAN's defence diplomacy is largely carried out under the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) framework, which is one of the three main ASEAN Community pillars. This study aims to investigate the contributions made by Thailand's defence diplomacy toward the integration efforts of the ASEAN Community, in increasing the understanding of the role played by defence diplomacy and see how such a role can be further enhanced. More importantly, this study also aims to propose policy recommendations on how Thailand's defence diplomacy can be made more effective, with greater impact on the overall efforts toward ASEAN integration. For the purpose of this study, primary and secondary data have been collected, examined and analysed, using the documentary research technique, together with interviews of key personnel at both operational and policy levels. This study finds that, as an instrument of foreign diplomacy, Thailand's defence diplomacy and its activities have significantly facilitated the process of ASEAN Community integration, but there remains much room for further improvement to optimize its usage. Despite the national consensus on its usefulness, Thailand's defence diplomacy still face challenges such as the lack of national integrated policy and guidelines, knowledge and competency of the personnel involved, and an adequate budget to support continuous defence diplomacy initiatives. Due to the above, recommendations have been made by this study on how such shortcomings and others can be overcome.

**Keywords:** *Defence diplomacy, political relations, security community, regional integration, Thailand, ASEAN*

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### 1. Introduction

Defence Diplomacy (DD) has become an important instrument for maintaining international security. In the environment of contemporary security, the defence diplomacy's role is to manage states' military forces, which could be induced in diplomatic negotiations in order to achieve the state's national interest or strategic objective. According to Fetic (2014), international actors must be stimulated to communicate and negotiate instead of initiating violent acts. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has largely relied on international diplomacy (Chow and Tan, 2013). Political relations have been managed by consultation, consensus, and declarations. In 1997, ASEAN member states proclaimed their vision for closer regional integration by 2020, aiming to become a community which would peacefully resolve disputes, forge closer economic integration, and be bound by a common identity. This initiative eventually led to the establishment of the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC).

In the APSC sphere, the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) was created in 2006 and it is the only regional defence body established currently. The meeting serves as a forum to build confidence and enhance transparency. The measures envisioned for future co-operation activities are formulated to strengthen regional defence and security cooperation, to enhance existing practical cooperation and develop possible cooperation in defence and security. It is also designed to promote enhanced ties with Dialogue Partners and to shape and share the norms (ASEAN Charter, 2007). The key role of external powers in the security of the region is recognized so that an ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) is organized, aiming to engage ASEAN Dialogue Partners for the matters of defence and security cooperation.

The ADMM and ADMM-Plus forums are the stages where defence diplomacy accumulates its importance in the engagement of the regional political and security cooperation.

## **2. Objective**

There is great attention from the public as to whether the defence sector is performing responsively in the changing world. For Thailand, the role of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) on the realisation of an ASEAN Community has been evolving. However, on many occasions, some parts of the Thai public seem to be skeptical of the roles and duties of the defence, or military sector in the new era of globalisation and regional integration. There are criticisms concerning involvement of the defence sector at both the national and international political levels. This study intends to both encapsulate practices of Thailand's defence diplomacy in the recent decade and illustrate the underlying mechanism that makes defence diplomacy an effective geopolitical tool for ASEAN community integration. It was largely carried out via the documentary research technique for qualitative analysis. Together with documentary research, interviews with key persons involved were also conducted in order to attain greater insights into research data and analysis. Reference has been made to theoretical aspects of defence diplomacy and other theorem of international relations. Actual practices of the defence diplomacy employed by Thailand have also been analysed. The perceived benefit of this research is the ability to establish policy recommendations for the enhancement of Thailand's role and contributions in regional defence diplomacy.

## **3. Materials and Methods**

This study attempted to explore and examine relevant factors that are key drivers to achieve the APSC's goal, leading to several important questions. This research, therefore, aims to answer these research questions which bring along the intention and the general objectives into a comprehensive exploration of the specified aspects of the defence diplomacy role to support ASEAN integration. The scope of this research covered only recent and current practices of Thailand's defence diplomacy aimed to support the process of ASEAN Community integration; particularly those activities under the ADMM and ADMM-Plus framework during 2006 – 2016, i.e. since the ADMM establishment and inaugural meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 9 May 2006. Findings on challenges in ASEAN community integration are also expected. It is perceived that these research findings would contribute to the specific knowledge of purposes and contributions of defence diplomacy in relation with ASEAN community integration. Based upon research findings, the expected utilisation of this research includes the development of policy recommendations for improving the performance of Thailand's defence diplomacy practices, which can be used for the enhancement of Thailand's role in regional defence diplomacy. The research framework has been developed as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1 Research Framework

### 3.1 Diplomacy in Perspectives

Diplomacy has existed since the beginning of human evolution so that the act of conducting negotiations between two persons, or two nations at a large scope is essential to the upkeep of international affairs. Functions of diplomacy include preventing war and violence and fortifying relations between two nations. Diplomacy is most importantly used to complete a specific agenda. Without diplomacy, much of the world's affairs could be abolished, international organisations would not exist, and above all the world could be in a constant state of war. It is for diplomacy that certain countries can exist in harmony. According to Amacker (2011), there are four main functions of diplomacy:

- 1) Representing a state's interests and conducting negotiations or discussions designed to identify common interests; as well as areas of disagreement between the parties for the purpose of achieving the state's goals and avoiding conflict,
- 2) Gathering of information and subsequent identification and evaluation of the receiving state's foreign policy goals,
- 3) Expanding political, economic, and cultural ties between two countries, and
- 4) Facilitating or an enforcing vehicle for the observation of international law.

By looking at the various forms of diplomacy, it is possible to distinguish the differences between defence diplomacy and other types of diplomacy, which include:

a) **Traditional Diplomacy** is the form of diplomacy that comes to mind by the average person and is an attempt by an international actor to influence the international environment through engagement with other international actors (Cull, 2009).

b) **Public Diplomacy** is similar to traditional diplomacy except seeking to influence another international actor's population through informational and cultural programs (Swistek, 2012).

c) **Defence Diplomacy** is a nonviolent use of military forces through activities to further a country’s international agenda. Defence diplomacy uses a state’s defence apparatus to advance the strategic aims of a government through cooperation with other countries (Winger, 2014).

d) **Security Diplomacy** is comprised of defence, rule-of-law, human rights, and humanitarian crisis response initiatives that are packaged to meet the specific needs of its partners. Security diplomacy goes beyond defence diplomacy and harnesses a country’s security institutions into one combined effort in support of their diplomatic enterprises. This is not meant to replace defence diplomacy, but to be an option for policymakers (Kron, 2015).

e) **Preventive Diplomacy** refers to diplomatic action taken to prevent disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of conflicts when they occur (United Nations, 2014), which can be carried out through peaceful non-military methods such as negotiations, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement of disputes and other non-coercive methods of resolution.

f) **Economic Diplomacy** is harnessing the international environment to advance an international actors’ foreign policy, and employing economic tools such as trade agreements and fiscal agreements to secure its economic strength (U.S. Department of State (USDS), 2016).

These various forms of diplomacy work best when used in combination with one another. However, if properly tailored to fulfill the needs of a partner nation, then they can effectively achieve a government’s end-state alone (Kron, 2015). From the paragraphs explained above, this study suggests that applications of diplomacy in various types can be summarised and illustrated as shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2 Applications of Diplomacy

Nye (1990) has earlier developed a concept of power and identified both its different variants and the modes in which they are applied. The three specific varieties of power identified are hard power, economic power, and soft power. Hard power is the use of pressure to force a government into surrendering the will of another country. Economic power is the capability to offer some form of incentives or rewards to a country for its support, and soft power is the ability to simply convince a country and its leaders to do what another country wants.

While the connection between hard power and the armed forces is well established, the use of a country’s defence resource as a source of soft or economic power is still mostly unexamined. In terms of economic power, it is easy to foresee how the offered arms transfers or security guarantees could be used to incentivise another country into a preferred course of action. The question of using the military as a tool of soft power is difficult and needs to examine the process through which soft power is actually utilised (Winger, 2014).

Concerning the military as a source of soft power, it can be observed how the military has implemented an indirect approach with military-public diplomacy, where public relations missions emerged as important operational components. Missions like development assistance, disaster relief, and humanitarian aid are not only acts of charity, but a way of developing valuable relations between the military and a foreign country. The efforts which use military forces and development projects to win popular support have been particularly noticeable and regarded as the universal efforts to win “hearts and minds.”

Regarding the application of soft power, the issues of defence diplomacy such as using military-to-military activities may result in defence institutions influencing foreign government institutions. Military diplomat posting, officer exchanges, joint exercises, training programs, and ship visits are not just peaceful means of using military force, but they are efforts to directly communicate the ideas and policy preferences of one country to another. The ultimate objective of such attempts is not just to foster cooperation as a universal good, but to build partnerships that are beneficial to the practitioners’ interests.

### **3.2 Defence Diplomacy**

In agreement with definitions by Winger (2014), which indicate that defence diplomacy is a nonviolent use of military forces through cooperation activities with other countries, Kron (2015) points out that defence diplomacy seeks to build partnerships through the use of defence related programs, and does not seek to intimidate its partners into cooperation. Muthanna (2011) also envisages defence diplomacy as constructing sustainable cooperative relationships to build trust, facilitate conflict prevention, introduce transparency to defence relations, build and reinforce perceptions of common interests, change the mindset of collaborators and introduce cooperation in other areas. Similarly, Tan and Singh (2012) describe defence diplomacy as the collective application of peaceful and cooperative initiatives by national defence establishments and military practitioners to build confidence, create trust, prevent conflict, and resolve the conflict.

The increasing emergence of new non-state actors and new global powers; as well as the growing complexity of world politics have influenced over renewed relationships between the armed forces and the diplomatic sector (Cruden, 2011). The focus of defence diplomacy, sometimes known as military diplomacy, is on giving support to create a stable, secure and flourishing international environment by creating and preserving trust between friendly armed forces and countries. Defence diplomacy is therefore positioned at the junction between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence.

Cooperation amongst states is understood as a social process that can have a positive and transforming effect on their relations through internalizing regulatory norms. According to Acharya (2001), attempting to address the security community construction, and affecting the conditions under which states establish a durable peace, and avoid the recurrence of war is one of the most difficult challenges for international relations theorists and practitioners. It was explained that the concept of a security community describes groups of states which prefer a long-term and peaceful interaction while ruling out the use of force in resolving disputes with other members of the group. The idea of a security community was kept alive in the work of regional security organisations such as ASEAN. In this research, the defence diplomacy was examined as to how it can facilitate ASEAN’s integration, especially in the shaping of norms and attitudes, and development of common understandings, expectations, and practices about peaceful conduct.

The APSC pillar of ASEAN recognizes the principle of comprehensive security and commits to address the broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects of ASEAN Community building. The APSC recognizes strong interconnections among political, economic and social realities such that sustainable economic development requires a secure political environment based on a strong foundation of mutual interests, generated by economic cooperation and political solidarity (ASEAN, 2012). APSC also promotes an ASEAN-wide political and security cooperation in conjunction with the ASEAN Vision 2020, rather than a joint foreign policy, military alliance, or defence pact. Its plan of action is mutually-reinforced with bilateral cooperation between ASEAN countries while recognizing their sovereign rights to pursue individual foreign policies and their defence arrangements.

#### 4. Results and Analysis

Results of the investigation and examination on Thailand's Defence Diplomacy contribution during the process of ASEAN Community Integration, through archival records and interviews, are presented in accordance with the research objectives as follows.

##### 4.1 Evolution of Defence Diplomacy in ASEAN: From Bilateralism to Multilateralism

Since its establishment, bilateralism has been the fundamental choice of ASEAN states regarding defence cooperation, despite enduring debates over the role and value of multilateralism (Tao, 2015). While rejecting the necessity for a military alliance, ASEAN member countries were forging bilateral relationships to cope with various threats, which appeared to result in an informal bilateral defence network, the so-called 'ASEAN defence spider web,' being developed. ASEAN leaders believed that bilateral cooperation was more beneficial than other forms of multilateral military cooperation (Irvine, 1982). However, following the end of the Cold War, defence relations within ASEAN noticeably undertook adjustments. ASEAN leaders began to think about a multilateral security framework for ASEAN but still opposed to a military pact (Acharya, 1990). The Malaysian foreign minister suggested an ASEAN defense community while their Indonesian counterpart similarly called for an ASEAN military arrangement.

In light of the aforementioned changing security context, ASEAN has therefore promoted a multilateral defence cooperation through gradual and institutionalised approaches such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM), in which Thailand has also been a key actor of the cooperation. Similarly, defence cooperation between ASEAN and major regional powers was further expanded.

The ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) is an annual meeting established in 2006, a result of the APSC Plan of Action, stipulating that ASEAN shall work towards the convening of an annual ADMM. The ADMM is the highest defence consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN, aiming to promote mutual trust and confidence through greater understanding of defence/security challenges, as well as enhancement of transparency and openness (ASEAN, 2014). In order to guide the ADMM cooperation process, the 3-Year ADMM Work Programs have been consistently adopted since 2008, incorporating four areas: strengthening regional defense and security cooperation; enhancing and developing existing practical cooperation; promoting enhanced ties with Dialogue Partners; and shaping and sharing of norms. Concept papers, concentrating on the issues of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief have been progressing significantly in the ADMM while exercises on HADR have also been conducted (Tao, 2015).

Cooperation in the area of peacekeeping operations and defence industry has also moved apace with the adoption of the Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers Network, and on ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration in 2011 (ADMM, 2011). Initiatives on establishing the ASEAN Defence Interaction Program and an ADMM Logistics Support Framework were adopted in 2013. Implementation of these initiatives is currently underway. Another important ADMM initiative is Direct Communications Link, established in 2014, which is a practical confidence and security-building measure aiming to promote quick response cooperation in an emergency situation related to maritime security.

The ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM), established in 2003, acts as an annual mechanism for implementing decisions made by the ADMM. As a high-level military meeting, the ACDFIM is tasked with the role of serving as 'the center of linkage and coordination of military cooperative activities' in the region (ACDFIM, 2011). Furthermore, there are also the ASEAN Military Intelligence Informal Meeting (AMIIM) and the ASEAN Military Operations Information Meeting (AMOIM). The two meetings are also held annually and are accountable to the ACDFIM. It was pointed out that ASEAN military intelligence cooperation should be prioritized in order to help enhance and build the regional community (AMIIM, 2012).

Along with ADMM, the ADMM-Plus established in 2010 is a biennial meeting acting as a platform for ASEAN and its eight Dialogue Partners (i.e. Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Russia, and the USA) to strengthen security and defence cooperation for peace, stability, and development in the region. The ADMM-Plus' main work is undertaken by expert working groups (EWG) (ADMM, 2010), which currently cover six priority areas including Maritime Security (MS), Military Medicine (MM), Counter Terrorism (CT), Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), peacekeeping operations (PKO), and Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA). Each area is co-chaired by an

ASEAN Member Country and a Dialogue Partner. Meetings and exercises are organized accordingly by co-chairs during the chairmanship period. In May 2016, the ADMM-Plus meeting agreed to include a new EWG on Cyber Security (CS) in the next round of cooperation with the Philippines and New Zealand as co-chairs.

Another ASEAN-centered platform, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), has also made concrete achievements, increasing transparency promoted through the exchange of defence information and the publication of defence white papers; and networking between defence and military officials of ARF participants (ARF, 2011). ASEAN conducts regular negotiations with other ARF members under the framework of the "ARF Security Policy Conference," an annual vice defence minister-level meeting initiated by China in 2004. According to the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) shall remain the primary forum in enhancing political and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the pivot in building peace and stability in the region. ASEAN shall enhance its role in further advancing the stages of cooperation within the ARF to ensure the security of the Asia-Pacific region (Doung Chanto, 2003). The Bali Concord II also states that an ASEAN Community's three pillars shall be closely intertwined and mutually reinforce for ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region.

#### **4.2 Thailand's Defence Diplomacy for ASEAN Community Integration**

Thailand's Ministry of Defence has an important role in the realisation of the oncoming ASEAN Community. In the advancement of Thailand towards the realisation of an ASEAN Community in 2015, the Ministry of Defence has been a primary organisation in the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) in two distinctive dimensions: 1) Serving as a domestic cooperative organisation in carrying out government policies to prepare Thailand for the realisation of an ASEAN Community, and 2) Serving as an organisation to cooperate with international agencies to integrate Thailand and other ASEAN Member States into the ASEAN Community.

From a domestic standpoint, the Ministry of Defence has been operating under the mechanism of "The Supervising Committee of the Centre for the Readiness of Thailand towards ASEAN Community" which was established by the Prime Minister in November 2014. Subsequently, the Chairman of the Supervising Committee (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs) also established an "Ad hoc Committee Centre for Readiness of Thailand towards the ASEAN Political-Security Community" in February 2015. This Ad hoc Committee is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister for Security Affairs with high-level officers of the Ministry of Defence as members of the Ad hoc Committee, while the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serve as joint secretariats for the Ad hoc Committee.

From an international view, an important element is the cooperation with international organisations. Thus far, the Ministry of Defence has continuously participated with the Ministry of Defence of other nations in preparing towards an ASEAN Community on every level and in every aspect. Among the 10 Member States of ASEAN, there have been activities in the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) mechanisms. The Ministry of Defence has been involved with activities on every level, whether it is at the Ministerial level, Senior Officials' Meeting (Permanent Secretary or equivalent) or the Working Group level. As for the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters and Armed Services, there is also continuous and extensive participation in activities. For instance, there are ASEAN Chief of Defence Forces Informal Meeting and ASEAN Chief of Services meetings.

In fulfilling the research objective studying and analyzing the actual practices of Thailand's defence diplomacy activities, within the ASEAN's defence cooperation mechanism (presented in Figure 3); It can be seen that defence diplomacy activities solely lie under the framework of the ASEAN Political and Security Community pillar, which is one of three main pillars undertaken to achieve ASEAN Community Integration.

Figure 3 was developed in this study to help readers to visualize better linkages of defence diplomacy activities practiced by Thailand's military sector. The arrows designate the line of communications between relevant agencies. The ASEAN Secretariat communicates ASEAN policy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is the Chairman of the Supervising Committee for the Readiness of Thailand towards ASEAN Community, and also responsible for the formulation of the national foreign

policy. Then, such policy is further conveyed to the Ministry of Defence, which is a member of the Ad hoc Committee for Readiness of Thailand towards the ASEAN Political-Security Community, and shall plan and carry out defence diplomacy activities accordingly.




Figure 3 Defence Diplomacy Activities in ASEAN's Cooperation Mechanisms

### 4.3 Results from Interviews with Key Informants

Interviewees are comprised of nine officers from the Ministry of Defence, the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters, and the Royal Thai Army, with more than ten years experiences in defence diplomacy. Two officers are at the policy level (Generals), four officers are at the high management level (Senior Colonels), and three from Middle management level (Colonels). All interviewees are working in the positions which directly deal with international relations and defence diplomacy in ASEAN contexts. To ensure full participation and open opinion expression, all interviewees are informed that their data and opinions shall be kept confidential. Results are summarised as follows.

#### 4.3.1 Contributions of Thailand's defence diplomacy to ASEAN community integration

The interviewees have similar views on the importance of Thailand's defence diplomacy and its influence on the process of ASEAN Community Integration. For example, the interviewee from policy level explained that:

...Thailand's defence diplomacy activities are very important to the process of ASEAN community integration as it greatly facilitates creating trust between ASEAN countries, strengthening the existing relationships which lead to accelerating implementation of security problem resolution...

...there is a need to carefully analyse strategic impacts of international security problems so that ASEAN countries can work together at a strategic level in order to alleviate and eventually solve such problems for a more secure ASEAN community...

Similarly, interviewees who are from high management level indicated that:

...Thailand's defence diplomacy plays a significant role in exploring new areas of defence cooperation and strengthening the existing cooperation, bilaterally or multilaterally, and also helps to effectively analyse requirements of both sides which help reduce suspiciousness between defence sectors in ASEAN countries...

...Thailand's defence diplomacy activities help strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation among ASEAN states as they provide more channels for cooperation including education and training...

Also, interviewees who are from middle management (operational) level pointed out that:


...Thailand's defence diplomacy is a primary tool for Thai Armed Forces in strengthening security cooperation between ASEAN countries, as it is a coordinating mechanism for establishing cooperative frameworks for operational level...

Responses from questions concerning contributions of Thailand's defence diplomacy to ASEAN community integration can be summarised as follows.

a) Defence diplomacy is a significant tool to coordinate and facilitate ASEAN countries to quickly attain bilateral/multilateral cooperation, based on mutual trust, in several fields with ASEAN countries during the integration process.

b) Defence diplomacy leads to cooperation at a strategic level which can alleviate and could eventually resolve conflicts in the region, so it is essential to explore cooperation opportunities and carefully analyse impacts of such cooperation.

The interviewees were asked to rate the performance of Thailand's defence diplomacy regarding its contribution on ASEAN Community Integration (ACI), by providing their level of agreement to 11 statements, and the results are as shown in Figure 4.



**Figure 4** Rating on Thailand’s Defence Diplomacy Practices (Using five-point Likert’s Scale; 1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly Agree)

From the scoring chart, it shows that all respondents strongly agreed that Thailand’s defence diplomacy practices have helped to create trust among ASEAN countries. Besides, it is considered as a significant factor that facilitates the ASEAN Community Integration process. Also, it was strongly agreed that Thailand’s defence diplomacy has helped a reduction of conflicts among ASEAN countries and also support their potential enhancement. It was also strongly agreed that Thailand’s defence diplomacy practices have complied with the government policy and effectively supported the three pillars of the ASEAN Community, but, however, slightly less agreed that such practices were carried out efficiently. This reflects that the optimal benefits of Thailand’s defence diplomacy practices may not yet be attained. As it is seen in two other factors, the form and types of Thailand’s defence diplomacy have not yet been practiced at its best capacity and appropriate level, which is evidently seen in another factor showing that Thailand’s defence diplomacy has not yet fully participated in the ASEAN Community Integration process.

Another viewpoint on Thailand’s defence diplomacy practices is that the respondents agreed that the defence sector should work in relation to the civilian sector. In fact, the civilian sector such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries are working in a larger scope and scale of cooperation during the ASEAN Community Integration process.

**4.3.2 Obstacles of ASEAN community integration with respect of defence diplomacy**

The interviewees have similar views on the importance of Thailand’s defence diplomacy and its influence on the process of ASEAN Community Integration. For example, the interviewee from policy level explained that:

The interviewees have a broad range of views on obstacles of ASEAN Community Integration. For example, the interviewee from policy level explained that:

...ASEAN community integration still faces major obstacles, which hinder effective implementation of defence diplomacy, such as internal security problems, domestic laws, borderlines, minorities, gaps in people’s income, lacking of trust, overlapping maritime territory, and separatist movements...

Likewise, interviewed officers from high-level management stated that:

...Major obstacles of ASEAN community integration are mainly from cultural differences, economic gaps, and even the ASEAN’s principles of non-interference and consensus which prevent ASEAN to fully unite in solving regional security problems...

...ineffective ASEAN measures of sovereignty non-interference and consensus decision making, lack of unity for solving problems in the South China Sea, skepticisms on each other, historical conflicts, economic imbalance, and unstable politics within a country can significantly hinder the achievement of ASEAN community integration...

Based on the interview results, it indicated that there are obstacles which hinder effective defence diplomacy and ASEAN Community Integration, including: 1) Inadequate trust, 2) Economic gaps, 3) Overlapping maritime boundaries, 4) Internal security conditions, 5) Incomplete border demarcation, 6) Minority groups conflicts, 7) Separatist movement, 8) Inadequate foreign language skills, 9) Cultural diversities, 10) The principle of non-interference and consensus decision-making, and 11) Lacking unity of ASEAN when an ASEAN nation is in conflict with non-ASEAN nations especially with major powers.

These findings reflect that defence diplomacy practiced by Thailand's and other ASEAN countries, especially those having borders together, where they faced obstacles which significantly hinder the optimized success of ASEAN Community Integration. In particular, complete mutual trust between ASEAN countries is not easy to create because every nation has its own national interest and would not wish to bring any further problems into their country or region. However, as the ASEAN Community is in its early stage, and as defence diplomacy is believed to be an effective means to create trusts among ASEAN nations, there is still a way to go to improve the situation.

#### **4.3.3 Shortcomings of Thailand's defence diplomacy and possible improvement**

There are interview questions designed to investigate weaknesses of Thailand's defence diplomacy practices, particularly for ASEAN Community Integration, and ways to improve them. The findings show that the shortcomings of Thailand's defence diplomacy practices include the following:

a) Lack of integrated strategy for implementation of the existing soft power of defence diplomacy to fully support the government's foreign policy and diplomatic activities. This indication also corresponds to findings in the previous section in which defence diplomacy is not yet optimally utilized at its full capacity. Also, the interviewees informed that, as each of the military services (Ministry of Defence, Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters, Royal Thai Army, Royal Thai Navy, and Royal Thai Air Force) have their own budget allocated from the government; they, therefore, may have their own initiatives based on needs corresponding to their plans and activities. As such, plans and activities of Thailand's defence diplomacy are not yet fully integrated into a holistic strategy.

b) Lack of a plan for the development of personnel to become experts in a specific area or country so that they can continuously work on the matter so that such personnel can be worthy assets to carry out the country's defence diplomacy effectively.

c) Inadequate budget to support integrated defence diplomacy plans and activities. The current activities under the ADMM and ADMM-Plus activities are carried out with some level of confusion. That is, the policy level has better knowledge, but the lack of operating capacity while the operating units have the capacity to carry out the task but they have limited understanding on the issues at hand, particularly at an international level.

d) Language barrier has caused Thai personnel facing difficulty in dealing with English as an international language, used in all cooperation documents, and this somehow affects Thailand's overall capacity to effectively carry out defence diplomacy activities.

In short, when, the obstacles and shortcomings of Thailand's defence diplomacy are mostly related to the existing national policy and structures of the defence sector, which causes unharmonious execution and unclear direction for planning and further development. When it comes to international issues such as ADMM and ADMM-Plus activities, problems such as a limited understanding of the holistic strategy of the country can cause unexpected failure of the defence diplomacy efforts.

## 5. Discussions

One of the aims and purposes of the ASEAN Community is to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries in the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter (Chow and Tan, 2013). Also, ASEAN seeks to maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves (Acharya, 1990 and Gindarsah, 2015). Recognizing the strong interconnections among political, economic and social realities, the APSC acknowledges the principle of comprehensive security and commits to address the broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects of building an ASEAN Community. The idea of regional security can be attained by an established regional community structure as previously explained by Buzan and Waever (2003).

Focusing on ASEAN's idea of Regional Integration, it was found that this approach leads to greater regional security. This is in line with Singaporean research scholars who consider ASEAN, as a regional grouping has been successful in reducing and minimizing regional conflicts particularly inter-state conflicts among its members (SIIA, 2007). The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) provides a venue for multilateral and bilateral dialogue and cooperation including the networking and exchange of information relating to defence policy and publication of defence white papers. Thailand and Malaysia also exhibit strong collaboration, such as military-to-military cooperation in Exchange of Information, Transparency in Defence and Military Affairs, Joint Exercise and Training, Defence Technology, and Defence Industry (Saicheua, 2012). Such collaborations are significant actions within the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC).

The findings in this study show that there is still a lack of trust among ASEAN countries so that multilateral cooperation has not yet been fully achieved. This finding corresponds to the suggestion by Acharya (1990) stating that a lack of mutual trust is an important factor which limited ASEAN defence ties and the level of regional integration, while bilateral cooperation remains preferable among ASEAN states. Achievement of multilateral cooperation, as aimed by ASEAN Community integration plans, can, therefore, be accelerated by several forms of bilateral defence cooperation among ASEAN states (Tao, 2015), including border security arrangements, intelligence sharing, joint military exercise/training, and also defence industry cooperation (Saicheua, 2012). In light of the changing security context, ASEAN has therefore promoted multilateral defence cooperation through gradual, institutionalized approaches, such as the ADMM. Under ADMM, the ACDFIM, AMIIM, and AMOIM meetings are organized to enhance practical cooperation among ASEAN defence forces. Meanwhile, the ADMM-Plus meetings and activities have laid strong foundations for the ADMM to cooperate with Dialogue Partners. Similarly, the countries outside ASEAN also seek regional security via strengthened relationships with ASEAN (Fris, 2013).

Defence diplomacy, regarded as non-violent use of military forces, is generally seen as one of the tools in the conduct of a country's diplomacy and international agenda, including specific national foreign and security policy objectives by managing defence foreign relations and supporting other diplomatic initiatives of the government. It has been observed that Thailand's defence diplomacy has an important role in supporting ASEAN Community integration process. Domestically, the Ministry of Defence actively operates under the mechanism of the Supervising Committee. Internationally, the Ministry of Defence should also lead in carrying out cooperation with international organisations and the Ministry of Defence of other nations, on every level and in every aspect.

Achieving ideal results of defence diplomacy is highly challenging because there are several existing gaps, such as economic and development gaps among ASEAN nations. It is suggested that these significant gaps should be effectively alleviated in order to strengthen confidence-building measures, promote greater transparency and understanding of defence policies and security perceptions, build up the necessary institutional framework, such as Joint Committees and Joint Working Groups to strengthen the cooperative process in support of the APSC. Eliminating the hindering factors would strengthen efforts in maintaining mutual respect and unity of ASEAN Member States, and promote the development of norms that further enhance ASEAN defence and security cooperation, which would eventually make the ASEAN Community completely integrated.

## 6. Conclusion

Thailand's defence diplomacy has noticeably played an active role to support the process of this regional integration. Concerning the constructivism concept, Thailand's defence diplomacy practices have created and strengthened relationships with the defence sector in ASEAN countries through various activities, especially multilateral engagements under the ADMM and ADMM-Plus framework. Recently, Thailand's defence sector had provided humanitarian aid to ASEAN countries when there were natural disasters in Myanmar and the Philippines, assisted Laos PDR in preparing the conduct of joint/combined exercise for the Expert Working Group (EWG) on Military Medicine (MM) and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). Such cooperative engagement and participation have resulted in a positive and transforming effect on relations between Thailand and ASEAN member states.

Such achievement has contributed to attempts to address the construction of a security community which would eventually sustain durable peace and avoid the recurrence of war. This concept, which is compliant with the idea of transactionalism developed by Karl Deutsch, becomes an integral part of the regional integration. So far, Thailand's defence diplomacy has clearly facilitated the process of ASEAN community integration in the sense that it helps to shape of norms and attitudes towards the role of the defence/military sector. Development of common understandings on the significance of defence diplomacy leads to better perceptions and expectations of Thailand's defence diplomacy practices, which have been widely recognized not only in Thailand but also in other countries through peaceful conduct and exploitation of military assets and deployment personnel in several humanitarian assistance missions.

This research found that cooperation amongst defence sectors in ASEAN countries has been increased, particularly after the establishment of the ADMM framework. With this framework, defence diplomacy activities in ASEAN have been expanded to support other areas of cooperation especially those involved with civic assistance as well as social and economic development. Moving towards ASEAN community integration, Thailand's defence diplomacy practices have been involved with a number of activities under the umbrella of ASEAN cooperation. Major Forums for defence diplomacy interactions include the ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM), the ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting (ACAMM), the ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference (AACC), the ASEAN Military Intelligence Informal Meeting (AMIIM), the ASEAN Military Operations Informal Meeting (AMOIM), and the ASEAN Armies Rifle Meeting. Other forums of defence cooperation such as the Navy-to-Navy Talk (NTNT), the Intelligence Exchange Conference, and the exchanges of visits among ASEAN defence sectors are also found supportive for creating trust and confidence building as aimed by the ASEAN Community Integration roadmap.

It was found in this research that there is a wide range of defence and security cooperation forums under the larger framework of ASEAN and also beyond ASEAN. Thailand's Ministry of Defence and other defence sectors have exerted their efforts and available resources to carry out their defence diplomacy activities to support the ASEAN Community Integration. However, as found in this research's studies on primary and secondary data as well as interviews with key informants at the policy level, there are still shortcomings and gaps for improvement of Thailand's diplomacy practices in order to strengthen relationships among ASEAN countries, particularly the defence sector, which would be supportive for better and sustainable ASEAN Community Integration.

When considering the induced research questions and research objectives, it can be seen that this study has found answers correspondingly. That is, the defence diplomacy in ASEAN has significantly influenced both domestic and international sectors, and all activities are in a peaceful manner which brings a positive contribution to the ASEAN community integration process. Concerning the challenges and gaps in defence diplomacy practices between Thailand and other ASEAN states, some challenges such as low mutual trust and inadequate support to perform defence diplomacy activities have been identified and remain challenging for ASEAN community to solve. Utilization of Thailand's soft power through defence diplomacy practices have noticeably reduced the previous gaps with some ASEAN countries via assistance programs, while exchange visits have strengthened bilateral and multilateral relations, and these strengthened relationships significantly facilitated the process of ASEAN community integration. Therefore, findings in this research lead to the achievement of research objectives and accordingly answer


the induced research questions of this research, which shall end with the establishment of policy recommendations for improving the performance of Thailand's defence diplomacy.

It was found that, despite some shortcomings, there are several strengths of Thailand's defence diplomacy which could be utilized with prospective opportunities in order to alleviate those undesirable shortcomings. For example, border demarcation between Thailand and neighbouring countries in many areas are not yet completed due to several reasons, including the internal security, budget-related matters, and even lack of trust. The lack of trust, or inadequate trust, is considered as a significant challenge. Without trust, desirable outcomes or cooperation for supporting and maintaining ASEAN community integration can hardly be achieved. Thailand can exert more effort in utilizing soft power or economic power to assist neighbouring countries to develop the bordering area as the secured joint development zone, which can be seen as a local hub for international trade. The embedded defence diplomacy as a cooperative mechanism can facilitate economic and cultural cooperation as well.

In conclusion, the hypothesis of this research stating "Thailand's defence diplomacy plays a significant role in positively supporting the ASEAN community integration process" has been accepted. Evidence and findings show that Thailand's defence diplomacy practices have significantly and increasingly extended fields of cooperation with ASEAN countries and significantly contributed to trust and confidence building among ASEAN nations, which has helped to strengthen the process of ASEAN regional integration. However, there are still some shortcomings which can be improved by the proposed policy recommendations.

## **7. Recommendations**

Policy recommendations for improvement of Thailand's defence diplomacy policy and practices are made to fulfil the final objective of this research. It can be seen that there are existing obstacles that hinder the process of ASEAN Community integration. These obstacles may also affect Thailand's defence diplomacy plans and implementation. Figure 5 is developed to visualize the found obstacles, shortcomings, and recommendations for handling them.



**Figure 5** Policy Recommendations

Major obstacles of ASEAN community integration include internal security condition and conflicts among minority groups, especially along the border, in each ASEAN countries. Furthermore, problems of overlapping maritime boundaries and incomplete border demarcation, as well as economic gaps and cultural diversities, are also obstacles that hinder ASEAN integration process. Inadequate trust, which could be resulted from historical conflicts, is indicated as a major obstacle. To alleviate these obstacles, it is essential to carefully analyse the surrounding contexts before establishing a national strategy in order to carry out defence diplomacy practices successfully with the purpose to support the ASEAN community integration process.

For example, when Thailand wishes to initiate some kind of cooperation activities but the counterparts may not be ready, or not fully trust so that such cooperation initiatives have not been established. Likewise, when other countries wish to establish some cooperation initiatives but Thailand's defence diplomacy are not ready due to the existing shortcomings, or skepticism on such proposals, the proposed cooperation initiatives cannot be established.

Similarly, there are shortcomings of Thailand's defence diplomacy practices about the ASEAN community integration. Shortcomings include a lack of integrated strategy and guidelines for conducting the national defence diplomacy. Also, there is a lack of plans for the development of personnel in the field of defence diplomacy. As a result, there is a lack of knowledge and understanding to effectively execute defence diplomacy activities. Moreover, a lack of budget and existing language barriers noticeably hinder implementation of defence diplomacy activities.

To alleviate the foreseen obstacles and to improve the performance of Thailand's defence diplomacy within the context of ASEAN community integration, policy recommendations are adopted. The foremost recommendation is to define a strategy especially for executing the country's defence diplomacy

initiatives. This strategy formulation is essential, and it has to be led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to its responsibility to specify the nation's foreign policy so that the other ministries, such as the Ministry of Defence, can follow the set direction. Such policy shall aim to create mutual trust, enhance existing cooperation, and seek for new areas of cooperation so that security cooperation complies with the ASEAN working plans for the APSC pillar.

Upon the established strategy and strategic policy, an integrated guideline should be provided to all agencies so that they can use it as a pathway for their personnel to follow. Based on these strategies, policies, and guidelines, personnel working in the field of defence diplomacy should be provided with integrated training and a body of knowledge on the national foreign policy.

To implement the proposed policy recommendations, emphasis should be placed on introducing mechanisms that effectively strengthen bilateral cooperation, which is regarded as the priority and an important factor leading to further multilateral cooperation needed for the process of ASEAN community integration. To build mutual trust and increase confidence among each other, it is essential to increasingly initiate and enhance bilateral cooperation in order to facilitate and achieve the desired multilateral cooperation.

With the proposed policy recommendations, it is hoped that this study could lead to further in-depth research and improvement in the use of defence diplomacy as a tool in foreign relations among ASEAN countries in the process of attaining, maintaining and enhancing ASEAN community integration

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## **The Impact of Thai Culture on Perceptions and Experiences of Sexual Harassment in Policing: A Case Study of Female Police Officers in the Royal Thai Police**

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### **Abstract**

Many women face sexual harassment in the workplace, especially in the male-dominated workplace where the majority of employees are men. Many studies show that there are cultural norms that reward traditional masculine values and therefore women who work in the male-dominated workplace had been harassed by a senior male officer. This article examines whether female police officers in Thailand face sexual harassment in the workplace or not by using the Royal Thai Police (RTP) as a case study. Semi-structured interviews were conducted to gather information on women's experiences. Approximately 37 participants were interviewed including both retired and current officers. This research found that most participants did not face any physical sexual harassment. They also reported that verbal and physical harassment in the workplace was not perceived as a major problem. However, lack of reporting of sexual harassment does not necessarily mean that sexual harassment does not occur in the RTP. There are two reasons that why these participants reported that sexual harassment does not occur. The first reason is that Thai women do not discuss or talk about sexual harassment with other people. The second reason is that there is no clear definition of the term sexual harassment.

*Keywords:* Sexual harassment, culture constraint, female police officers in Thailand, policing, Thai culture

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### **1. Introduction**

The number of women who enter the formal workforce has increased gradually. There was approximately 74 percent of women around the world in the workforce in the mid-2014 (The Globalist, 2016). Women's participation in the workforce is lower than 30 percent in Northern Africa and Western Asia; lower than 40 percent in Southeast Asia; and lower than 50 percent in the Caribbean and Central America (United Nations, 2010). While European countries, especially in Sweden, Portugal, Iceland, Austria, Switzerland, and Slovenia, have experienced different trend, there was around at least 85 percent of women participation in the workforce (The Globalist, 2016). The major reason that why there is a high percentage of women who enter the workforce is because of a better benefit offered such as extended paid maternity leave and protections for women to return to their jobs after having children when compared to other countries (The Globalist, 2016).

As there is a high number of women who enter the workforce, many anti-discrimination laws have been enacted to help prevent gender discrimination in the workplace at both an international and national levels. However, many women still confront gender discrimination in the workplace. International Labour Office (2007) states that sexual harassment is a form of gender discrimination based on sex and a manifestation of unequal power relations between men and women and further defines the term sexual harassment as a sex-based behavior that is unwelcome and offensive to its recipient. For sexual harassment to exist, these two conditions must be present. Sexual harassment may take two forms:

- 1) Quid Pro Quo, when a job benefit – such as a pay rise, promotion, or even continued employment – is made conditional on the victim acceding to demands to engage in some form of sexual behavior; or
- 2) The hostile working environment in which the conduct creates conditions that are intimidating or humiliating for the victim.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) (2013) further reported that approximately 50 percent of women in the European Union have experienced unwanted sexual advances, physical contact, and verbal suggestions or other forms of sexual harassment in their workplace while there are around 40 percent of women in Asia-Pacific who have experienced sexual harassment in the workplace. Additionally, Cairns and Wright (as cited in Cairns, 1997) stated that most researchers who worked in the area of sexual harassment often heard this statement or a similar statement to this in cases of sexual harassment: “we were in his room talking and he started to kiss me and more and I wanted him to stop but I just could not say no. I felt terrible, and I hated it”. Therefore, this demonstrated that they felt obliged because the person was their boss.

Therefore, sexual harassment is a severe problem for women, especially in male-dominated occupations where the majority of employees are men who have more power than women. Stockdale (2005) indicated that sexual harassment is used to maintain masculinity and status differences between men and women. In other words, the objective of sexual harassment is the satisfaction of power needs. In traditional male-dominated occupations, supervisors often used the fact that men outnumbered women, combined with the power of their higher position to make sexual advances (Kauppinen & Patoluoto, 2005).

Gruber and Morgan (2005) studied of male dominance in the workplace defining it as a multifaceted concept, consisting of two dimensions: numerical and normative male dominance. Numerical male dominance refers to an organization that is numerically dominated by men or has more men than women employees. In numerically male-dominated organizations, sexual harassment occurred much more often when compared to other types of organizations, and because of its frequency, it was a major problem in male-dominated occupations. Berdahl (2007) also undertook surveys on sexual harassment in five organizations where the number of male employees outnumbered female employees in the US. He found that women who worked in male-dominated occupations often faced higher rates of sexual harassment than women who worked in female-dominated jobs. Contrary to expectations, women who acted like men and worked in male-dominated occupations had even higher chances of facing sexual harassment. Women who worked in male-dominated occupations were also often more aware of sexual harassment rather than women who worked in feminized occupations.

Moreover, numerically male-dominated workplaces tend to have cultural norms that support sexual bravado, sexual posturing and the denigration of feminine behavior. These cultural norms increase the risk of the occurrence of sexual harassment in the workplace (Sbraga & O'Donohue, 2000). Wilson and Thomson (2001) also indicated that in workplaces where men outnumber women, women are likely to face sexual harassment because the presence of women in the workplace reinforced male hegemony and masculinity. They also further indicated that when women enter the workplace, men fear the loss of their power and as a result, sexual harassment increasingly occurs.

Normative male-dominated workplaces refer to the organizational or occupational culture that rewards traditional masculine values such as the devaluation of women, aggression and emotional self-regulation (Gruber & Morgan, 2005). In normative male-dominated workplaces, the incidence of sexual harassment depends on the sexist behavior of women in those workplaces. O'Hare and O'Donohue (1998) found that women who perceived sexist attitudes and believed that men and women had been treated unequally were more likely to have experienced sexual harassment. Conversely, women who believe that there is equal treatment for men and women less experienced sexual harassment (Timmerman & Bajema, 2000). Sbraga and O'Donohue's (2000) research shows that such culture is reinforced when men outnumber women.

The Royal Thai Police (RTP) is a male-dominated organization in Thailand where sexual harassment should exist. This paper then aims to discuss whether female police officers had faced any sexual harassment themselves and had they met anyone or heard about any sexual harassment in their workplace. This paper is divided into three parts. The first section is the literature review on sexual harassment in policing. The second part describes how this research is conducted and the final section discusses what the researcher has found from conducting this research.

## 2. Sexual Harassment in Policing

Brownmiller and Alexander (as cited in Giele & Stebbins, 2003) argue that the term sexual harassment was used for the first time in 1974 when clerical employees and other staff at Cornell University started to name this problem. Gregory (2003) claims that Catherine MacKinnon was the first to outline how sexual harassment in the workplace was a major issue for women. MacKinnon (1979) studied and analyzed the problem of sexual harassment in the late 1970s. She found that sexual harassment generally happened in two types of situations. The first occurred when employers offered improved conditions of employment or access to promotion in exchange for sexual favors. The second situation was where employers created a hostile environment in the workplace to interfere with an employee's work in order to force employees to have sexual relations with them.

According to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (2011), sexual harassment means "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical harassment of a sexual nature". It also indicated that sexual harassment happened when "submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment" (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1990). This definition of the term sexual harassment will be used in this research.

There are two main types of sexual harassment. The first one is 'quid pro quo harassment' which is when a supervisor refuses employment or any action that related to work because of their subordinate rejects their sexual advances. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity (1990) stated that quid pro quo harassment occurs when "submission or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for an employment decision affecting such individual". The second type is 'hostile environment harassment'. It takes place when verbal or physical harassment has an effect on work performance and may lead to an aggressive environment in the workplace (DeLaat, 2007). Normally, these two types of sexual harassment always happen together (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1990). For example, a supervisor may ask for sexual advances in exchange for some rewards, that is, quid pro quo harassment. After that hostile environment, harassment will happen when their subordinate may refuse the sexual advance, and the supervisor may then create some threat that effects the employment status of their subordinate.

In policing, sexual harassment happens in part because it has been seen as a man's job and male officers are the majority. Male officers may act aggressively to fellow female police officers and may take part in activities that constitute sexual harassment (Gruber & Morgan, 2005; Gutek & Morash, 1982; Remington, 1981). Brown (1998) argued that female police officers are more likely to face sexual harassment from male police officers than civilian women. When male and female police officers have to work together, sexual harassment may occur. In policing, this tends to happen most in patrol departments where women and men work together closely most of the working day. In contrast, there is a higher number of women than men who work in administrative work. The sexual harassment rate is, therefore, low when compared to the patrol department. In the administrative department, there are more supervisors to check closely on sexual harassment while in patrol work, women and men work together and this is unsupervised work. Therefore, the patrol department has a higher rate of sexual harassment than administrative work (Brown, 1998).

Female police officers face the possibility of sexual harassment at every level (Brown, 1998; Chaiyavej & Morash, 2008; Martin, 1990; Martin & Jurik, 2007; Schuck & Rabe-Hemp, 2007; Wexler & Logan, 1983). Female police officers of every age may be confronted with sexist languages such as dirty jokes, rude language, and comments on their appearance. Some male officers may gamble with their male co-workers as to who will be the first person to sleep with a new policewoman on the job (Brown, 1998; Chaiyavej & Morash, 2008; Gutek & Morash, 1982; Martin & Jurik, 2007). A policewoman also claimed that she heard six officers suggest that "if you sleep with someone, you are a slut; if you are not, you are a dyke" (Wexler & Logan, 1983, p. 49). This form of sexual harassment creates major problems for female police officers. Policewomen may then separate themselves from male co-workers in order to avoid such occurrences. Gutek and Morash (1982) further claimed that in policing, female police officers are often confronted with sexual harassment. Therefore, most female officers may then decide to resign from

policing. Sexual harassment could be one of the reasons why female police officers decide to resign in policing and that is why there are few female officers left to work in policing.

Non-verbal forms of sexual harassment, such as unwanted touching, exist but are in the minority. If such instances occur, they are more likely to be a result of male supervisors using their position and power to force female police officers to agree to sexual activities. They may be either direct or indirect supervisors over these female officers (Chaiyavej & Morash, 2009; Gutek & Morash, 1982; Wexler & Logan, 1983).

However, some women are happy to use their femininity with their supervisor to gain promotion. These female police officers may fit into the deprofessionalization<sup>1</sup> category. They may not perform police work well and may complain when have to do some tasks that they do not want to do such as patrol tasks. Therefore, they tend to use their femininity with their supervisor to gain promotion (Martin, 1990).

### 3. Methodology

Qualitative methods were used to conduct this research. Semi-structured interviews were used to get more detailed information in order to identify whether female police officers in Thailand face sexual harassment in the RTP or not. Participants were interviewed for an hour with open-ended questions to allow participants to explain their answer and share their life experiences. The interview question guide was used as an outline for interviewing in order to confirm that the researcher covered the similar details of sexual harassment for each participant.

As the RTP is a large organization in Thailand, this research will only focus on four bureaus; the General Police Hospital (GPH), the Education Bureau (EDB), the Royal Police Cadet Academy (RPCA) and the Provincial Police Region Division 1 – 9 (PPR). Three of the four bureaus are the categories in the Technical Support Bureaus. Only the Provincial Police Region Division 1 – 9 is categorized as a Field Operation Unit. The major reason to choose these four bureaus is to show that whether female police officers faced sexual harassment in both Technical Support and Field Operation units in the RTP or only female police officers often faced sexual harassment in the workplace. This section is divided into two parts which are the selected bureaus and participants.

#### 3.1 The Selected Bureaus

As mentioned above, this research focuses on four bureaus: the Police General Hospital, the Education Bureau, The Royal Police Cadet Academy and the Provincial Police Region Division 1-9. The main reason that these four bureaus are selected is that they perform different tasks in the RTP. The major reason that these three bureaus were selected rather than other bureaus in the Technical Support Unit is due to the fact that these three bureaus have the highest number of female police officers who work at the senior levels. From the four chosen bureaus, only the Provincial Police Region Division 1-9 is categorized in the Field Operation Unit. The reason that the Provincial Police Region Division 1-9 was selected is because this is the only bureau where female police officers have to perform traditional police tasks. The following paragraph outlines the specific reasons why these four bureaus have been selected.

The first bureau is the Police General Hospital (PGH). In this bureau, the number of female police officers who work at the senior levels is higher than other bureaus. The main reason for focusing on this bureau is because police officers who work at this hospital are also doctors and nurses. These officers are only assigned to hospital work and never to any 'police' duties in the form of patrolling or even police paperwork tasks. However, they are officially police officers according to the RTP definitions. All employees who work at this hospital have the same rank as police officers. In the PGH, many female police officers work there, especially as nurses. Employees who work at the police or military hospital in other countries do not consider themselves as police or military officers. The PGH is then a unique bureau and a fascinating matter to be studied.

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<sup>1</sup> Deprofessionalization or policewomen means that the female police officer "accept the men's invitation to function as a nominal equal while actually functioning as a junior partner or assistant and receiving treatment and exemption from work tasks appropriate for a lady" (Jones, 1986, p. 171).

The second bureau is the Education Bureau (EDB). The main duty of this bureau is administration. Female police officers who work at the EDB are assigned to do only administrative tasks that have been seen as 'women's work'. Women are traditionally seen as more suitable to do this work than men in Thailand. Most police officers who work at the EDB, then, are women. The central reason that this bureau has been selected is because this bureau has been seen as a 'woman's bureau'.

The Royal Police Cadet Academy (RPCA) is the third bureau. The core reason that this has been selected for this research as police officers have to be assigned to police work and perform well in order to be able to work at the RPCA. Therefore, officers who work at this academy have to be highly experienced in frontline policing or have worked in the Local Police Bureau. If the police officers do not have significant experience in frontline policing, they have to be teaching in the area in which they are the specialists. For example, most female police officers who work at the RPCA often graduated in Law and had some experience as lawyers before joining the police. Thus, police officers either work at the field operation unit or become specialists in Law.

The last bureau is the Provincial Police Region (PPR). The central reason for choosing this bureau is because their main duty is crime prevention. This means female police officers who work in these bureaus have to perform all police work that is usually referred to as a 'man's job'. Therefore, female police officers who work in these bureaus mostly work with male police officers and compete with male officers to gain promotion. At the same time, police officers at this bureau are also assigned to administration work. Female police officers who work at this bureau are assigned to perform police tasks such as investigation and being inspectors when they have lower ranking and positions. In contrast, when female police officers are promoted to a higher ranking and positions such as at Police Lieutenant Colonel and above, they are often assigned to perform administrative jobs rather than police work.

### 3.2 Participants

Approximately 37 participants who sworn and non-sworn women police officers were selected. All intended participants had to work in either the PPR, the EDB, the PGH, or the RPCA. In addition to meeting the department criterion, they also have to meet one of the following criteria:

- 1) Ex-senior female police officers who have retired within the last five years;
- 2) Current senior police<sup>2</sup>;
- 3) Women who have not been able to achieve promotion to the senior level. These women will be identified by having the rank of police lieutenant colonel. They also have to have been working as a Deputy Superintendent for at least six years but not received promotion; and
- 4) Significant public authority figures who work with the RTP. These women are not employed by the Thai government and are external civilian advisors.

These three significant public authority figures were Supensri Puengkongsung who is head of the supportive gender equality department of Women and Men Progressive Movement Foundation; Thanawadee Tajejan who is the President of Friends of Women Organization in Thailand; and a female senior officer who works in the Office of Women's Affairs and Family Development (OWF). Two of these three women gave their explicit permission to be named and to have their work details recorded in this research.

Thirty-four participants were selected from the four bureaus while the other three participants are significant public authority figures whom most participants highly recommended to the researcher. These 34 samples combined 12 participants who are ex-senior women police officers who have retired within the last five years from the GPH and the EDB, 13 participants who are current senior police officers from these four departments; three participants from each department, except the GPH that has four participants as there are the highest number of female officers who currently work at senior levels. For the third criteria: women officers who have not been able to achieve promotion to the senior level, there are only nine participants and did not have participants from the EDB.

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
<sup>2</sup> Senior level in this research refers to policewomen who work at police colonel position or higher. The reason for this is that policewomen who are in this category are noted in Thai newspapers when they are promoted from this level onwards.

To protect the anonymity of participants, only those who expressly allowed the researcher to disclose their name are named which as two of significant public authority figures. The remaining participants are identified by a number, such as P1 and P2.

**4. Research Findings**

Participants were asked whether they had faced any sexual harassment themselves and had they met anyone or heard about any sexual harassment in their workplace. However, none of the female police officers in these four bureaus said they felt uncomfortable working with men, and verbal and physical harassment in the workplace was not perceived as a major problem.

The three bureaus which are the PGH, EDB, and PPR reported in the same direction that there were few incidents involving sexual harassment in the RTP (see Figure 1).



**Figure 1** Have female police officers faced any sexual harassment in the RTP?

**Source:** This figure was designed by the author

In the EDB, sexual harassment appears to have occurred less when compared to other bureaus as no female police officers interviewed reported having heard of experiences of any type of sexual harassment in the workplace. For the PGH and the PPR, 20 out of 24 of the participants reported that they had never heard of or experienced sexual harassment. For instance, participant P2 reported that her supervisors evaluate her and police officers who worked under him each year as to whether both male and female police officers behave correctly when they perform their duty according to section 83(8) of the Civil Service Act of 2009 in order to consider salary increases and promotion. This includes sexual misconduct and harassment. Section 83(8) in the Civil Service Act states that:

A civil servant must not commit any of the following prohibitions: (1) to not make a false report to the supervising official; ... (8) to not commit acts which amount to a sexual violation or harassment as prescribed by Civil Service Commission (CSC) Regulation.

("Pra Rat Cha Banyat Ra Beab Kha Rat Cha Karn Pon La Roen B.E. 2552 (Civil Service Act of 2009)", 2009).

Section 83 (8) is further defined by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Regulation of Sexual Harassment of 2010, section two:

Any civil servant who commits any of the following actions to other civil servants or colleagues against his or her will or causes nuisance, whether such action is committed inside or outside of official workplace, such civil servant is deemed to commit a sexual harassment according to the section 83(8) of the Civil Service Act of 2009.

- 1) Any action involving physical contact in a sexual manner such as kissing, hugging or touching any part of body;
- 2) Speaking in a sexual manner such as criticizing others' bodies, teasing or talking impolitely;
- 3) Any action of a sexual manner such as looking at other people's bodies, and making any signs or symbols of a sexual nature;

- 4) Communicating in any way that implies a sexual manner such as displaying of pornographic material, sending letters, sending messages or any other form of communication containing sexual references or material;
- 5) Any behavior of a sexual nature against others' will or causes nuisance. ("Kot Kor Por Wa Duai Karn Kra Tum Karn Un Pen Karn Lung La Meard Reu Kuk Kam Tang Pet B.E. 2553 (The Civil Service Commission Regulation of Sexual Harassment of 2010)", 2010).

The categories covered in this Regulation should prevent sexual harassment in the workplace. At the same time, section 85(7) in the Civil Service Act of 2009 which supports section 83(8) is the regulation which mandates the punishments for such behaviors. Section 85(7) states that:

Disciplinary breaches of the following description are gross breaches of discipline: (1) wrongfully performing or refraining to perform official duties in order to cause severe detriment to any person or dishonestly performing or refraining to perform official duties; ... (7) refraining from or committing any act not in compliance with section 82 or in violation of a prohibition under section 83 causing severe detriment to the government service; ....

("Pra Rat Cha Banyat Ra Beab Kha Rat Cha Karn Pon La Roen B.E. 2552  
(Civil Service Act of 2009)", 2009)

Although, all supervisors in the RTP have to evaluate the police officers who work under them to ensure discipline is maintained, no participants from other bureaus mentioned about this evaluation. This may be for the reason that the supervisors at the other bureaus did not pay as much attention to these aspects in the annual assessments. Therefore, sexual harassment was not seen to be a problem in the PGH. Participant P24 also stated that when she has formal meetings with her subordinate police officers, she often discusses appropriate behavior in the workplace, including sexual harassment in the meetings with all police officers. Thus, most officers were aware of harassment issues, and no female officers made any reference to such harassment.

It has to be noted here that there are two main issues related to Thai culture that may have affected these answers about sexual harassment. The first issue is that sexual harassment issues are rarely discussed or talked about with other people in Thai culture. Thai women feel shy about disclosing their personal stories and therefore they tend to keep it secret. However, Thanawadee mentioned that Thai women would call women's organizations to tell about sexual harassment when they have resigned from their workplace because they feel too shy to let other people know that they have been harassed.

Zimbroff (2007) found that Asian people are more likely to endure sexual harassment than Western people and Asian people do not tend to report sexual harassment. Therefore, when participants reported that they had not heard about or experienced any sexual harassment themselves, this may not have been the truth as they may have wanted to keep their story secret. This point may assume that there is a level of under-reporting of sexual harassment rather than a non-existence of sexual harassment. One senior representative who works in the OWF also indicated that even though several incidents of sexual harassment in the workplace are known to exist, "few people report about sexual harassment". Therefore, sexual harassment in the workplace has not been seen as a serious issue in Thailand as it is very hard to learn about the cases of sexual harassment in the workplace. Most Thai people then assume that there is no sexual harassment.

The second issue is that Thai people do not know much about the definition of the term sexual harassment and behaviors that have been identified as sexual harassment. In Thailand, the law preventing sexual harassment in the workplace was introduced in 1998 for the first time. However, they did not define the term sexual harassment. According to section 16 of the Labour Protection Act of 1998 ("Pra rat Cha Banyat Kum Krong Rang Ngan B.E. 2541 (Labour Protection Act of 1998)", 1998), it only stated that "An employer or a person who is a chief, supervisor or inspector shall be prohibited from performing an act of sexual harassment against an employee who is a woman or a child." Although the latest Labour Protection Act was announced in 2008, the Act only updates to protect male employees from sexual harassment ("Pra rat Cha Banyat Kum Krong Rang Ngan B.E. 2551 (Labour Protection Act of 2008)", 2008). The term sexual harassment still has not been defined.

Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, for public agencies, the OCSC has announced in section 83(8) of the Civil Service Act of 2009 and section 2 of the CSC Regulation of Sexual Harassment of 2010 what actions are considered as sexual harassment ("Kot Kor Por Wa Duai Karn Kra Tum Karn Un Pen Karn Lung La Meard Reu Kuk Kam Tang Pet B.E. 2553 (The Civil Service Commission Regulation of Sexual Harassment of 2010)", 2010; "Pra Rat Cha Banyat Ra Beab Kha Rat Cha Karn Pon La Roen B.E. 2552 (Civil Service Act of 2009)", 2009). This means if any officers do any action that listed in this Regulation, they will be punished because of sexual harassment. However, this Regulation has not been widely promoted. Therefore, participants may not be sure whether actions that they have faced would be called sexual harassment. For example, one senior representative who works in the OWF reported that Thai women might not know whether they had been harassed or not as sometimes their colleagues or supervisors just 'tease' or 'joke' with them.

However, five participants worked in these two bureaus who stated that they had heard about sexual harassment in their workplace. Three participants, participants P18, 23 and 25, each stated that they heard their supervisors make jokes of a sexual nature. The other two participants had heard about physical harassment, like unwanted touching. Participants P10 and 26, who worked at the PGH, reported that they heard that some female officers had agreed to have sex with their supervisor to gain promotion.

At the RPCA, all participants had heard about physical harassment that happened in this bureau in 2007. All six participants reported the same story that one female officer had been harassed by her supervisor in the past. This officer went to report her story to a higher supervisor, and she requested to move to another bureau. However, no participants had heard of any recent cases of sexual harassment.

## 5. Discussion

The cultural subordination of women is a major problem in the RTP, and sexual harassment is one of them. Although, most participants (68 percent) reported that they did not face any physical sexual harassment such as touching, lack of reporting of sexual harassment does not necessarily mean that sexual harassment does not occur in the RTP. The most important point here is that there is no bureau or department that has responsibility for the management of sexual harassment in the workplace in the RTP or a place that female police officers can go to talk and discuss sexual harassment issues. Female police officers may not know what action is called sexual harassment and do not know whom they can talk to about it. Moreover, there are no strict regulations as to what actions are considered as sexual harassment. Therefore, female officers lack knowledge about sexual harassment.

There are two reasons related to cultural constraints that need to be explained in order to understand why most participants reported that there is no sexual harassment in the RTP: the notion that participants may not actually know whether they have been harassed or not, and fear to talk or discuss about sexual harassment. Firstly, Thai women often did not know whether they had been harassed or not. As previously mentioned, in Thailand women still lack knowledge and awareness of sexual harassment. For Thai women, sexual harassment means a situation whereby a man may force a woman to have sexual intercourse or may touch her body against her will. In the RTP, there is no department or division to take responsibility for sexual harassment. Therefore, it is quite difficult for female police officers to decide what action is defined as sexual harassment. Female police officers then believe that most verbal and physical actions are not sexual harassment because male officers always use the word "teasing" to explain their action. The term 'teasing' is defined as "a behavior designed to provoke a target through the use of playful commentary on something relevant to the target. This provocation can be verbal (a cutting remark) or physical (an embarrassing gesture)" (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007, p. 969).

Participants use the word "teasing" to explain situations that internationally may be defined as sexual harassment. Teasing in this context means trying to make fun or jokes with their colleagues, but this can include using 'bad words' and touching. For example, Participant P11 reported that there were some teasing and dirty talk in her department. Teasing for her can mean some touches, but overall it seems like male colleagues want to 'play' with her. Therefore, she did not feel that she has been harassed through this teasing. However, sometimes teasing can constitute sexual harassment. When male officers touch female officers' arms or hands when female officers do not want it, this is in reality called sexual harassment even though they may think that this action is teasing between male and female police officers.

This situation is also a cultural constraint which prevents identification of which behavior and actions are in fact sexual harassment. Most of the time, Thai women try to believe that these actions are teasing as they do not want to report them and feel shame later when their male colleagues say that he just wanted to tease or play with them. Finally, women have been seen as if they are the wrong side, thinking too much and making other people in the workplace feel uncomfortable about talking with them.

Teasing is an action that is considered as sexual harassment because it can “contain elements of humor and insult and can function as either play or punishment or both” (Alberts, 1992, p. 186). However, the content of teasing in oral communication is often insulting and can have sexual innuendos. Also, the mix of ‘fun’ and insult elements in teasing occur to varying degrees. Therefore, teasing is perceived as sexual harassment. Tangri, Burt and Johnson (1982) also did a survey of federal employees in the US. The total participants were 20,083: 10,644 were women, and 9,439 were men. Tangri et al. found that less than half of men considered that sexual teasing and jokes from co-workers was sexual harassment, but that such actions from supervisors were not sexual harassment. Conversely, more women than men believed that sexual teasing and jokes from both supervisors and co-workers was sexual harassment.

Secondly, Thai women may fear to talk about or discuss sexual harassment. In the RTP, there is the regulation which is the CSC Regulation of Sexual Harassment of 2010 to protect police officers from sexual harassment in the workplace even though the term sexual harassment still has not been defined. As mentioned earlier that in the CSC Regulation of Sexual Harassment of 2010 does describe what actions are considered as sexual harassment, so this regulation should be able to guarantee the safety of female police officers in the workplace from harassers. Similarly, participants who worked in the PGH also reported that all supervisors have to evaluate the police officers who work under them as to whether they behave appropriately towards other police officers or not. This annual evaluation should be another way to protect female police officers in the RTP from sexual harassment.

However, there is a cultural constraint that prevents female police officers from reporting when sexual harassment has happened. This cultural constraint restricts talk about sex in Thai society as it is taboo. Female police officers, therefore, fear to report that they have been harassed. Supensri also explained that most Thai women do not feel confident to talk about or discuss that they have been harassed in the workplace because of Thai culture. Most of them will keep quiet, and there are still some people who do not know that they have rights in the workplace. Zimbhoff (2007) also found that Asian people endure sexual harassment situations more than non-Asian people. Thai people may be a good example that confirms the research findings of Zimbhoff as Thai people may endure sexual harassment because they do not want to talk about it. Buddhism also teaches that to be a good woman, they should not talk about sex, unless they are married. This may be one reason why women remain quiet when they have been harassed. However, it cannot be denied that Buddhism also teaches in the five precepts<sup>3</sup> that Buddhists should abstain from taking the life of living. This means that men should not do any violent action to or take the life of any living beings. Therefore, men should not do any violent action to women including sexual harassment.

To be a good woman in Thailand, one should not talk about sex. Thanawadee also mentioned that after Thai women resigned from their workplace, subsequently the latter called women’s organizations to tell their stories about sexual harassment and to ask for some help in dealing with this issue. This reinforces the claim that Thai women may fear to discuss sexual harassment in the workplace when they are still working there because they may feel ashamed to let other people know that they have been harassed. These women will wait until they have resigned and do not have any more contact with any of the people in that workplace to report about sexual harassment or they may decide to resign to escape sexual harassment in this workplace. This is the cultural norm in relation to reporting sexual harassment in the workplace in Thailand.

Unfortunately, when women are generally reluctant to report sexual harassment incidents, both women and organizations face many serious consequences. For example, the consequences to women who fear to report sexual harassment are health problems, performance problems, relationship problems and career problems while the consequences to organizations where there are underreporting sexual harassment

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<sup>3</sup> The five precepts is the major part of the Buddhist practices to become more self-disciplined. Observing the precepts is a way to gain mastery of the mind. At the same time, the idea of such precepts is to avoid harmful ways of behaving and speaking.

incidents are high turn-over employees, lost organizational reputation and costly lawsuits (Peirce, Rosen, & Hiller, 1997). Despite these negative outcomes, there is effectively a culture of silence. Cairns (1997) argued that the causes of women's silence are that:

If, all our attempts to educate women about harassment and to establish accessible, non-punitive procedures to deal with it when it occurs, women continue to have trouble applying the term harassment to their own experiences, and if, even when they do label their experience correctly, they do not use the means available to them to combat harassment, then we must consider the probability that we still have not fully understood the nature of harassment and of women's responses to it.

This means when women do not feel certain that they have been harassed or that they were not to blame for the harassment, then they still will not report their problems like sexual harassment, even when system are available for them to do so.

Similarly, Peirce, Rosen and Hiller (1997) surveyed women who worked in a variety of managerial position in the US and found that there are two reasons why women decided not reporting sexual harassment incidents. The first reason is that women fear long-term damage to their career in their current organization. Most women who participated in this study agreed that reporting sexual harassment incidents are very harmful to their career. The second reason is that there are problems with company reporting policies and procedures on sexual harassment incidents. Over 40 percent of participants in this study reported that they did not know about complaint policies and procedures on sexual harassment incidents and they also questioned the fairness of sexual harassment investigation and the length of time it would take.

Thus, even if this cultural constraint on talking about sexual harassment were lifted, there is still likely to be a problem on lack of reporting on sexual harassment in the workplace in Thailand, as in other countries. In the RTP, female police officers still did not clearly understand that what actions should be called as sexual harassment. This may be one point that makes female police officers fear to report sexual harassment incidents. At the same time, there is no unit or department that has responsibility for preventing sexual harassment in the workplace. When a female police officer was harassed by their male supervisor, they did not know whom to talk or discuss about with regards to this situation. Therefore, this lack of system or unit with responsibility adds to the cultural constraint that makes female police officers decide not to report sexual harassment occurrences.

Moreover, supervisors can often be the person who uses their power to harass female officers who work under them. Thanawadee explained that "supervisors are a major problem in Thailand, as they tend to use their power to force or harass women in the workplace". A woman does not know how to manage this sexual harassment situation because if they reported it to senior supervisors, male supervisors would explain that they did not do anything and there is no evidence to confirm that these women have been harassed. Therefore, women will decide to resign from that workplace because of shame from this situation. The reporting of the current research is supported by research that found that male supervisors often use their positions and power to force female police officers to agree to sexual activities with them (Chaiyavej & Morash, 2009; Gutek & Morash, 1982; Wexler & Logan, 1983).

In addition, it is very hard in Thailand to sue some people for sexual harassment because male colleagues or supervisors will explain that they just wanted to play or joke with this woman, and finally, the case will end with a verdict that those involved simply misunderstood the term sexual harassment. This result has the effect of making women feel reluctant about reporting sexual harassment in the workplace. For example, five participants did report that they had faced some verbal harassment from their male colleagues or male supervisors. However, they did not report this to senior supervisors because they knew that male officers would likely to belittle the incident. This situation means female police officers are seen as in the wrong while male officers are seen as having done nothing wrong in people's eyes.

## 6. Conclusion

Overall, many anti-discrimination laws have been passed to prevent gender discrimination in the workplace at both international and national levels. However, many women still face gender discrimination in the workplace such as sexual harassment. In the case of the RTP, most participants who worked in the PGH, EDB and the PPR reported that they had never heard of or experienced sexual harassment while all participants who worked in the RPCA reported that they had heard about physical harassment that happened in this bureau. The major reason that why most participants reported that no sexual harassment had happened is because there is an evaluation to check whether male and female police officers behave correctly according to the Civil Service Act of 2009.

However, it cannot deny the fact that Thai culture may have an influence on the answers of participants. Two reasons have to mention here. The first one is that Thai women do not discuss or talk about sexual harassment with other people. Therefore, they tend to keep it secret rather than disclosing their personal stories. The second point is that there is no clear definition of the term sexual harassment. Participants may then not be sure whether actions that they faced would be called sexual harassment. With these two reasons, it cannot, therefore, say clearly that there is no sexual harassment happening in the RTP.

Finally, there are two major recommendations to prevent sexual harassment in the RTP. The first recommendation is that ensure that supervisors complete annual evaluations to check whether male police officers behave appropriately towards female police officers to prevent sexual harassment. When interviewing participants who have worked in the PGH, they reported that there is no sexual harassment in the PGH because there is an evaluation every year by supervisors to ensure that male police officers are behaving appropriately towards female police officers. In contrast, no participants from other bureaus mentioned about this evaluation. This should be one of the strategies that the PGH shall use to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace. If other bureaus strongly ensure that every supervisor has to complete annual evaluations to check whether male police officers are behaving appropriately towards female police officers every year, this strategy should help to prevent sexual harassment in the RTP. The second recommendation is that establish a unit or department to deal with sexual harassment. The role of the unit would be to ensure that police officers are aware of sexual harassment issues, knowing what action should be called sexual harassment and that take it very seriously. Over time, a cultural shift would occur in the RTP making sexual harassment unacceptable. Female police officers would, therefore, feel confident to work in the RTP as they would be less likely to encounter or never encounter sexual harassment in their workplace in the future.

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## **The Differences in Perception towards the Progress of Recovery between Metropolitan and Coastal Areas in the Great East Japan Earthquake**

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### **Abstract**

As Japan continues its process of reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011, several problems are widely being pointed out. One of the problems in disaster-hit regions is in the varying levels of recovery in different areas. The objective of this paper is to find possible causes of such disparities by comparing two cities in Miyagi prefecture, Sendai City, and Shiogama City. The comparison is based on two studies. The first is on the regional conditions including economic trends to identify the disparities that exist between the two areas. The second study is qualitative and is based on interviews of residents of the regions to verify how such disparities are influencing the people's perceptions toward the progress of recovery. The results indicate that there are clear differences in the levels of the recovery in the two distinct areas, and that gap has significantly influenced their perceptions about the progress of recovery and their well-being. One significant finding from these two studies is that economic disparity is not the main cause of the difference in their perceptions toward the progress of recovery from the disaster as it is often stated in disaster studies, but such perception is due mainly to the disparity in their levels of satisfaction with their local community after the disaster, and that has significant implications for the people's well-being. Based on these findings, the paper identifies lessons and proposes possible solutions to rectify these inequalities.

**Keywords:** *disaster, the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, recovery, disparities, well-being*

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### **1. Introduction**

More than five years have passed since the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami occurred on March 11<sup>th</sup>, 2011. The scale of the quake was magnitude 9.0, the largest earthquake to have occurred around Japan in recorded history. The disaster, which extended up to 500km (310 miles) and centered around Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures, caused massive damage to vast areas of the Pacific coastal line of Japan. The official death toll and the missing have reached 18,455 as of March 2016 and destroyed 130,000 houses, partially destroying 260,000 dwellings. Since the damage inflicted covered such vast areas, the level of damage in each region differed and thus the level of recovery of each area after five-and-a-half years has also been widely varied.

One of the problems which have been pointed out after the disaster is the different levels of recovery in each area within the disaster-hit regions. Bipolarization between the places where recovery is progressing smoothly and the ones where recovery is lagging is becoming evident, and the issue has been picked up by newspapers and television media. According to research on disasters to date, the suffering from disasters become more evident in relatively vulnerable parts of society, and creates inequalities among residents depending on the difference in the people's social environment (Urano, 2014; Wisner et al., 2004). Besides, research has pointed out that disasters affect most negatively society's disadvantaged including the economically vulnerable and the elderly. The existing societal and economic structures give birth to even more disadvantaged for people by expanding existing inequalities, and that expansion leads to inequalities in the progress of recovery.

In one of the hardest hit regions of Miyagi Prefecture following the Great East Japan Earthquake, we can witness such inequalities forming. While reconstruction demand is now buoying the economy in the capital, Sendai City, where the damage was comparatively small to start with, the economy in coastal areas, which experienced greater damage, has been lagging due to factors that existed before the disaster. Shiogama City had already been experiencing such adverse trends as structural reform, globalization,

municipal mergers, population decline and population aging. The disaster added even more damage to such declining areas (Okada, 2012).

This paper discusses two studies in Sendai City and Shiogama City in Miyagi Prefecture. The first study is about the regional conditions of each area comparing trends, including economic factors, before and after the disaster. The second study is a qualitative one involving interviews of local residents to focus on examining the differences in the perceptions toward the progress of recovery, a factor that has not been a focal point of studies thus far. The objective of the research is to ascertain whether inequalities in recovery including economic gaps exist. If they do indeed exist, the paper seeks to find out the causes of such inequalities, and how the inequalities relate to perceptions about the progress of recovery. In particular, the paper explores whether economic factors are the main cause of disparities in the perception of recovery as the existing literature on the subject indicates.

The results are analyzed from the standpoint of the people's well-being. The perception of recovery for each person consists of different factors, so comparing the "perceptions toward the progress of recovery" can be difficult, but the purpose of the study is to understand the disparities in such perceptions in Sendai and Shiogama.

The author believes that understanding the actual situation surrounding the disparities in the perception towards the progress of recovery in different areas may contribute to the correction of such inequalities, and enables formulation of proposals for better reconstruction plans to various actors involved in the reconstruction process, who directly or indirectly have real impact in the lives and well-being of the people in disaster-hit areas.

### **1.1 Background – Sendai City and Shiogama City**

Sendai City is the capital city of Miyagi Prefecture and located in the middle of the prefecture. It is the largest city in the Tohoku region with 786.3 square kilometers and a population of 1.08 million people. Although the Sendai City is an urban metropolis, it is called "The City of the Forest" for its richness of nature and greenery, and more than 30,000 tourists visit it every year. The proportion of the people over the age of 65 is increasing, but there is a high percentage of young people in the city because of the many schools in the area. The city prospered as a castle town after the daimyo (feudal lord) of the Warring State period Masamune Date built the Sendai Castle over four hundred years ago.

Shiogama City is a port town facing the Pacific Ocean located about 16.5 kilometers from Sendai City. The city has an area of 17.37 square kilometers and a population of 53,000. The main industry of Shiogama is fishery. The amount of tuna caught and production of fish products such as fish cakes is ranked number one in the country. The city is surrounded by Matsushima Bay and Matsushima Hill, and most of the flatland is landfill. Partly because of the geographical conditions, there are few businesses coming into the city, and that has been a drag on the city's business activities. Although the city is located in Matsushima Bay which is well known for its scenic beauty (designated as "Tokubetsu Meishou" or "Place of Special Beauty"), the number of tourists has not been increasing as the bulk of the tourists tend to drift to the neighboring Matsushima City.

## **2. Method**

This research draws on two studies in order to assess the difference in the levels of recovery. The first study attempts to clarify the disparity in conditions of the regions, Sendai City and Shiogama City, based on various statistics including economic data collected from Miyagi Prefecture, Sendai City, Shiogama City and The Ministry of Labor. The second qualitative study involves interviews conducted in Sendai City and Shiogama City, with interviewees residing in the two cities, to learn the disparities in the level of the people's perceptions about the progress of recovery.

### **2.1 Study 1 - Comparison of Regional Conditions: Sendai City and Shiogama City**

The data used for the comparison as aforementioned were based on the information and statistics publicly released by Miyagi Prefecture, Sendai City, Shiogama City, and The Ministry of Labor. The data used for comparison were the population, number of business offices, municipal tax, job openings, and

trends in people looking for jobs. The data was collected in July 2016, and the data prior to the disaster were compared to those after the disaster.

## 2.2 Study 2 - Qualitative Study: Perceptions toward the Progress of Recovery by the Two Regions

The second study was a qualitative one mainly based on interviews with residents of the subject regions. This research was conducted between March 2016 and June 2016, and involved interviews with 70 residents in each city, 140 residents in total. The interviewees were male and female adults over the age of twenty and were limited to people who resided and experienced the disaster in the area. The interview took a face-to-face semi-structural style, and each interview lasted about 20 to 40 minutes. The interviews were conducted in all five wards in Sendai City: Aoba Ward, Miyagino Ward, Wakabayashi Ward, Taihaku Ward, and Izumi Ward. In Shiogama, the interviews were conducted in four areas that mainly from the city of Shiogama: West Shiogama, Hon Shiogama, East Shiogama, and The Urato Islets (Katsura Island, Nono Island, Sabusawa Island).

## 3. Study 1 Findings: Inequalities in the Recovery Based on Regional Conditions

In Sendai City, the death toll and the missing from the disaster have reached 1028<sup>1</sup>, which is about 0.09% of the entire population of the city. The coastal areas of the city were severely damaged by the tsunami, but the damage to the central part of the city was relatively small. Based on Table 1, the population since the disaster has increased about 36,000 as people outside the city, who lost their homes or family or were seeking jobs, moved into the city. The number of offices also increased by about 900, which represents about a 2% increase. This gain is mainly attributed to Miyagi prefecture's reconstruction policies which have given preferential treatment to large companies for the stated purpose of "Structural Reform" as well as to the inflow of businesses taking advantage of reconstruction demand and established bases in the city.

In Shiogama City, the death toll and the missing have reached 45, which is about 0.08% of the city's population<sup>2</sup>. The death toll is smaller than Sendai City, but the percentage of people who were in areas that were inundated by the tsunami accounted for about 35% of the population, which is over ten times as much as the percentage in Sendai<sup>3</sup>. The population had decreased by about 2,400 compared to the population before the disaster as some older people left the city in order to seek refuge with their relatives or to find work. The number of business offices decreased by about 17%<sup>4</sup>.

By referring to Table 2, in terms of municipal taxes, in Sendai City, individual municipal tax revenue went up about 27%, and corporate municipal tax revenue went up about 29%. In Shiogama City, both individual and corporate municipal tax revenue decreased by approximately 7%.

The information above clearly shows that Sendai City's economical scale was bigger than Shiogama City, and the damage from the disaster was smaller. On the other hand, Shiogama City's economical scale was smaller, and the damage from the disaster was larger. However, the recovery from the disaster has been pronounced in Sendai City while the recovery of Shiogama City has been lagging.

**Table 1** Estimated Population Growth/Decline (March 2011 to May 2016)

	5/1/2016	3/1/2011	Growth/(Decline)
Sendai	1,083,446	1,046,737	36,709
Shiogama	53,780	56,221	(2,441)

**Source:** Miyagi Prefecture

<sup>1</sup> Source: Sendai City. Includes 192 who died outside of the city.

<sup>2</sup> Data released by Shiogama City. Includes 28 who died outside of the city.

<sup>3</sup> Data from Hideaki Matsuyama, The University of Tokyo Interfaculty Initiative in Informational Studies

<sup>4</sup> Shiogama City Statistics. Comparison of 2009 and 2012

**Table 2** Tax Revenues (Resident Tax)

<b>Sendai</b>		('000 JPY)	
	<b>Individuals</b>	<b>Corporate</b>	
2011	48,187,578	21,417,291	
2014	61,613,619	27,841,976	
	27% Up	29% Up	


  

<b>Shiogama</b>			
	<b>Individuals</b>	<b>Corporate</b>	
2011	2,232,321	364,947	
2014	2,091,359	340,177	
	7% Down	7% Down	

Notes: Data represents gross revenue from resident tax

Source: Sendai & Shiogama City Offices

When looking into the data released by the Public Employment Security Office, or Hellowork, the effective opening-to-application ratio of both Sendai City and Shiogama City rose since the disaster, from 0.54x to 1.31x and 0.34x to 0.75x, respectively. As per Figure 1, the rate of increase is slightly higher in Sendai City than in Shiogama City whose number has risen from a low base and remains relatively low. A look at the details of the data shows that reconstruction-related jobs such as construction, security, shipping and real estate conveyance are pushing up the overall rate in both cities. This means that reconstruction demand is contributing significantly to the improvement of the ratios. The factor that is making the most difference in the increased rates of the two cities is that in Sendai, the rate of other kinds of jobs such as general administrative office jobs has increased due to the rise in businesses established after the disaster.



**Figure 1** Effective Job Opening to Applicant Ratio

Source: Hellowork

The statistical data on Shiogama City shows that the decline of the city’s main industry, fishery, stands out. Therefore, we need also to look at data which is not reflected in the numbers from Hellowork. Based on Table 3, the number of ships that entered into port was 2,294 ships in 2010 but was 1,790 ships in 2014, which represents about a 22% drop<sup>5</sup>. Vehicles used for transporting fish products declined 43% from 11,247 to 7,891. Also, the number of workers in the fishery industry was 387 in 2010, but that number also dropped to 216 in 2013, which is about a 45% decline<sup>6</sup>. These statistics indicate a serious decrease in the main industry supporting the local economy and a lagging process of reconstruction.

<sup>5</sup> Source: Latest data from Shiogama City and Sendai City

<sup>6</sup> Source: Latest data from Shiogama City and Sendai City

**Table 3** Number of Ships and Motor Vehicles for Fish Transport<sup>S</sup>

Year	Ships	Motor Vehicles for Fish Transport <sup>^</sup>	Weight <sup>*</sup>	Amount ('000 JPY)
2010	2,294	11,247	16,825	9,991,194
2014	1,790	7,891	17,966	8,442,123
Change	-28%	-43%	6%	-18%


Notes: <sup>^</sup> Vehicles unit in number of vehicles, <sup>\*</sup> Weight in tons

Source: Miyagi Prefecture

**4. Study 2 Findings Inequalities in the Residents’ Perceptions toward the Progress of Recovery**


This section shows the results of the qualitative research conducted to identify the disparities that exist in the level of people’s perceptions toward the progress of recovery between Sendai City and Shiogama City. The qualitative research, which hears testimony directly from local residents, enables us to verify whether the difference in the level of recovery shown in the data and from the information above is directly influencing the local residents’ perception toward the recovery, and to understand their perception toward the recovery which may not be understood from various numbers.

Figure 2 shows when the respondents were first asked if they believe the recovery has been progressing in their area. In Sendai City, 40% of respondents answered that it’s “progressing,” 50% stated “progressing somewhat,” 9% said “not progressing so much,” and 1% answered “not progressing at all.” In Shiogama City, 6% answered “it’s progressing,” 63% stated “progressing somewhat,” 30% said “not progressing much,” and 1% answered “not progressing at all.”




**Figure 2** Question: Is the recovery progressing in your city?

Next, in Figure 3, with regards to the question, “Is your life still being affected by the disaster?,” in Sendai City, none of the respondents said “it’s still affected greatly,” 13% said “it’s still much affected,” 44% answered “it’s still affected a little” and 43% said “it’s not affected anymore.” In Shiogama City, 7% said “it’s still greatly affected,” 43% answered “it’s still much affected,” 29% stated “it’s still little affected,” and 21% said “it’s not affected anymore.”




**Figure 3** Question: Is your life still being affected by the disaster?

Next, by referring to Figure 4, is about the question, “On a scale from zero to 100, how much do you feel your life has recovered from the disaster?” In Sendai City, 43% of the respondents answered that their recovery was in the score of 90s, which comprised the most respondents. In Shioigama City, 47% of the respondents stated that their recovery was in the 50s, which represented the most respondents. The average was 80 in Sendai City and 62 in Shioigama City.




**Figure 4** Question: On a scale of 0 to 100, how much do you feel your life has improved since the disaster?

With regard to the question about the respondents’ financial situation, based on Figure 5, in Sendai City, 4% stated that their financial situation is better after the disaster, 79% said unchanged, and 17% stated their financial situation is worse after the disaster. In Shioigama City, none of the respondents said it is better after the disaster, 84% said unchanged, and 16% stated that it is worse after the disaster.



**Figure 5** Question: Is your financial situation better or worse after the disaster?

By looking at Figure 6, with regard to the question, “Are you satisfied with the community to which you currently belong?” In Sendai City, 71% said “satisfied,” 24% stated “not satisfied.” In Shiogama City, 47% answered “satisfied,” and 50% said “not satisfied.”



**Figure 6** Question: Are you satisfied with the community to which you currently belong?

**5. Discussion of Results from Study 1**

First, as Okada states, a comparison of the statistics of each area’s regional condition shows that there are indexes that are above the pre-disaster level in Sendai City, but the indexes of the coastal area, Shiogama City show that its recovery is lagging.

The causes of this disparity must be considered. An inspection of the minutes of the Great East Japan Earthquake Reconstruction Design Council clearly reveals that the government was trying to push forward the reconstruction along with an economic growth strategy in the name of “creative reconstruction.” In effect, the government placed special priority on the economic recovery of the entire Tohoku region by focusing on the region’s function as part of a supply chain of global businesses without considering the unique needs of each area and recovery of small-scale fishermen, farmers or other individuals’ living conditions.

For example, the prefecture opened fishing rights to corporations and relaxed regulations in the Agricultural Land Act by applying the “Special Zone System” to consolidate fishery and agriculture. The prefecture also made an effort to attract more corporate businesses to the region. With regard to the fishery

industry, which is the main industry of Shiogama City, the prefecture decided to aggregate the function of fish processing and distribution in order to expedite a fast recovery. This was done by selecting 60 ports out of 142 in the prefecture (about 40% of the ports affected by the disaster), as “base ports” so that the prefecture can invest their limited resources intensively<sup>7</sup>. However, this meant that many individual fishermen who base their livelihoods on small ports with supporting industries (primary industry to tertiary industry) have been unable to revive their livelihoods<sup>8</sup>.

In addition, the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant affected the export of Miyagi’s marine products. Miyagi has been famous for Hoya (sea squirt) farming. The latter yearly catch used to be about 9,000 tons and 70% of that was exported to South Korea before the disaster. However, following the nuclear disaster, South Korea took measures to ban imports of marine products from eight prefectures in Japan including Miyagi, effectively closing the distribution channel for the hoyo business.

There are other reasons that contributed to the decline in Shiogama’s fishing industry. Shiogama had been known for its large volume of its catches of tuna fish. However, adverse trends such as restrictions on the amount of tuna caught by the movement to protect marine resources, increases in fuel costs and the fishing license fee, and the aging factors for fishermen were already progressing prior to the disaster. These issues were compounded by the fact that some fishermen had to move out of their homes to live in temporary housing after the disaster which made continuing their work difficult. Therefore, the decline of the industry in Shiogama City accelerated as a consequence.

On the other hand, Sendai City has been experiencing a brisk economy as many reconstruction related businesses from inside and outside the prefecture flowed into the city to take advantage of demand from recovery and reconstruction which is expected to be up to JPY20 trillion (or US\$200 billion)<sup>9</sup>, and many of the businesses set up branch offices in the city. In addition, there are many companies from inside and outside Japan entering the Sendai market as the city adopted the “Reconstruction Special Zone System” and relaxed restrictions in the agricultural, fishery and medical industries. As one example, in Asuto-Nagamachi town in Sendai City, which is designated as a redevelopment district, construction projects are progressing rapidly. Currently, there are some commercial developments in the area, such as large-scale shopping centers and apartments, which is a radical change from before the disaster when the city consisted of many vacant lots and industrial parks. One resident who moved into Asuto-Nagamachi from outside Sendai City after the disaster said “I moved in this area just by chance, but I feel lucky. I want to settle down here.” This comment is representative of the level of satisfaction by residents of Sendai City.

## 6. Discussions of Results from Study 2

The results of the qualitative study clearly show that the perception toward the progress of recovery in Sendai City is more positive than the perception in Shiogama City. The difference in the people’s perception toward recovery also confirms Okada’s statement that there is a disparity in the recovery from the disaster between big cities and other coastal areas.

As mentioned in the beginning, the basic viewpoint of disasters, that vulnerable parts of a society become visible in disasters, and that social vulnerability creates disparities in disasters and that leads to the disparities in the level of recovery. The study on the case of Sendai City and Shiogama City also supports this idea in many ways.

Here, the vulnerability that existed in Shiogama City needs to be explained. First of all, Shiogama had issues of population decline and an aging society. The pace at which these phenomena had been developing was more rapid than that of the nationwide figures before the disaster, and the population had been estimated to decline from 56,897 in 2010 to 41,025 in 2035, a 28% decline, and people over the age of 65 had been estimated to increase from 27.1% of the city’s population in 2010 to 40.1%, twenty-five years later<sup>10</sup>. The fishing industry is a key industry of Shiogama City, and this region already had problems of

<sup>7</sup> Jiji Tsushin, December 8, 2011

<sup>8</sup> Tomohiro Okada, Regional Reconstruction from the Earthquake – Recovery for the People or Taking Advantage of “Structural Reform” Reconstruction? Shin Nihon Shuppan, 2012

<sup>9</sup> Hiroaki Okada, Regional Reconstruction from the Earthquake – Recovery for the People or Taking Advantage of “Structural Reform” Reconstruction? Shin Nihon Shuppan, 2012

<sup>10</sup> Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research

aging fishermen. However, the disaster accelerated the problem as there were fishermen in advanced age who decided to retire after the disaster, had to leave the region after losing their homes, or had to give up fishing in order to recover from other damage to their lives. In addition, the pace of decrease in population accelerated as some residents moved out of the city to find better job opportunities. This situation not only leads to a population decline but also to separation of households and breakup of families.

Besides these problems, the regional industry of Shiogama had already been declining before the disaster due to the policy of economic and structural reforms. However, the region suffered another blow as the central government and Miyagi Prefecture pushed ahead with the strategy of “Creative Reconstruction,” as mentioned earlier. This strategy did not place priority on the recovery of each small-scale population unit and individuals in the region. Without making sufficient effort to listen to the needs of these residents, as a consequence, there is a gap between the municipality’s reconstruction policies and a vision of recovery that residents hoped to realize. The so-called “massive embankment issue” and the “high ground migration issue” were examples of such reconstruction policies.

In this way, disasters tend to become more visible in vulnerable parts of society and socially vulnerable people tend to bear the risks of disasters unequally.

However, this qualitative study has revealed one commonly accepted theory about disasters that does not hold in terms of the people’s perception toward the progress of recovery from a disaster: that lags in recovery occur to people whose economic status is weaker, a trait that is said to be a major vulnerability in disaster studies.

One notable point from the findings of the qualitative research is that, in response to the question, “Is your financial situation better now or before the disaster?”, in Sendai City, the answers, “better now” and “unchanged” accounted for 83%, and in Shiogama City, there were no “better now,” but “unchanged” accounted for 84%. The totals are almost the same in the two cities. However, the data regarding the level of the perception of recovery told a different story. In the question regarding the level of progress (Figure 3), Shiogama City had an overwhelming number of people who said recovery was not progressing. Also, on a scale of 0 to 100 (Figure 4) for the progress of recovery, Sendai City was 80 and 62 in Shiogama City, an 18 point difference between the two cities.

What is making the perception toward the progress of recovery for people of Shiogama City much more negative? One possible clue is the difference in the levels of satisfaction toward their local community between Sendai City and Shiogama City, and not for economic reasons. According to the results of the qualitative study, in Sendai City, 71% of the respondents are satisfied with their current local community, and on the other hand, in Shiogama City, 47% of the respondents answered that they were satisfied with the current local community. There is a 24% difference between the two cities. In Shiogama city, 50% of the residents said that they were not satisfied with their local community, more than twice the number of Sendai City which was 24%. One can infer that people are more influenced by their ties to the community or that the levels of satisfaction with their community influence residents’ perception towards recovery.

The definition of “local community” has been suggested by many scholars, but in this paper, the community is defined as places, society or group of people who share a common residential region and relate to each other in production, government, customs, and culture.

The author conducted further research on this matter and uncovered the following information regarding the issues of the local community. The man in his 60’s who lived on the Katsura Island in Shiogama City and moved to temporary housing in the mainland said, “I used to live in an environment where I was surrounded by neighbors that I had known since childhood and had the feeling that I was living together with my family and the people around me, but now I’m living alone in a temporary house and don’t know most of the neighbors. It feels harder in some ways. There is going to be a drawing for new housing, but I hear it is going to be difficult to get housing that I want. There are going to be people who will be forced to move to places far inland, but that would be too much for me since it would be inconvenient and I would be isolated.”

A woman in her 70’s living on the Katsura Island said, “We used to get along better before the disaster, with a spirit of helping each other and communicating more. Something has changed us after the disaster. But maybe we can’t help it because the disaster was such a devastating life and death experience for everyone.”

Another man in his 70's mentioned the psychological effects after the loss of his community by the disaster. "Only a few died on our island, but the damage of the tsunami was extremely big and so many residents lost their homes and had to move off of the island. The population was declining but now its worse, and it feels lonely."

Further, a man in his 30's living in the city said, "For me, recovery means 'change,' but we cannot see any change in our community. There is no visible change around us. When even young people like me can't see it, I'm sure older people who do not move around a lot are feeling it even more."

A fisherman in his 60's expressed his opinion saying, "The tide embankment project that the prefecture is pushing ahead in our area is troublesome. The prefecture is stubbornly pushing forward with their project, but that tells how much they don't know what fishermen's lives are like."

A point in common among these opinions is that the residents value their sense of belonging to their community and the wellness of their local community. These people count this feeling as a more important part of their lives. Even though their financial situation didn't change materially, the fact that their community was damaged by the disaster by neighbors moving out or the fact that they started feeling negative about their community affected the wellness of their lives. Even though their damaged houses were repaired with subsidies by the government, and they can carry on with their lives with no major financial problems given the pensions they receive, or even if they were compensated for disposal of their unsellable products, their feelings are affected by factors other than financial. Instead, they are affected by the quality of their lives which may not be replaced with financial and material factors. Further, it can be said that those non-economic factors have led to significant disparities in the people's well-being between Sendai City and Shiogama City.

What has been said in disaster studies to date is that socially vulnerable people who are economically vulnerable tend to have less access to various resources, which leads to less access to political influence, and that leads to disparities in the level of recovery. Undoubtedly, Shiogama City was saddled with more vulnerability with a smaller scale of economy and more aging and declining population. However, this study has revealed that economic issues were not the primary reason for the negative perceptions toward the progress of recovery by the people of Shiogama.

### **6.1 Case Study: The Massive Tide Embankment Issue, a Cause of Suffering for Residents in Shiogama**

One of the major local issues for the community in the reconstruction process in Shiogama City is the tide embankment issue, as one of the residents in the interview mentioned. This issue has led to negative feelings by residents toward the recovery and is representative of reconstruction policies that ignore the needs of many local residents. Many tide embankments, whose total length was about 190km, in the hard-hit prefectures of Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima were severely damaged by the disaster. After the disaster, Miyagi Prefecture conducted scientific simulations in cooperation with experts in order to set a new standard for tide embankments in the prefecture. The proposal called for new heights for the tide embankments which assume tsunamis that are estimated to occur every 100 to 150 years. Some of the proposed embankments exceeded T.P. 10 meters (T.P.= height from the average sea level of the Tokyo Bay) including those that are almost 15 meters high. However, this plan was met with strong objections from local residents.

The major complaints from the residents were that the embankments would take away scenic views, thus harming the quality of residents' lives and would negatively affect the tourism industry. Such high, lifeless walls would make life akin to living within huge prison-like walls and would make work difficult for fishermen as it is important for fishermen to be able to monitor conditions of the sea from the shore. The walls would actually be dangerous for residents and fishermen as they would not be able to notice even if there is an accident at sea. In the case of another tsunami, the walls would pose even more danger as residents would not be able to see a tsunami approaching and would not be able to escape. Moreover, some proposed embankments even for *uninhabited islands* were estimated to cost about JPY20 billion or about USD20 million of taxpayer funds.

In response to complaints made by residents, the governor of Miyagi Prefecture flatly refused to revise the plan, at the beginning, saying that protecting the lives of people in Miyagi is the first priority and the height of the embankments was determined based on a proper scientific basis. Further, the governor even refused to change his position on the construction plans for the uninhabited islands<sup>11</sup>.

However, following persistent criticism from residents and the general public, the prefectural government showed a change in their stance. In March 2014, the governor of Miyagi said that they could try to reach common ground with residents through discussions regarding the extra height they included in the estimate. That was effectively an announcement that the plan would be substantially revised<sup>12</sup>. Since then, there were some contentious cases that were successfully resolved after both sides agreed to compromise, but there are still some cases that are still in deadlock as of July 2016, and the residents are still contesting the height of the embankments.

The embankments of Nono Island in the Urato Islands are an example. The original height announced by the local municipality after the disaster was T.P. 4.3M, but the residents of the area have been in opposition about the height. The residents complained about the municipality's plan, and the municipality compromised and proposed to lower the embankment to T.P. 3.3M. But the residents did not accept the municipality's new proposal saying one meter does not make a material difference in the view and such a wall would still make the residents feel like they are living in prison and would harm the quality of their lives. The municipality and the residents have still not reached an agreement. The negotiations are at a standstill between the prefecture, which asserts that no further compromise is possible, and the residents who state that the prefecture needs to be more flexible in listening to the request of residents. Some residents have said that they met with the municipality, but the officials never listen to the voice of the residents.

Based on events to date, what is behind the conflicts between the municipalities and residents is the municipalities' lack of effort to try to understand the point of view of residents and lack of flexibility to resolve problems.

Needless to say, maintaining the safety of the region is important. However, people's "wellness of life" is not made up of just safety. Miyagi Prefecture has apparently put too much emphasis in scientific simulations, but such science is not absolute since the assumptions such as scale, location and timing of potential earthquakes cannot be one hundred percent certain.

Amartya Sen, economist and philosopher, states the well-being of a person can be seen in terms of the quality (the 'well-ness', as it were) of the person's being. Living may be seen as consisting of a set of interrelated 'functionings,' consisting of beings and doings. [...] an evaluation of well-being has to take the form of an assessment of these constituent elements. (Sen, 1995)

If residents cannot have scenic views which have always been an important part of their lifestyle, the quality of residents' lives would seriously deteriorate. Also, the lack of views would negatively affect the tourism and fishing industries which have been the source of their livelihood for many residents. Such drastic change harms and could eventually lead to the disappearance of the community.

Sen also states that to realize the freedom to live various different lifestyles and of well-being is valuable (Sen, 1995). In linking this perspective to the issue of the embankments in Miyagi, the government's insistence on emphasizing safety by implementing the high embankments deprives residents' freedom of choice to live desired lives. This forceful act of depriving residents of freedom would further expand the disparities in recovery and also in the capabilities between Sendai City and Shiogama City.

As stated previously, behind the negative perceptions toward the progress of recovery of residents of Shiogama City, there is a strong influence from the low level of satisfaction toward their local community rather than from economic factors.

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<sup>11</sup> Miyagi Prefecture Website, July 8, 2012 Minutes

<sup>12</sup> From the minutes of the press briefing by Governor Matsui in March 2014

## **7. Lessons Learned and Proposals to Improve the Well-being of Residents of Areas Whose Recovery is Lagging**

This section discusses lessons learned from the studies and attempts to propose how the quality of lives may be improved, and well-being may be created in areas whose recovery has been delayed. The key actors are the municipalities, local residents, volunteers and aid workers from outside and the mass media.

### **7.1 Improvements in the Reconstruction Policies by the Government and the Local Municipality**

A key lesson from these studies is that reconstruction policies by the central government and the local municipality influence the level of recovery in each disaster-hit area, and this influence, in turn, affects the level of people's perception toward the progress of recovery.

The results of the comparative study of regional conditions of the two cities show that the central government and the municipality pursued hardware-centered reconstruction policies under the name of "Creative Reconstruction" which has not brought ample benefits to disaster-hit areas. These policies placed emphasis on economic growth from reconstruction businesses and from big businesses that had bases in Tokyo with supply chains in the Northern and Southern Kanto regions. The policies failed to put top priority on the recovery in the life of each individual, thus creating disparities in recovery in different areas. In addition, the divided government at that time delayed the formulation and the execution of reconstruction projects such as the effort to buy up trade receivables of companies, farmers and fishermen's unions that were affected by the disaster, and thus delayed the rebuilding of local businesses affected by the disaster<sup>13</sup>.

Further, as mentioned previously, structural reforms which gave priority to large-scale businesses, relaxation of regulations for private companies using the special administrative area system, consolidation of farmland and fishing ports, building of massive tide embankments on the coastal area, and attraction of new corporations exacerbated the disparities between the big city and other coastal areas.

What is required of the government and the local municipalities is an emphasis on the point of view of the "Human Recovery," a concept that Professor Tokuzo Fukuda of Tokyo University of Commerce (Currently Hitotsubashi University) proposed after the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake. He proposed this concept in response to the Imperial Capital Reconstruction Design announced by the then Interior Minister and President of Imperial Reconstruction Council, Shinpei Goto. The reconstruction design, as declared by the government, placed top priority on hardware projects, but Fukuda asserted that the recovery of people is more important than the construction of buildings, upgrading infrastructure, the rebuilding of the major cities and the recovery as a whole. In another word, he emphasized the importance of placing maximum priority on the "right of life" and the recovery of the people affected by the disaster and the recovery of individuals<sup>14</sup>. When defining the "right of life," it means the importance of lives, businesses and works for people's survival. Spanning space and time, his idea has meaning for the current state of Japan which is trying to recover from the East Japan Earthquake.

In order to realize a more effective reconstruction from the disaster, rather than placing priorities as mentioned above, governments need to understand the unique attributes of the region and help the economy get on a more virtuous and sustainable path. The local municipalities need to try not to use government subsidies for the disaster in a one-off fashion but need to utilize those resources to construct drivers of growth and recovery.

### **7.2 Ties between Local Residents and Volunteers**

When the Great Hanshin Earthquake occurred in Japan in 1995, a significant number of volunteer workers from all over the country rushed to the disaster area. The movement received much attention and the year 1995 in Japan came to be called the First Year of Volunteers. This trend is still continuing, and 1,492,000 volunteer workers thus far have contributed to disaster-hit areas of the Great East Japan Earthquake (As of May 31<sup>st</sup>, 2016)<sup>15</sup>. Given their large number, volunteer workers have recently started to

<sup>13</sup> Tomohiro Okada, Research of Problems with Local Governments, "Disaster Reconstruction and Local Governments", Local Government Research Company, 2013

<sup>14</sup> Tokuzo Fukuda, Fukkokuban Principles and Problems of Reconstruction Economics, Kansai University Publishing, 2012

<sup>15</sup> The National Council of Social Welfare HP

exercise significant influence on disaster hit areas besides their general aid work, and have been helping rebuild the community for disaster-affected residents.

There's one case on Katsura Island in Shiogama City in which a family of local fishermen on the island started a new business venture based on a proposal from student volunteer workers. Some volunteer workers became interested in the fishermen's oyster cultivation during their volunteer activities and requested the fishermen to allow volunteers to try oyster cultivation. Based on this experience, the fishermen started oyster cultivation for tourists as a new business. During the months of February and April, tourists visit the area and seed the oysters, putting them on a rope. The following February, the tourist return to the area and harvest the oysters that have grown to maturity.

Five years after the disaster, the new business has expanded, although little-by-little, and currently customers have expanded through word-of-mouth and internet marketing.

Most of the volunteer workers are students living in the major cities with little experience with nature, and these volunteer activities have been a source of joy for them. Further, fishermen's families are discovering newfound values in their work as they interact with outsiders that had absolutely no knowledge about fishing. Hearing the reactions of customers such as "I had never seen the seedlings of oysters!", or "I didn't know the seedlings are bound by ropes like this," the fisherman's families have been pleasantly surprised that volunteers are impressed with things that they had completely taken for granted. This experience has turned out to be an unintended opportunity for the residents to discover value in their lives they had never realized.

Similar to this case on Katsura Island, there have been some cases in disaster-hit areas in which local people have rediscovered values of their livelihood and jobs from new points of view of volunteer workers and activists from outside. Cases such as these are leading to critical, new roads to recovery for the local community.

### **7.3 Efforts of Residents**

The residents have been making great effort to recover by themselves, as they realize their lives will not recover relying solely on the government and the municipalities. As mentioned earlier, the fishing industry, Shiogama City's main industry, was severely damaged by the disaster and many fishermen decided to give up their work as a consequence. The amount of the total catch of Shiogama has been continuing to decline partly due to global trends such as the restrictions on catching tuna, which had already been widening before the disaster. The disaster has exacerbated this decline. In this environment, there is one sector that has been growing since the disaster, and that is the wakame seaweed cultivation. The wakame growers cooperated with each other and restarted their work soon after the disaster even though their lives were severely damaged. To improve the yield from wakame, the growers tried various practices such as leaving more space between each net of wakame seeds to avoid overcrowding and to grow bigger and better quality wakame. The experiments turned out to be successful, and the catch has increased from 164 tons in 2010 to 322 tons in 2012, almost double the yield. Their efforts are continuing by making further use of fishing areas that are rich in nutrients.

In addition, residents are making efforts to recover and further develop their area by trying to attract more tourists, reviving a beach and some local festivals that that were discontinued after the disaster. The local festivals such as The Shiogama Port Festival and swimming at local the beach had been important parts of the people's lives throughout their history. Thus reviving these customs and activities is invaluable for the improvement of the quality of the residents' lives.

With regard to the role of government, it is imperative that the government policy enables residents to help themselves such as in the above cases and rebuild their communities and livelihood. Government efforts such as building large tide embankments and Creative Reconstruction have not aided residents on this front.

### **7.4 The Role of Media**

Finally, among the actors involved in disasters, the influence of media is getting more attention in recent years. A detailed discourse on the role of media is outside of the scope of this paper, but the subject is worth mention.

In the case of the Great East Japan Earthquake, various aid from outside, including volunteers, donation of money and goods were provided to disaster-hit areas. One of the key attributes of the disaster was that the damage extended to vast areas. One issue that was pointed out after the disaster, partly because of the sheer vastness of the damage is that appropriate amount of aid was not delivered to each area on a timely basis. There were some areas that got little aid although the damage was extensive, and there were some areas that experienced relatively small damage, but aid was abundant and concentrated. The same can be said about the amount of reporting by the media. Some areas received large amount of media coverage while other areas received scant coverage.

Studies in reference to the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami have revealed that the amount of media reporting influenced the amount of donations (Miura 2012, Numada et al. 2013, Matsuyama 2013).

There are some reasons for the disparity in the amount of reporting in disaster-hit areas. First, there was a tendency to give more media coverage of areas with more population and areas that were tsunami-inundated rather than to report on areas with more casualties and missing people (Matsuyama 2013). This meant that the media preferred to report on areas with more visually sensational scenes. As a consequence, coastal areas with fishing and farming villages which had less population were downplayed. Second, studies revealed that areas that have branches of the media companies such as Sendai City and Ishinomaki City tended to be covered as those areas were easier to access, and areas whose roads were damaged and were difficult to access had much less reporting. Third, in terms of Miyagi Prefecture, people in the area originally held the belief, based on their past experiences, that big tsunamis could hit the northern coast of the prefecture but that there would not be large tsunamis in the southern coast. That false belief is said to have negatively affected the beginning stages of reporting by the media.

Amartya Sen (2009) explains the importance of media freedom. Investigative journalism can unearth information that would have otherwise gone unnoticed or even unknown. Sen also says that media freedom has an important protective function of giving voice to the neglected and the disadvantaged, which can greatly contribute to human security (Sen, 2009). Further, Sen adds that media can give leaders of a country strong incentive to take timely action to avert crises (Sen, 2009).

Private television companies tend to have difficulty with fair reporting as they deal with viewer ratings and sponsors. The companies have been criticized for their sensationalism and unfair reporting, but the original responsibility of democratic media was to pick-up neglected voices and to convey diverse voices to the audience. As Sen says, it is critically important for people's capabilities.

Aid activities, including the donation of money and goods, and volunteers play extremely important roles in the circulation of resources following disasters. In order to mitigate the disparities in the level of rebuilding in each area, the reporting needs to be improved so that appropriate aid can be delivered fairly depending on the level of damage and need.

## 8. Conclusion

This paper focused on the disparities in the level of recovery from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami. The field research focused on Sendai City and Shiogama City to verify the existence of disparities in recovery between a big city and other coastal areas. The studies clearly showed that there indeed exist disparities between Sendai City and Shiogama City. Further, this disparity in the level of recovery of each area is clearly having an effect on the levels of perception toward the progress of recovery in each area.

Here are the likely causes of the disparities in recovery between Sendai City and Shiogama City. In Sendai City, whose economy had been stronger, the damage from the disaster was smaller than that of coastal areas, whose economic situation had been weakening. Sendai City benefited disproportionately after the disaster because many businesses from inside and outside the country gathered in the city to take part in reconstruction projects. On the other hand, the local industry and the community of Shiogama City were more severely damaged, compounding the previously existing problems and vulnerabilities in the area such as aging and declining population. Furthermore, the recovery of local small businesses such as fishermen and individuals were not given much priority by the government and Miyagi Prefecture as they pushed forward reconstruction policies of "Creative Reconstruction," which are aimed primarily to lead to the

economic growth and structural reform of the entire country. As a result, these policies led to the decline in the quality of life of individual Shiogama residents.

The disparities in the progress of recovery between the two cities and the expansion of such inequalities indeed show that the vulnerabilities of the area become evident by disasters and expand the damage as stated by earlier studies on disasters. However, the key finding in the case of Shiogama City through this research is that their economic vulnerability is not the primary reason for their low perception toward the progress of recovery. The factor that matters to residents of Shiogama most is the collapse of and the damage to their local community.

To improve this situation, first, the government and the local municipalities need to rethink their policies of reconstruction that place most importance on national interests and consider policies that enable the use of and add value to the uniqueness and characteristics of the individual area. Second, based on the local residents' experience with volunteer workers and other aid workers from outside the region, the residents' ability to make use of new connections and collaboration to create new value in the area has been found to be important. Third, enabling local people to help themselves to revive their area is crucial. Moreover, lastly, the media, which plays a major role in the allocation of resources following disasters, needs to strive for more fair reporting based on the amount of damage in an area and on need as such information flow has been found to influence the amount of donation and support in disaster-hit areas.

For the reconstruction of the areas which have vulnerabilities such as aging or a decline of industries, it is indispensable for us to consider not only how the working of politics, economics and society need to be, but also to consider the recovery of the individuals' lives, securing the livelihood of the residents, and recovering and improving the local community and their identities, which the residents have valued for a long time.

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## European Migration Models: A Sociological Insight

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### Abstract: Contested Alterity

“We asked for workers. We got people instead.” (Beth Lyon quoting Swiss playwright Max Rudolf Frisch on the cover of her book, 2016) This literature review evaluates the role of multiculturalism in Europe and its impact on social practices. Although ethno-cultural diversity has been for long the political kernel behind modern ideological state apparatuses, migration pressure on economic and political landscapes led to a growing skepticism in public fora, regarding the factuality of a harmonious heterogeneous world. Fears reinforced by the exposition of clandestine places of religious fundamentalism and seditious propaganda that put in peril the European civic fabric and its liberal values. Popular responses to foreigners and minority communities fluctuate from an enthusiastic acceptance to blatant intolerance; a state of emergency that brings the need of a new critical grammar of multiculturalism and integration (Leslie Adelson, 2005; Zygmunt Bauman, 2015).

**Keywords:** *tolerance, multiculturalism, integration, religion, freedom, alienation*

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### 1. Introduction

Conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Eritrea, provoked a dramatic raise in asylum claims, marking a turning point in modern European history. The plight of refugees and migrants has generally divided public opinion and policymakers (having the first influence over interest group strategies) between sympathetic grassroots movements and people who accuse migrants of being a threat. A political and cultural gap that has created a new ideological iron curtain, slowing down coalition-building. More than 480.000 people (escaping wars) arrived in Europe in 2015; an unprecedented volume that is bringing European countries to a breaking point (Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, 2015, migration policy institute).

Multicultural counseling literature confirms the unavoidable reality of mass migration and the subsequent exigency of novel conceptual schemas to cope with ethnic otherness. Unfortunately, the management (national and community-based) proved to be ineffective, inducing differentialist and xenophobic practices. From theory to policy, we witness an emblematic rapture between a substratum of cultural openness (of non-separateness and dialogue) and the clamant failure of EU institutions to have it translated into significant social impacts. Henceforth, the idiosyncrasies of a political pattern that while theoretically granting recognition, it erodes it by the lack of uniformity in usage, thwarting effectiveness and a long publicized doctrine of *willkommenskultur*. What happened to Europe is the manifestation of a distorted understanding of ethnos and habitus; a dispute of rhetoric versus reality that spawns an aesthetic of sufferance and alienation.

### 2. Objective

The following exploratory essay questions the political validity of national and transnational mechanisms actuated in Europe (in the post Lisbon-era), to control geographical mobility and migration. It is also considered socio-philosophical aspects behind the ongoing hermeneutic deficit (manifesting itself in symbolized cultural boundaries) and the inability to construct a functional ecological model.

The debunking of alleged cultural universals has brought a re-formulation of the traditional political jargon with the annexion of what were considered less remarkable appendages of state-discourse: ethno-national identification and migration narratives. Scapegoating minorities groups, deportation of unwanted individuals, practices of inclusion and exclusion are new addenda of a sovereign power that, to enhance political desiderata, often fail to protect democracy. As a research, I wish to convey the importance of Σκέψις (skepsis/philosophical doubt) in investigating social events and practices, not to be controlled by

propaganda and embedded journalism. This paper should be considered a critical evaluation on what led the European Union to entrench exclusion and inequality.

### 3. Methodology

This manuscript is an exploration of modern perspective and contemporary political propositions regarding the cross-national humanitarian crisis that has wrapped the European Union. Construed on theoretical models of social attitudes/performances, it investigated the relationship between minorities groups and host societies. Although community development has a multivariate statistical history, I summarized political trends on an international scale, via reading of pooled cross-sectional and time series data.

Special interest is given to the philosophical treaties of Julius Wilson (1987), Jürgen Habermas (2001) and Zygmunt Bauman (2007) on how ghettoizing a *persona non grata* (the Agambian *homo sacer*), starts a downward spiral that outflow resources by the lack of suitable competitive advantages and escape routes.

Taking into account a highly polarized public debate, readers should interpret my work as a tentative to conceptualize political ecologies and praxes regarding immigration and by extension, those mechanisms opted by group-based ethno-cultural identities to adapt and survive (Fethi Mansouri, Boulou Ebanda de B'éri, 2014).

### 4. Results

Integration of migrants as implemented in European legal and ideological strata can be considered unsuccessful. *Pima facie*, liberal democratic administrations showed to be inapt or unwilful to solve ethnic and religious conflicts, embittering intern-ethnos historical tirades. Scholarly works indicate that aliens and group members of minorities are often treated as catalysts of psychological disturbances and violence. Moreover, asymmetries of economic and social development among citizens eroded cohesion and national wellbeing.

#### 4.1 Managing Integration

Due to the European immigration crisis ignited in 2015, by a massive influx of people, the integration of “new citizens” and the need to improve individual and environmental factors to understand cultural heterogeneity, are topoi of utmost importance. Tackling migration and managing denizens are problems that have to be addressed by concrete actions. Realpolitik-based government, although overlapping ethos with political calculus, seems to be the only fructuous choice. In examining social praxes and aspects behind the phenomenon, we should avoid a reductionist approach that evaluates the volume of immigrants only from a perspective of economic gain or loss (an echo of utilitarianism), to privilege one that also encompasses social and cultural coordinates. A way of dealing that allows a better understanding of the complexities and subtleties behind the diaspora and permits a more substantial management.

The huge flaw and the political vacuum created by an unprepared Europe, unable to curb the problem, have caused fear and insecurity among its citizens. A feeling of disendowment and powerlessness that can become a fertile humus for xenophobic and biased tendencies. Civic integration is an ample and articulated notion but in danger of becoming nothing more than a mere rhetorical exercise if social workers do not understand the needs of their clients (future human capital), in an ongoing struggle of inclusion. Hereby, a functional ecological dimension needs network-bridging opportunities based on institutions and communities level, an operational ground that targets service resources and develops mediating structures on a micro and meso-level perspective. An effective process is multifaceted, and it is designed *ad persona*, tailored on the subjects: a multidimensionality of strategic thinking that can be expressed by the following scheme:

- a) **Economic inclusion:** it concerns the attainment of economic independence through decorous job opportunities. Immigration brings (potential) benefits to the market economy, being also an engine of demographic growth. The misalignment between population decline (in industrialized countries) and occupational possibilities, produces spaces that immigrants can fill. The new

workers can lower the dependency ratio of an aging population (with few children) and consequentially alleviate the tax burden. Financial access is linked to economic prosperity and independence for those migrants that opt for long-term stays (through the processes of integration and settlement). Even if temporary and illegal migrants are still outnumbered permanents, international surveys indicate that settlers, unlike the others, are able to start up small activities and, participating fully in the mainstream financial and social system. An encouraging crescendo of economic and civic integration thanks to bank services and products developed specifically for foreign customers (AL Paulson, 2006). Illegal migrants, unaware of labor laws are usually exploited by unscrupulous employers. They perform menial jobs without collecting benefits. Having unassigned wages, they are not eligible to receive (full) social security or public assistance and cannot ask retirement pensions. A situation that brings Europe close to the USA, as shown in “The Settlement Process Among Mexican Migrants to the United States” (Douglas S. Massey, 1986) and “Illegal immigration on the US-Mexico border: is it really a crisis?” (Tony Payan, 2014).

- b) **Social inclusion:** a path that develops equality of access to enhance autonomous relations and kinships. The nexus immigrants-peril is emblematic of the difficulties of a multi-cultural dialogue. (Spatial) segregation, should be if not avoided, at least contained: a dichotomous approach that divides a society into opposite subsets, is fruitless because whereas it overlaps cultural singularities (underscoring assimilation), it promotes biases and sets the ground for future turmoil. Immigrant settlements need propinquity to the social arena, to expand solidarity and communality (to avoid what Giddens and Stein defined as “footloose relation”). In point of fact, institutional completeness of ethnic minorities has shown to foster integration and wellbeing.
- c) **Cultural inclusion:** the process of acquiring linguistic and cultural competence that leads individuals to understand the society they live in. On a multi-ethnic landscape, claims-making can face the hardness of recognition or ostracism, whenever they move aside from the institutional framework. Religious demands that go against secularized *acta politica*, posing an ideological threat, need to be avoided to favorite a constitutional patriotism (H.G. Soeffner and Jürgen Habermas).
- d) **Political inclusion:** In all three Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes (liberal, conservative and social democratic), the regulation of the legal status of immigrants (from aliens to citizens) conveys political incorporation and engagement. Although theoretically, migrants have the same rights of the host populations, Garbaye (2004), highlighted that under the skin of fairness, it is present a strong inequality (as political polarization). A mismatch (evolved into stark class differences) that can be lessened only when (local) government organizations take action to promote minority representation in electoral competitions (David Karl, 1983; Philip Oreopoulos, 2009). The same asymmetry is also experienced in the labor market, with lowered (nominal) wages and a higher level of unemployment. In a qualitative follow-up survey conducted by J-Pal (2008) in Canada and the USA, it is emerged that applicants with a white sounded name get more callbacks than others (with African or Middle-East origins). In a political playground, migrants and other disadvantaged groups are often excluded from useful participation (Young, 2000).

The main vehicles of a proficient integration (resulting in long term job careers) are language fluency of the host community (dual language development) and culture knowledge. It is a two-way process (between distinct identities) where both sides actively seek a common understanding to ensure sustainable results (Hans-Jürgen Krumm & Verena Plutzar, 2004). Awareness-raising activities are helpful to strengthen psychosocial adaptation and self-identification. Government incentives (on the job or vocational training), empower and engage individuals in civic life via political involvement.

The centrality of the (human) persona (seen as a summa of inalienable values/rights) is a condition *sine qua non* of any negotiation or discourse between immigrants and host countries, whose inter-action can be damaged by spins that equate aliens' to domestic and international threats (hence blurring the boundaries between immigration and crime). Offenses committed by denizens cannot be downplayed, but at the same time, it is unfair to allegedly connect them to illegal activities *a priori*. Even when we consider "illegal aliens" *personae non gratae* we face an ethical conundrum: the conventional wisdom enlaces public opinion to a judicial consensus, but it is a misconception that can generate interpretational mistakes. Collective judgment is generally negatively biased, understanding their presence as an ongoing misdemeanor or offense, a mythical claim that has no legal base, being only a clandestine entrance a crime (actually only an administrative infraction) but not the consequential undocumented presence on a national soil. A foreigner whose existence can be interpreted as illegal entry is *de jure* expellable only if not eligible for asylum or refugee status but the position of being present without a Visa is not *actus reus* (Elie Wiesel, 2008). Words matter and mislabeling is a tool of politically overstretched accusations to dehumanize people and to cement prejudices, setting an inaccurate frame. The collateral civil penalty of deportation must be limited to grave felonies and act of moral turpitude, but not to light misdemeanors; we should avoid criminal charges as techniques of management and control.

Unlike the ground of exclusion, a proficient approach to noncitizens is based on a discourse of alterity, understood as a positive driving force, opposed to racism and cultural bigotry. Whereas racism involves categories and pejorative labels (literal or transitive sense) that destroy intergroup resources, functional (multi)culturalism recognizes the importance of positive in-group and out-group strategies to foster sympathy (as a communion of feelings) and understanding among social actors. In cluster analysis, siting and conceptualizing cultures on a correct perspective (that examines substantive differences among them) without erecting ideological frameworks, benefit cross-cultural comparison, and mediation. A vision that does not overrun cultural differences but disempowers racial markers.

In an organizational scheme, it is relevant to pinpoint how the integration (of migrants and ethnic minorities) refers, on one hand to background material conditions (constituted by economic and educational help) and on the other to multilevel social analysis (politically and community context). A conceptual dualism that avoids endangering the fragility of the interplay, whose tenet is a person-centered approach. Predictors of social incorporations recognize in disintegrating tendencies (religious fundamentalism and political radicalization) a likable outcome of a managerial inability to cope with the alterity (Collins & Yearley, 1992).

As written afore, secular states must take cautious steps when addressing cultural lexicons, not to permit a legal climate that favorites undemocratic claims<sup>1</sup>. No elements of arbitrariness can be conceded: understanding differences and tolerance are acceptable political conditions only when they are not detrimental to democracy and statehood identity. Longitudinal studies exhibit that integration of ethnic subpopulations is a phenomenon that takes time, in virtue of a knowledgeability inextricable from social practices (Collins & Hoopes, 1995). The effects of acculturation can start appearing substantially in the second or third generation of immigrants. Giovanna Zincone and Tiziana Caponio in their analyses of urban policies and governance (2010) believe that key elements of a successful policies are:

- a) An objective-aspect concerning a social and economic profit maximization of the phenomenon of immigration for the host country, through the promotion of legal flux of high-skilled foreigners, in lieu of an uncontrolled one. A policymaking of integration and a sustainability ethic that better democracy. The Browne report (2003) demonstrated clearly how in England, an uncontrolled demographic mass immigration is a leading vector of social inequality, crimes, and diseases (TB and HIV *in primis*). The rapid growth weakened stability and augmented racism, leaving mindful integration unmet. The situation calls to mind the Hardin' lifeboat metaphor (1974) where it is explained that every nation has a limit capability that cannot be exceeded not to incur in a socio-economic collapse.

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<sup>1</sup> Dismantling a sect or a credo when reputed hostile should be a possibility (fostered by judicious encouragement), in constitutional provisions (Russell Blackford, 2012).

- b) The National tutelage of human rights and civil liberties (welfare regime) to rule out apartheid and favorite cohabitation (Darko Suvin, 2006) and the need of self-determination. In-state tuitions to guarantee educational services and encourage political engagement. In anchoring otherwise disqualified migrants (especially their children) to education and knowledge sharing, we enrich social cohesion. It is also noted that educational attainment is higher in those countries unaffected (on a macro level) by deep economic misalignments (Angelos Agalianos, European Commission, 2008).
- c) A positive interaction between immigrants and national agencies that operate through territorial surveillance and control procedures, to avert conflicts.
- d) Settling on state discourse about brain drain and the pervasive evidence of fiscal losses and the induction of occupational distortions, policy responses are aimed to enhance functioning governance of developing (or post war) countries, to block foreseeable hemorrhages of talents (Paul Collier, 2014). Political scientists should take into account Albert Hirschman, and his work "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty" (1970), where he subtly pinpointed how a borderless world causes harm to countries that need reforms but whose (best)citizens preferred to live abroad (choosing to exit in place of voicing their dissatisfaction). Loyalty to a cause (or transversally, to a nation) can make people stand and fight rather than moving away. The ideology of exit is a two-headed coin that while offering unhappy individuals the opportunity to start again, it weakens social environments of its most quality-conscious customers (Albert O. Hirschman, 1970).

#### 4.2 Following the White Rabbit

Nowadays the large majority of world countries is characterized by in loco cultural diversity. There are only few places where all citizens speak the same language or belong to a common ethno-national group. However, globalization and political interest in foreign markets, are making their borders porous. This ongoing difference in ethos/nomos is an unavoidable element inside modern societies and, together with the need of organizational development models, is behind the urge to question the limits of cultural comparability. Within any linguistic-territorial unit, there are groups that by virtue of body size or political superiority represent a majority compared to minorities that cohabit the same space. Eventually, minorities ask an acknowledgment of their political identities, fighting for their creative social role against the political inertia of the ruling apparatus.

The Western world after being driven for decades by liberal-democratic principles, it is now evaluating different formulations of justice, in approaching inter-group problems and migrants (that pose a vexing challenge). It is worth to remember that liberal democratic rights are not the same as human rights, being only the latter universally binding and therefore, they cannot be granted or enforced internationally by legal automatisms (John Rawls, 2005). After the second war world, philosophers like Robert Nozick believed that only a minimal state presence was necessary to solve ethnic conflicts, arguing against the conferment of tailored-privileges to minorities. It was thought that the universality of human rights was sufficient to guarantee political and civic engagement, leaving ethnos-national disputes to community consultations. Consequently, the general trend of post-war politics gathered around the idea that members of a minority who were bestowed an equality of treatment as citizens of a country (subjective human rights), could not claim further political instruments for their racial or ethnic identities.

The realm of cultural and religious ideas, (legitimated in traditions), was considered an area of the private sphere, closed to a public discourse (Preston, 2000). States offered elements of relative autonomy to individuals to express their beliefs but at the same time, enforced sanctions (both pervasive-formal and pervasive-informal) against who tried to extend an ideological network. A "benign neglect" approach (Nathan Glazer, 1975) that separates a state from ethnicity precluding recognition to group-specific advantages. It is true that many (left) political theorists outlined exceptions, setting a different framework (affirmative action) to help disadvantaged/discriminated minorities but always limiting it as a temporary and remedial measure (*extrema ratio*).

The governmental affirmative action in allocating (temporal) benefits did not end the political space between state and ethnicity, neither the constitutional doctrine that subdues private interests to public ones (Jed Rubinfeld, 1997). Minority rights could not be ascribed as constitutional, lacking homogeneity and a precise legal definition, standing on a theoretical dichotomy between universality and particularity (Ignatieff, 2003). We witness at this moment a gap created by the inability of political agencies to negotiate through a cultural narrative, falling into a structural inadequacy unable to move beyond basic human needs. A sterile abstract universalism that eclipsed particularism, overlapping individual demands with social necessities.

For Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka (2009), the erroneous ethnic conflict management failed to adopt formal acknowledgment of fringe cultures and recognition of special statuses, exacerbating the dilemma between *polis* and *oikos*. Jürgen Habermas (2010) and Charles Taylor (2012) also argued that the complete absence of a mere form of proceduralism and the ideological impossibility of democracies to be neutral (especially when cultures or ethnic identities are considered) perorate injustice. A disequilibrium that had its origin in the impossibility for a state to renounce its own cultural/social identity, as a set of rules and ideologies rooted in its history. On a constitutional perspective, judicial equality was referred as the product of the conferral of different rights (but always after the dutiful acceptance of common political values), aimed to create more progressive outcomes. A theory challenged by Turkish American political theorists Seyla Benhabib (2014) and Joseph Carens (2015) who emphasized its incompatibility with liberal philosophy, especially if rights were given *ad infinitum*. According to them, allocating privileges (or immunity clauses) undermines state power via internal restrictions of its authority, an unacceptable liability.

#### 4.3 Theoretical and Political Perceptions of Multiculturalism: Rhetoric versus Reality

Charles Taylor suggested (1989) a project of modernity (based on historical contingent changes) in which individuals are driven by idea(l)s of dignity and freedom, in dialogic intercourses. Referred here is a discursive knowledgeability not to be interpreted as metaphysical but anchored to social processes (as stage-setting), where agency and selfhood are tokens of subjects relating to other subjects qua subjects. In fact, from a construction perspective, utterance is a basilar condition for human communities, enlarging of semantic meaning action-like modes of expression. To understand this axiom, one need look no further than the Saphir-Worf hypothesis and its conceptualized nexus between lingua and culture. A pathway that exposes the cross-cultural roots of modernity, bringing us to a critical recognition of pluralism as necessary sub-stratum and, transversally to envision its heterogeneity. Implied here is the logical difficulty for a functional society to be blind to differences and to the dangerousity of inter-group estrangement. The metaphors of location and positionality are useful strategies to understand personal narratives and permit political investment to be located into precise social spaces and hence, to determine capability. In this geography, exclusion and integration are both products of a communication competence.

Veritably, daily life practices are loci of re-adjustment of meanings by which, differences and discourses are translated and adapted to be used in a continuum of scenes and possibilities. To this end, Mahoney and Thelen's researches highlighted the path-dependency of institutions and human groupings, whose inner plasticity and potential heteroclitism lead to a substantial degree of fluidity (Baumann) and the negation of a homeostasis. Thereof, unlike liberal theories that treat particularism as unwanted (cultural) dust to sweep under the rug, we should consider it the real base of a modern (polyphonic/liquid) society and move accordingly.

The concept of recognition is central because it allows the construction of a persona to be enlaced with both public-institutional (*polis*) and private-subjective (*oikos*) spheres. Political desiderata apart, having acknowledged the dynamic nature of social ontogenesis, there is the need to leave behind biased semantic alignments that negatively influence assumptions and expectations, to ensure a respectful interaction and to build up trust. Not to embrace multiculturalism (or symbolic actions) uncritically but, through an interplay of agency and structure, to understand the complexities and breadth of communication, while fostering practices of solidarity. From this point of view, a future-oriented perspective in the conflict-negotiation process (in-group and out-group), strategically staged to be proactive against low-grade situations (and thus preventing further escalation), is fundamental for the wellness of nations (Samovar &

Porter, 1994). In sum, to guarantee an interdependent construal of Self and move beyond the aridity of a cultural monotheism, we need to be mindful of cognitive and behavioral blinders, “*striving to reach a larger community goal*” (Samovar & Porter, 1994:371).

Multiculturalism and cultural pluralism are often confused as synonyms to indicate the ongoing presence in a state of different symbols, languages, and cultures. A misunderstanding that hides a subtle conceptual discrepancy: while pluralism is a descriptive category, multiculturalism is a normative/prescriptive one. Multiculturalism refers to politics that recognize a pluralist framework and adopt or change legal strata to promote equality and freedom. Liberal democracies can accept many forms of cultural diversities but not all of them, due to political limits. Further, Tolerance is considered intertwined with independence, a link that upholds unlimited personal development. From this point of view, liberalism cannot coexist with those ideologies that restrain individuals on a set of specific values. The outcome of facing un-liberal groups can be moral intolerance, the end of a multicultural stand (the ideological-conflict hypothesis) and the beginning of asymmetric violence (state-individuals). For Renzo Guolo (2009), Ambrosini Maurizio (2013) and Mario Catarci (2014), in contemporary Europe, there are four main responses to immigration crisis and minority claims:

- a) The first reaction is a hardening of liberal ideals of universalism and equality against what is described as (detrimental) tribalism and fundamentalism. A sclerosis motivated by the fear that a rule based approach (secularism) is at risk with the antagonist and undemocratic cultures.
- b) The second reaction comes from who (like Habermas and Michael Walzer) refuse multicultural claims as illegitimate and ethically wrong. In this view, minorities must abide to state laws and not ask different legal treatment. Professor Jagdish Gundara (2005) zeroed in on education as a medium to accept and introject social values of a host country, to avoid marginalization of groups.
- c) The third response considers subjective rights and liberal neutrality (the separation between ethnic groups and state) insufficient to confer full equality/dignity among different individuals. Cultural rights are seen as a feasible choice to protect minorities against assimilation. Tailored treatments are part of an affirmative action that recognizes that minorities incarnate various cultural identities and needs. Will Kymlicka and Joseph Raz shoulder this position, considering it a healthy background for a modern multicultural scene.
- d) The last riposte is similar to the first one, considering multiculturalism dangerous and unadoptable within a liberal spectrum. But, while the first adopts universalism and equality as key factors to protect society against fissiparous ideologies, the latter comes to refuse the liberal-democratic theory as (oppressive) unattainable utopia. It is a post-modern way of thinking that de-constructs without offering solutions, on the verge of constitutional anarchy. A critic to the western political philosophy that ends up in being an empty shell.

A multiculturalist inclusive model, able to guarantee social cohesion, should be based on a shared civic nomos, political engagement, and pluralism (to increase the visibility of minor groups). Hence, it is fundamental to build a popular consensus around procedural aspects, rather than on specific ethnic values. Normative interventions (on them) are to be avoided unless they violate the principles of public order, being influenced more by social interaction than proscriptive dimensions.

As noted in the previous paragraphs, claims that are in blatant violation of constitutional principles are to be banned. Conversely, there is a need to limit constraints on subjective rights to avoid deculturalization, subsuming personal freedom under civic participation. Citizenship is an essential legal instrument to obtain political loyalty, and its acquisition has to be simplified, though the progressive extension to foreigners of voting right, starting from administrative elections. The lack of it weakens legal arguments against migrants and breaks the (liberal democratic) nexus between taxation and political representation. We should move away from a notion of voting as a privilege that can be discretionally offered or withhold, in an effort to stop disenfranchisement: social capital is ruined by discrimination and institutional inequality, pulses that bring into existence frustration and fractuosity.

#### 4.4 The Failure of European Models

The European Union was considered a successful model of integration where diverse populations share the same social space (agora). A structure based on agreed (joint) leadership that promotes regional cooperation among (continental) countries, to support the respect for linguistic and cultural diversities. However, over the last three decades, the impact of large-scale migration from the developing world (known as diaspora politics) reshaped EU, widening a spectrum of analysis focused on a democracy-mobility nexus. The emergence of the (uncontrolled) flow put the whole fabric of society at risk, having impoverished lives, due to its breakaway tendencies that erode democracy. The problem opened the door for a negotiation of perceiving compatibility versus enmity to influence to what extent political rights should be offered to denizens (Hammar T., 1990) and on what legal ground future citizenships can be given. It is a social issue cored in a globalized paradigm shift undergone by world states to free not only goods (economy) and workforce (human capital) but also individuals with specific cultural and religious grounds. Identities that unlike the past, demand particular rights and acknowledgment of their needs.

Forced to sustain social cohesion and avouch for rights, European societies elaborated different models (orbiting around an ethnocentric or universal scheme) to manage the cultural integration. France offered an assimilation policy with national loyalty as driving vector, while British and Holland adopted a multicultural stand. Germany implemented the *gastarbeiter* (guest worker) program to benefit the economy and fill labor shortages, under rotating shifts. For years, Belgium limited labor migration (without preventing family reunifications), formulating naturalization merely on the principle of the *jus soli* (citizenship/right of the soil), without requiring any other social attributes (such as linguistic knowledge). Other countries, like Italy, followed for many years the *jus sanguinis* (citizenship/right of the blood) but offered partial welfare services. Although orienting public policies and prescriptive dimensions, these models are outlines, idealistic constructions that cannot completely encompass the difficulties of facing alterity, due to structural inadequacies present in every social theoretical formula.

I particularly find interesting the French model based on the principle of equality under the law. An ideological apparatus that grants memberships through the subordination of requests of collective rights and preferential treatments to secular and universal values (France banned face covering in 1989). The path to obtaining citizenship is based on the acceptance of national values, a *nomos* of rules that has to be introjected and followed. Public spaces are formulated on a negative laity that excludes the presence of religious symbols as inimical of Republican principles. (Mainstreaming) Integration of migrants is formulated on state ideology through social programming (area-based approach) to strengthen social glue and international linkage (Angéline Escafré-Dublet, 2014). This inclusive model does not drive back population-swelling immigration and, in theory, it simplifies citizenship requirements.

The effectiveness of the integration can be undermined by incongruities between naturalization and complete social coverage, especially among people from the Middle East and Africa, in scattered municipalities. The insufficient enforcement of civic rights under regional mechanisms can be translated into a general disengagement (not due to lack of attentiveness) of migrants from politics. Religious beliefs are generally kept private and disbanded when made public, a policy that can spark cultural controversies or racially-charged messages. Critics of French political system recognize in it and its fragmentary assimilation, causative elements of friction, a hiatus between citizens and state regime. A point of rupture felt by cultures that do not detach personal credo from the public sphere, apparently refractory to secularism and social equality. A disagreement that can inflame social conflicts or (Huntington's) clashes of civilizations, phenomena avoidable through stricter controls and more pragmatic political agendas.

It is important to remember that Western model of enlightening was erected on a refractory or at least unwelcoming framework to cultural pluralism (but now evolved over time) and that often gave origin to indigenized forms of secularism, antithetic to a globalized modernity. In France, after the Revolution, it became a learned practice, embodied in people' agencies through a didactic method, which formed a specific habitus (Michael Warner, 2010), averse to religious dogmas.

Dissimilar to France, Great Britain, opted (after the 1960s) for a "light touch" multi-cultural stand that recognizes not only individual rights but also (collaterally) those of the membership group, offering a legal conscience more prone to (religious) freedom; a sensibility that provided assurance of autonomy and privileges. A political landscape with social treatments that (rhetorically) champions diversity (not

equality), while encouraging compliance with the state (as guarantor), to avert discrimination. A balance of power based on collective negotiations that have social impulses, self-ruling. A sense of collective belonging (as a dialogic process) thought to supersede the animosity disparities created by the French policy of assimilation. Aside main stream rhetoric that pledges on the success of the system, excessive immigrations, and internal conflicts, have degraded public trust and alienated foreigners, fueling anxiety.

In a recent poll (2015), commissioned by the Huffington Post) it emerged that resentful citizenries believe multiculturalism to be synonymic of instability and unsafety, a not subtle innuendo to the advocates of a heterogeneous society. Multiculturalism failed because it was born on a deceitful base: a post-colonial syndrome that made the existence of a superior (meta-) culture able to fatherly embraces and organizes other cultures, an addendum of political calculations. A tolerance, placed into a top-down scheme that boxed in diversities (as sub-cultural classes) offering help, but demanding obedience.

Anthropology teaches us that an inter-cultural dialogue is an osmosis between two different personae, who without dismantling their ethical substrata face diversity, weighing their assumptions, leaving open the possibility of a change. An equilibrium made by a similarity of roles and not subduction. Accepting social diversities is of great value, but it is more important not to stereotypes individuals, framing their lives into a unmovable pattern of recognizance.

The English arena and its immigrant-host model put on display clear institutional limits even before the terroristic attacks of 2005 (London bombings), heinous acts organized by British Pakistanis, integrated into their ethnic community but not in the mainstream political culture. A dangerous divergence that makes the management scheme standing out as one of the culprits behind the formation of parallel societies that while living together do not share the same values or principles. Self-segregation and the consequential withdraws from social interaction, created ethnic enclaves that cause community tensions (Deborah Phillips, 2003). A gullibility that has no excuses having resulted in the loss of innocent people, individuals who expected their government to protect them. A rupture that could have been averted, following what liberal philosopher Will Lymlicka (1995) proposed as an effective model of multicultural citizenship; a scheme construed around a governance that actively contributes to defining cultural and symbolic dimensions. An approach that suggests to use specific (but limited) rights to enfranchise poly-ethnic and national groups, to limit encroached discriminations to whom minorities are subjected.

Noticeably, in Lymicka's thought, against a larger jurisdictional openness toward national minorities, foreigners who voluntarily come to a country are granted less tolerance. Inspired by a theory of justice that has roots in moral philosophy, he interpreted any human exodus (when not forced) as a willful act carrying a degree of responsibility (and a consequent minor legal malleability).

#### 4.5 Bloodlines and Contracts

The Latin locution *ius soli* is a juridical expression that underlines the possibility of anyone born in a state to citizenship, regardless of the legal status of the family. In a debate that tackles whether the conditions for naturalization should become more or less restrictive, it sets a strong non-nationalist argument. The *ius sanguinis* is counterpoised to it, contrasting its expansive inclusion, with an acquisition of citizenship only through parental lineage. Many European countries considered the right of blood a *condition sine qua non*; a limit inclusion (against the expansive inclusion of the *ius soli*) that grants privileges only to those who are born into the ethnos (Philip Spencer, 2003). Immigrants are accepted as temporary guests (especially in Germany), often only on a workfare perspective (cheap labor shortage) as compliance with an economically driven approach to immigration (with states brokering connections in a sort of human trafficking play). Eventually, exogamic marriages, economic development, and schooling modify the situation, merging immigrants with autochthones.

Amid international similarities, the Italian situation can be considered worse than other European ones: the acquisition of citizenship is not regarded as a subjective right but as a discretionary administrative act, not even construed on precise legislative criteria. It is a hybrid (groundless) scheme, a disciplinary model often influenced by xenophobic policies. Italy showed a multiculturalism without "multiculturality", a situation that often leaves individuals in dismay.

The *ius sanguinis* was the legal scaffolding of Risorgimento (Italian unification), inducing communal participation and feelings of ethnical belonging, a true Weberian *politische vergemeinschaftung*.

Libertarian municipalism and localism, connected with an organic theory of the state (a contractual nature would have cast a shadow on its perfectibility), were the main axis of a country that was left almost untouched by migration. This conceptualization became the political mantra against modern processes of de-centralization and differentiation, of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century, posing state legitimization beyond the limits of a political sphere. In 2015, the government accepted a limited form of *ius soli* but at the same time, it did not dismantle the persistence of laws that denote a form of territoriality based on the all-inclusive ideological stance of the nation-state (Salvatore Natoli, 2014). Nowadays, with the breaking of cultural homogeneity, we should ask ourselves if democracy and liberal values are being empowered or damaged. It is a dilemma that, apart from the inadequacies of the Italian legal system, concerns us all.

### 5. Conclusion: In the Eye of the Beholder

Integration is a polysemic notion characterized by an un-univocally spectrum of meanings with qualitative-quantitative variations. On a cultural group dimension, a critical exploration would lay down also its background elements of creativity and reactivity that always stimulate resistance to cultural homogenization (John Berry, 2011). In complex modern societies, the ethno-cultural groups dialogue is characterized by a multidimensionality of meanings and praxis whose nature cannot be easily absorbed or assimilate.

The negotiation of ethnic identity is a political event that, in acting as a catalyst of social climate change, exasperate conflicts, and insecurity. Lassègue and Serenest, in their “Adskillensens politik” (“The Politics of Segregation,” 2008) criticized multicultural agendas as unproductive in preventing ethnic and religious clashes. Attempts that failed to bring political enfranchisement. The circular causality into which particular rights are formulated on behalf of a universal equality (that cannot be imposed institutionally), creates insular communities, blocking true democratic stimuli. An illogicality that lacerates unity, forming spaces of abysmal (legal) differences among minority groups, in a parody of a common ground dialogue. A mistake that did not promote cultural vivacity but a hardening of inter-group differences, often confusing individual freedom with *libertas ecclesiae* (as the right to promote religious roles and traditions even against the state), shifting from an Illuminist conception of the human persona to a dysfunctional political one. Social frictions and dissident movements, testimony the unpreparedness of a system cocooned in unrealistic expectations. The mismatch between immigration and integration has eroded the nation-building stage (Kenan Malik, 2015); a paradoxical truth hidden in systems that while promoting cohesion and understanding, *de facto*, institutionalized diversities (through laws *ad hoc*), creating those inter-groups divisions that were thought to reconcile.

The European models were unsuccessful because they did not critically face and analyze diversity, they simply let it in. Neglecting intercultural dialogue and overlooking geo-political limits cannot tie communities together, and in the end, they produce only chaos.

### 6. Afterword: Brexit

After a long campaign scarred by bigotry and nationalistic slur, on Thursday 23 June, the UK has finally abandoned the *Vieux* continent, leaving the population in dismay and sparking numerous debates about its (clumsy) future. Although the overall impacts are still uncertain, Woodford Investment Management and The Centre for Economic Performance (London School of Economics) believed that gross domestic product, financial services, and foreign direct investment, will face only short-term negative outcomes, lowering the national economic level of output. The UK did not leave Europe (as a free trade area), only the European Union (as a single market). Actually, it has never been really inside, only partially: one foot in and one out. It had relaxed Maastricht parameters, it was tactically placed outside the Schengen area, and it was even allowed to have its own coin, but it was not enough. English people were scared, afraid of hordes of unwanted immigrants (an improbable consequence of free movement rules), even undesirous of their Europeans brethren.

We cannot say that they were the only carriers of an anti-European virus, it should not be fair. They never had the exclusive in disliking unity, only a historical defensive vocation for isolationism. After all, even Europe and America, seem to be victims of a gradual desegregation and implosion, with behind-the-scenes stories of squalid xenophobia and hate crimes. Extreme positions that, as Noam Chomsky

pinpointed, are iconically represented by a legion of less educated working class white people. (Injected) frustration and a sense of uselessness are gorging brotherhood and comradeship, sinking families into despair.

In this worrisome panorama, the specter that wrapped London has the outlines of a populism without flags, a hybrid product of ultra-conservationist right-wing parties and a lost leftist enclosure. Brexit is a product of a fraudulent populist demagoguery and a widespread social myopia, unable to recognize the difference between equality and equity. We let it happen, preferring the easiness of localisms (and passive obedience to faulty politics) to the difficulties of an inter-ethnos dialogue and a more social openness.

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## **Saudi Arabia – Iran’s Foreign Policy Crisis: A Case Study of Execution of Saudi Shia Cleric Shaikh Nimr al-Nimr**

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### **Abstract**

Saudi Arabia and Iran have been in conflict since the Iran revolution in 1979. Three factors shape their relationship: 1) Sunni-Shia disagreement, 2) the rivalry to be the regional power in the Middle East, and 3) the politics in the OPEC. The execution of Saudi’s Shia cleric, Shaikh Nimr al-Nimr, is a continuing phenomenon of the protracted conflict between the two countries. The study found that the root cause of their foreign policy crisis is their rivalries for hegemonic ambition in the Middle East and a quest for leadership in the Muslim world. The sectarian divide between Sunni and Shia plays the most important role to ignite the hatred throughout the region. The impact of the execution was tense, whereby Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States cut diplomatic ties with Iran as a response to the burning of Saudi’s diplomatic places by a group of Iranians. However, the tendency toward a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran is unlikely because the highest-level of policymakers of the two countries are rational. They fully realize that if they waged war against each other, the result would be a catastrophe, not only in the region but to the entire world.

***Keywords:** Foreign policy crisis, Saudi Arabia, Iran, execution of Nimr al Nimr*

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### **1. Introduction**

This research analyses the execution of Saudi Shia cleric Shaikh Nimr al-Nimr and tries to explain how it has turned to be a foreign policy crisis between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The relationship between the two countries has fluctuated between normal and poor. There are several reasons for that phenomenon. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been competing to be the regional power and the leader of the Muslim world. Since the Iran Revolution in 1979, sectarianism has gradually appeared to be a major factor that divides them up until now. The consequences of the Arab Spring reinforced by the proxy wars in many countries, particularly in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, have increasingly worsened Saudi Arabia and Iran ties, with Saudi Arabia and Iran supporting different groups in Syria and Yemen. On January 2, 2016, a decision made by Saudi Arabia to execute the outspoken Shia cleric triggered a foreign policy crisis between Saudi Arabia and Iran, followed by Iranian protests that set fire to the Saudi Embassy and Consulate. As a result, Saudi Arabia cut all diplomatic and trade relations with Iran, followed by different degrees of cutting diplomatic relationship of other Gulf countries against Iran, except Oman. This paper analyses how the crisis developed, why it has not caused a war or confrontation between the two countries, and what are the consequences or impacts of the incident concerning the reconciliation of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

### **2. Objectives of the Study**

- a) To discuss the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran regarding the execution of Sheikh Nimr.
- b) To ascertain the root cause of the foreign policy crisis of Saudi Arabia and Iran.
- c) To examine the impacts to Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Middle East caused by the crisis.

### **3. Historical Background**

Before proceeding to discuss the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, we must first look at the role of the U.S. in the Middle East. Understanding how the U.S. has implemented its policy will help form a clear picture of the dominant factors that prevail regarding the relationship between the U.S and Middle Eastern countries. The U.S. has both economic and political interests in the Middle East. It has established economic interest since the 1930s, mainly concerning oil interests (Jones, 2012). Currently, the

U.S. still depends on oil from the Middle East, though its dependence on oil from the region has substantially decreased. The presence of its military bases along the Gulf States proved that the oil is a primary interest that has to be protected. This is how oil has turned to be a security concern for both the U.S. and the Gulf States. The historic meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud in February 1945 helped forge the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia (Jones, 2012). The Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, would receive the U.S.'s protection from any attempt of intervention. Politically, apart from the classical interest of the stability of Israel, the U.S.'s standpoint in the ongoing Syrian War to oust President Bashar Assad is another essential point for its strategic policy. The U.S. plays the role by providing support for several resistance movements in fighting against Assad's regime together with Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf States. This initiative is to ensure that the new regime is supportive of its interests. On the other hand, the Syrian army has been given technical, military, and monetary support from the Russian army, Iranian army, Hezbollah militants, etc. The U.S.'s combating against the Islamic State (IS) is another key concern for the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. In fact, the U.S. has been involved in all wars from the Iran-Iraq War, War in the liberation of Kuwait from Iraq's invasion in 1991, and the Gulf War II or Iraq War in 2003. The involvement of the U.S. has served both its economic and political interests in the area.

There are similarities and differences between Saudi Arabia and Iran with regard to their internal factors. Both countries share the same root of religion which can be traced back to the early age of Islam. However, there are many differences in their respective beliefs and practical principles. This has resulted in the Sunni and Shia schism. This factor is of crucial importance to understanding how Saudi Arabia (Sunni) and Iran (Shia) have little trust of each other. Saudi is Arab and speaks Arabic whereas Iran is of a Persian origin and speaks Persian (locally known as Parsi or Farsi). Moreover, the regime type also differs. Saudi Arabia is ruled by the absolute monarchical system while an Islamic republic governs Iran. Both countries rival for regional leadership with ambitions to be the regional power and the leader of the Muslim world. Nevertheless, the two countries are founders and significant members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (*OPEC*). This reflects the mutual dependence of both countries on oil. That is why the oil has often been used as a political tool, especially for Saudi Arabia as the largest oil producing country. A higher oil price will certainly benefit both countries while a lower oil price will more severely affect Iran's economy than Saudi Arabia.

Moreover, when viewing the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran through the balance of power perspective, we observe that Iran has attempted to increase its military capabilities, especially the nuclear weapons development so that it is able to balance the military capabilities of its immediate hostile neighbour. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia sought to ally with the U.S. for its security purpose and target Iran as a perceived threat to the kingdom. Therefore, it is not surprising to see how Saudi policymakers play the oil card in keeping the oil price low to deter Iran from having more capabilities to economically and politically recover very soon, despite the huge loss of oil income for Saudi Arabia.

The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran has been conflicting, though there have been attempts to normalize the relationship. Certainly, the negative relationship between both countries started from 1979 when Khomeini took over and overthrew the Shah regime via the Islamic revolution. The main driving force that led to deteriorating relationships was the Iranian idea of "exporting revolution", not only in the Middle East but throughout the Muslim world. This revolution has been understood by Saudi Arabia as a destabilising force due to its "repeated attempts to export its revolution" to other Gulf states (Kechichian, 1999). In contrast, Iran views Saudi Arabia as unfit to protect the holy lands of Islam. Iran's Khomeinist ideology was anti-monarchical which goes against the Saudi political structure. After the revolution, the relationship has been seen increasing mistrust between Saudi Arabia and Iran that ended their cooperative diplomatic relations and created bitter competition for power and influence in the region.

In revolutionary doctrine, Khomeini preached that revolt and especially martyrdom against injustice and tyranny were part of Shia Islam (Wright, 2000) and that Muslims should reject the influence of both liberal capitalism and communism, ideas that inspired the revolutionary slogan "Neither East, nor West – the Islamic Republic." Moreover, Khomeini developed the ideology of *velayat-e faqih* (guardianship of the jurist) as government, that Muslims – in fact, everyone – required "guardianship", in the form of rule or supervision by the leading Islamic jurists (Dabashi, 1993). However, Kamal (2015) pointed out that the

revolutionary values here mean the Shia version of Islamic values which originate from the core Shia principle of Imamate.

The Iranian action of exporting revolution has gradually become a critical point of sectarian conflict that plays an important role in Saudi Arabia and Iran's relationship until now. However, it is worth stating that sectarianism had not been a conflicting issue between Saudi Arabia and Iran before the Islamic revolution in 1979 because of two reasons. Firstly, the two countries were identical regarding their type of regime. Both ruled the countries under a monarchical system; the Shah ruled Iran and the King govern Saudi Arabia. Another factor was their shared concerns regarding the overthrow of King Faisal of Iraq by the coup in 1958 (Jahner, 2012). The incident had politically and diplomatically united them and given them opportunities to consult one another on their regime's survival which was threatened by the Iraqi progressive movement. At the U.S. urging, Saudi Arabia forged a measure of security cooperation with the Shah of Iran. In order to maintain future security in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to cooperate in the defence of the region (Eilts, 2006). David Long pointed out that "prior to the Iranian revolution, the primary political confrontation in the Gulf was neither Sunni-Shiite nor Arab-Persian but conservative-radical" (Jahner, 2012). Consequently, the overthrow of Shah resulted in a major shift in Iranian foreign policy which was more threatening toward Saudi Arabia.

#### 4. Foreign Policy Crisis

Based on Brecher's idea (2008), an international crisis starts as an external or foreign policy crisis for one or more states. It is interrelated with three following conditions; hostile act, disruptive event, and environmental change. These perceptions can be viewed from a state's policy makers of:

- a) Higher than a normal threat to one or more basic values,
- b) Finite time for response, and
- c) Heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities (war) before the threat is overcome (Brecher, 2008).

To summarize, according to Brecher (2008), "a foreign policy crisis for a state-actor arises from the highest-level political decision makers' image of pressure(s) to cope with externally focused stress. It also serves as the precondition, and marks the beginning, of an international crisis."

Then, the three defining conditions will be our main discussion on the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran pertaining to the execution of Saudi Shia cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr.

#### 5. Perception of Threats

Before discussing the foreign policy crisis of Saudi Arabia and Iran over the execution of Shia cleric, Nimr al-Nimr, it is worth viewing the perception of the threats of the two countries have toward one another for insight into current events between both nations.

Iran perceives Saudi Arabia as seeking hegemony for its brand of Sunni Islam and that Saudi Arabia is working with the U.S. to deny Shia Muslim governments and factions influence in the region (Katzman, 2016). Secondly, the U.S. and its Gulf states have cooperated in a security agreement which established the U.S. bases in many Gulf States; Iran views this as an intention of the U.S. and its allies, especially Saudi Arabia to attack Iran. Iran remains angry over Saudi Arabia's handling of a stampede during the Hajj in September 2015 that left more than 2,400 pilgrims dead, including more than 450 Iranians (Gladstone, 2015).

For Saudi Arabia, its officials repeatedly refer to past Iran-inspired actions as a reason for distrusting Iran. Such actions include encouraging violent protests at some Hajj performances in Mecca in the 1980s and 1990s, which caused a break in relations from 1987 to 1991 (Katzman, 2016). Then Saudi Arabia saw Iranian exporting revolution as the attempt to spread Shiism in the Gulf States and an ideology that harms the Saudi monarchical regime. Moreover, Iran's nuclear deal is a crucial point of concern for the Saudi Arabia of its hegemonic goal in the region. It views the deal as a step toward more engagement to the west, particularly with the U.S. Particularly, after the Joint Comprehensive of Plan of Action (JCPOA) had been agreed, it opens the gate for Iran for all developments, politically and economically. Nevertheless, Saudi reassures a close relationship with the U.S., despite the lifting of the sanction on Iran. Saudi Arabia

had made known its displeasure of Iran's alleged involvement in the anti-government uprising in Eastern province (where Sheikh Nimr lived) and worries about the future of Iran's possible involvement to train the Shia to revolt against the Kingdom.

## 6. Pre-Crisis Period and Arab Spring

The Arab Spring that began on 18 December 2010 in Tunisia led to instability across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and today we see political unrest in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain and Lebanon. The events of the Arab Spring have been seen as a movement of people to liberate themselves from tyrannical leaders and authoritarian regimes. The entire MENA has drastically changed toward different degrees of success and failure from the movements. The most dangerous factor is sectarianism which has become widespread and gradually rooted in the proxy wars in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and other countries in the region. Saudi Arabia and Iran play a major role to widen the sectarian division by supporting different groups in those countries. For example, in the Syrian case, Iran has sent supports, including its revolutionary guards, to help President Bashar al-Assad fight against Sunni-Syrian opposition groups which receive big money mainly supported by Saudi Arabia. In this regard, Iran has given between \$14 - \$15 billion annually to support Assad's regime (Bloomberg View, June 9, 2015). Such support has also been given to the Shia-led government of Iraq to fight against Islamic State forces when occupied land just 50 miles from the Iran border. Iran responded quickly by supplying the Baghdad government as well as *Peshmerga* force of the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with IRGC-QF advisers, intelligence drone surveillance, weapons shipments and other direct military assistance (Katzman, 2016).

The Saudi regime became more nervous when the revolution spread to Yemen, on its southern border, and Bahrain, a Shia-majority country ruled by a Sunni regime only 26 km from the Eastern Province. Saudi Arabia accused Iran of supporting the Bahrain uprising and sent troops in March 2011 across the causeway to help crush the pro-democracy movement (Bazzi, 2015).

Outside the Arab territory, protests occurred in Iranian Khuzestan by the non-majority Arabs in April 2011 (Abdel Salam, 2015). The Arab Spring movements in Saudi Arabia were small in scale but were led by a sectarian nature. King Abdullah responded to the Arab Spring by pledging to build half a million housing units for low-income Saudis; awarded two extra months of salary to all government employees, who make up a majority of the national workforce; and created more public-sector jobs. King Abdullah also granted about US\$200 million to organizations controlled by the Wahhabi religious establishment, including the morality police. In turn, the Kingdom's highest religious council issued a fatwa proclaiming that Islam forbids street protests. The ruling family also played the Shia card, declaring that the uprisings across the region were targeting Sunnis and being instigated by Iran (Bazzi, 2015). A demonstration occurred in the oil-rich Eastern province where in one of the protest leaders was Nimr Baqir al-Nimr known as Sheikh Nimr who lived in the Shia community of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.

Nimr raised vocal support of the movement in regions where the Shia area majority and have frequently complained of marginalization. He was seen as the driving force behind the protests, giving him a hero status among Saudi Shia youth. To the Sunni Kingdom's ruling elite, Nimr had, however, become a high-profile thorn in its side. Inspired by the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia's mass anti-government protests in 2011 included the public speeches by Nimr that urged an end to the Al-Saud monarchy and pushed for equality for the state's Shia community. As his role in the protests became more prominent, he warned the Saudi authorities that if they refused to "stop the bloodshed", the government would risk being overthrown (Townsend, 2016).

According to Mark Townsend (2016), the state-run Saudi Press Agency announced in July 2012 that Sheikh Nimr had been arrested and charged with instigating unrest, a chaotic incident during which the Shia cleric was shot and injured by police. Nimr faced a series of serious charges, including "disobeying the ruler" and "encouraging, leading and participating in demonstrations". Human rights groups including Amnesty claimed those allegations violated free speech protections (Townsend, 2016).

In October 2014, Saudi Arabia's specialized criminal court sentenced Nimr to death for seeking 'foreign meddling' in the Kingdom along with "disobeying its rulers and taking up arms against the security forces" (Townsend, 2016).

## 7. Proxy War in Syria, Iraq and Yemen

As far as the proxy war in Syria is concerned, Saudi Arabia and Iran have blamed one another for supporting different groups in Syria. In this war, sectarianism has been utilized to legitimate actions. Iran insists that Asad's fate be determined only by the Syrian people and not by outside powers. It is worth noting that Iran appears to be seeking to keep Asad in power, because: (1) his regime centres around his Alawite community, which practices a version of Islam akin to Shia; (2) he has been Iran's closest Arab ally; (3) Syria's cooperation is key to the arming and protection of Iran's arguably most cherished ally in the Middle East, Lebanon's Hezbollah; and (4) Iran apparently fears that the Islamic State and other Sunni Islamic extremists will take power if Asad falls. Iran seeks to ensure that Sunni extremist groups cannot easily attack Hezbollah in Lebanon across the Syrian border. Both Iran and Syria have used Hezbollah as leverage against Israel in attempts to achieve regional and territorial aims (Katzman, 2016). On the contrary, Saudi officials have sought to position the Kingdom as a patron and protector of Sunni Arab interests in Syria while pursuing Saudi national interests in Syria relative to Iran. Saudi officials have consistently advocated for increasing pressure on pro-Asad forces in Syria, and the Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir has frequently repeated the Kingdom's view that President Asad must leave office either through negotiations or through military means. Many observers have interpreted this formulation as a commitment by the Saudi government to provide continued material support to anti-Asad armed groups in the event that efforts to find a negotiated solution to the Syria crisis are unsuccessful (Blanchard, 2016).

In Iraq, the U.S. military ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003 benefitted Iran strategically by removing a long-time enemy and producing governments led by Shia Islamists who have long-standing ties to Iran. Iran was a strong backer of the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, a Shia Islamist who Tehran reportedly viewed as loyal. The June 2014 attack led by the Islamic State at one point brought IS forces just 50 miles away from the Iranian border. Iran responded quickly by supplying the Baghdad government as well as *Peshmerga* force of the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with IRGC-QA advisers, intelligence drone surveillance, weapons shipments, and other direct military assistance. Iranian leaders also reportedly acquiesced to U.S. insistence that Iran's long-time ally Maliki be replaced, helping engineer his replacement by the more inclusive Abadi (Katzman, 2016, pp.12-13). For Saudi Arabia, in December 2015, Saudi officials reopened the Kingdom's diplomatic offices in Iraq after a 25-year absence, marking a milestone in a normalization of Saudi-Iraq relations that occurred since the 2014 change in Iraq leadership from Nouri al-Maliki to Prime Minister Hayder al-Abadi. Saudi leaders viewed Maliki as unduly influenced by Iran and have appeared willing to engage Abadi in pursuit of better bilateral relations and support of more inclusion of Iraq's Sunnis. Saudi officials likely view the increasing empowerment of Iran-linked Shia militia groups in Iraq with suspicion (Blanchard, 2016).

As for Yemen, it does not appear to represent a core security interest of Iran, but Iranian leaders appear to perceive Yemen's instability as an opportunity to acquire an additional leverage against Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Yemen's elected leaders have long claimed that Iran is trying to take advantage of Yemen's instability by a Zaydi Shia movement known as the "Houthis" (Ansar Allah) with arms and other aids. Even though there is lesser support for Houthis by Iran than that in Iraq and Syria, a senior Iranian official reportedly told journalists in December 2014 that the IRGC-QF has a "few hundred" personnel in Yemen training Houthi fighters. Iran reportedly has shipped unknown quantities of arms to the Houthis, as has been reported by a panel of U.N. experts assigned to monitor Iran's compliance with U.N. restrictions on its sales of arms abroad (Katzman, 2016). In September 2014, the Houthis and their allies seized key locations in the capital, Sana'a, and took control of major government locations in January 2015, forcing Saleh's successor, Abd Rabu Mansur al-Hadi, to flee to Aden. Saudi Arabia subsequently assembled a 10-country Arab coalition, with logistical help from the United States, which undertook military action against the Houthi forces. Some analysts have viewed Saudi support for President Hadi and the transition since 2011 as a hedge against potential threats to Saudi interests posed by a broad range of Yemeni political forces and armed movements, including pro-ousted Saleh movements, Houthi movements, the tribal and Sunni Islamist supporters of the reform movement, and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Blanchard, 2016).

### 8. Crisis period and Execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr

On January 2, 2016, Riyadh announced the execution of Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, 56, who had voiced bitter opposition to the Saudi royal family, and 46 other "terrorists". Demonstrators rallied in Qatif, Eastern Saudi Arabia, where most of the Shia minority live. Nimr was arrested in 2012, three years after calling for the Eastern Province's Qatif and Al-Ihsaa governorates to be separated from Saudi Arabia and united with Bahrain.

Tehran warned that Riyadh would "pay a high price" for the execution, but the Saudis call Iran "a state that sponsors terror". Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, ratcheted up the rhetoric, declaring "God's hand of retaliation will grip the neck of Saudi leaders", and Saudi would face "divine revenge" for what he claimed was the killing of an "oppressed scholar", who opposed Saudi's ruling family (Ladane Nasser, 2016). The situation transformed into a foreign policy crisis when on January 2, 2016, hundreds of demonstrators in Tehran set fire to the Saudi Embassy before the police made 40 arrests. In Mashhad, north-eastern Iran, four more protesters were arrested after a crowd torched a Saudi consulate. Even though, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani denounced the attacks on the Saudi Embassy and consulate as "totally unjustifiable" and this wording of Rouhani was understood as his intention not to escalate the crisis which was opposite to hardliner stance, the next day Saudi Arabia's decision makers quickly responded by cutting all diplomatic relations with Iran and gave Iranian diplomats 48 hours to leave the Kingdom (Sinclair, 2016).

The situation became serious when Gulf monarchies expressed support for Saudi Arabia, in particular Bahrain, which faces chronic unrest among its Shia minority, and where police used tear gas to disperse demonstrators. Indignation flooded the Shia world. In Iraq, hundreds demonstrated in the holy Shia city of Karbala and prominent Shia lawmaker Khalaf Abdelsamad called for the closure of Riyadh's embassy in Baghdad, newly reopened after a 25-year rift (Ladane Nasser, 2016).

Not only in Iran did the execution create widespread anger outside the country. For example, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah slammed the Riyadh government as "criminal and terrorist". "This is not something we can ignore," he warned. Thousands of Shia demonstrated in Pakistan and violence broke out in Bahrain and Indian Kashmir ("Iran-Saudi cold war grows fiery hot", 2016).

Tehran accused Riyadh of seeking to stoke regional tensions and said the Saudi decision to cut ties would not deflect attention from Riyadh's "big mistake" of executing Nimr. Thousands of supporters of prominent Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr protested in Baghdad to demand that it severed ties with Riyadh. Blasts rocked two Sunni mosques in central Iraq, killing one man, while a muezzin (a person calling for prayer) was gunned down in the south of Baghdad. Bahrain and Sudan cut diplomatic ties with Iran, and the United Arab Emirates downgraded its relations. In Tehran, 3,000 people protested against the Saudi royal family and burnt Israeli and U.S. flags. Saudi Arabia also cut all air and trade links with Iran (Townsend, 2016).

Another movement was the travel to Pakistan of Saudi officials to secure the commitments from Pakistan's military authorities that any attacks (perceived attack from Iran) on Saudi territory would elicit a strong response from Pakistan (Blanchard, 2016). While the crisis is partly rooted in the Sunni-Shia conflict, it is mainly a struggle for political dominance of the Middle East between Shia-led Iran and Sunni-led Saudi Arabia.

### 9. Crisis under Control

Post-crisis has not been well-reached; the crisis is still ongoing. It will probably take more than a year for its recovery as we had seen from the experience when Saudi-Iranian relations were at their worst since 1987. Saudi Arabia broke off relations with Iran following an apparent massacre of Iranian pilgrims in Mecca during a Hajj. That massacre led to a storming of the Saudi embassy in Iran by angry youths and the death of a Saudi diplomat. Saudi Arabia severed relations with Iran for four years in response.

While some scholars may be afraid of the crisis' escalation to war or confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, both countries are well aware of the catastrophe from war. If the war is intentionally or accidentally occurs, it will affect not only the two states and the region but the world at large, especially a great impact on the world economy given that the two countries are major oil producers. The oil prices would increase because of the limited supply in circumstances of high demand. However, major power

countries, particularly the U.S., will not allow that to happen because it will harm their national interests in the Middle East and slow down their economic development.

Saudi Deputy Crown Prince and Defence Minister Muhammad bin Salman said in the interview in the Economist magazine that anyone pushing for a direct war between Iran and Saudi Arabia “is somebody who is not in their right mind. Because a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran is the beginning of the major catastrophe in the region and it will reflect very strongly on the rest of the world. For sure we will not allow any such thing.” Asked if he considered Iran to be Saudi Arabia’s biggest enemy, he said: “we hope not” (Blanchard, 2016).

### **10. Impact of the Execution**

For Saudi Arabia, the worsening relationship with Iran could affect regime stability. There are emerging signs of disquiet with King Salman’s leadership, especially among the nation’s youths who are more attuned to events and developments outside Saudi Arabia. People are more open to questions about the monopoly that the royal family has in every aspect of the country’s political, economic and social spheres. Some protests have broken out over these issues, with some of the most high-profile unrest occurring among minority Shia populations in the Eastern Province. Moreover, with these challenges, Saudi Arabia could benefit domestically from the execution, which was popular among a number of Sunni clerics and pro-government loyalists. The execution may also be a reinforcement of the more assertive foreign policy stance of King Salman. By refusing to agree to Iranian pressure to release al-Nimr, King Salman may hope he has projected a position of strength at home and abroad (A Drum Cussac Global View, 2016).

For Iran, the current diplomatic tension with Saudi Arabia may play into an ongoing power struggle between hardliners and moderates. Since taking office for three years, President Hassan Rouhani has welcomed better relations with Saudi Arabia, as well as the rest of the world. Most prominently, Rouhani’s government has engaged with powers it considered hostile such as the U.S. on high-profile issues such as the landmark nuclear agreement signed in July 2015. However, Rouhani’s approach to improving relations with the Arab world has been criticised by conservative rivals determined to undermine him. Indeed, the attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran played into the agenda of hardliners, who enjoy the support of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Furthermore, hardliners in Iranian media outlets have called for attacks on Saudi government officials and military bases (A Drum Cussac Global View, 2016).

Currently, the Hajj affair is one of the consequences created from this hostility, specifically to Iranian Pilgrims in 2016, whereby Saudi consular services has not currently operated in Iran as it severed diplomatic relations with Iran on January 3, 2016, following the attack on its Embassy and Consulate in Tehran and Mashhad by angry protesters. It causes difficulty for Iranians to acquire Hajj visas for their travel and Saudi Arabia has also insisted that third country airlines have to transport the pilgrims, while the two countries would have previously each share half of the responsibility for their travels. Iranian Foreign Ministry official said that “it is obvious that a non-normal status is not acceptable to Iran” (Press TV, 2016).

Lastly, the impact of this execution has indispensably widened and continued the sectarian division between Sunni-Shia in the Middle East with ongoing conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and other countries in the region. Until the war in Syria and Yemen is resolved, the tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran would be probably able to resume to the normal relationship. The proxy war environment will also be reduced. That pleasant environment will help lessened hatred and distrust between Sunni-Shia in the region, but rather impossible to reach of its total elimination.

### **11. Conclusion**

The foreign policy crisis between Saudi Arabia and Iran on the execution of Saudi Shia Cleric, Shaikh Nimr al-Nimr, is a continuing phenomenon of a protracted conflict that has begun since the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979. The conflict derives from their competition for hegemonic ambition in the Middle East and a quest for leadership in the Muslim world. The rivalry has been reinforced by sectarianism, which was not the case before the 1979 revolution, but afterward, the division of Sunni and Shia has gradually appeared in their state-level relationships and has been empowered in proxy war scenarios, particularly in Syria and Yemen. The execution of al-Nimr has worried some scholars about its escalation to war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, it has confirmed their mutual rationality, not to

escalate to any possible confrontations but instead strengthened by sending more support to their allies, because both states know very well of a possible catastrophe that will not only affect them but the region and the whole world if they wage war against each other. The impacts are huge for Iran because it has cut diplomatic relations with some Gulf States where it seeks economic cooperation to improve their economy after sanctions were lifted. The Hajj affair is another difficulty for Iranian pilgrims, as they have to obtain a Hajj visa and take third country airlines after Saudi severed diplomatic ties and cut all air links with Iran. Saudi Arabia has been blamed for human rights violation especially in the case of the execution of Shaikh Nimr along with the majority of Sunni terrorists. The most critical impact here is a more deeply rooted sectarian division between Sunni and Shia in the region and its expansion throughout the world.

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## **The Concept of Biopower: The Use of Terror as a Political Technique of Controlling and Governing Citizens**

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### **Abstract**

This paper discusses how the concept of biopower explains the use of terror as a political tactic for controlling and governing citizens. It attempts to demonstrate that biopower adds something to our understanding of fear as a political weapon. The paper mainly examines what biopower adds to the analysis of the use of terror and power as being exercised over bodies and populations. It begins the analysis by tracking back to the mainstream political thought of sovereignty, power, and fear in the work of Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes and before contrasting these ideas with Michel Foucault's notion of governmentality to show what is distinctive about the concept in a systematic manner. This is followed by the third section that provides an account of the use of biopower as a tactic of governmentality. It explains how biopower is reproduced by introducing three conceptualizations; as a technique shaping good elements from bad, biopolitical territorial borders, and the biopolitical framework of representability. Lastly, the paper provides the uses of biopolitics as the way biopower exercises the use of terror in War on Terror. The paper concludes fear is rather created and constructed as a form of a modern strategic model of power to control the bodies and populations beyond the level of the state itself.

*Keywords:* Biopower, biopolitics, governmentality, fear, Foucault, terror, sovereignty

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### **1. Introduction**

'Terror' is an exceptionally inexplicit concept and has a wide range of meanings. In 1794, the term 'la terreur' was first used to describe a revolutionary in France. Unlike the way in which terrorism is commonly used today, it was employed to consolidate the new government's power and designate all dissidents who were not involved in the French Revolution as the enemy of the people. Later, during the First World War, the 'great terror' was used to describe the acts of Stalin by his political opponents. Following the Second World War, in another swing of the term's meaning, it was used in reference to the often violent revolutionary nationalist struggles that emerged in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East during the late 1940s in response to the continued colonial rule. More recent examples include the 9/11 terrorist attacks which redefined an 'act of terrorism' and led to the declaration of the 'War on Terror' (WoT), stated by former U.S. President George W. Bush who firstly used the term on 20 September 2001 (Gerges, 2009). Not surprisingly, the meaning of the word has changed over time to accommodate the political vernacular and discourse of each successful era.

The question bounces back, 'What is an act of terror?'. The word 'terrorism' was first popularized during the French Revolution. However, the meaning and the usage has been changing time to time in term how it operates. According to the recent frequencies of use of its definitional elements, the three elements that are most used to label the term 'terror', are violence and force (83.5%), political action (65%), and feeling of fear (51%) (Schmid & Jongman, 1988). Nowadays, the term terror is coming to a more common understanding as the above the use of its definitional elements, people tend to take it negatively, whereby the term of terrorism in the old times, the word was categorized as a positive reference. Contrasting commonly terrorism understood today, according to Hoffman (2006) terrorism during French Revolution meant to such revolutionary of antigovernment group undertaken by non-state actors. It was rather portrayed as one of the instruments of governance to established revolutionary state and specifically 'well designed and well planned' to consolidate the new government's element of power by frightening those whom government took as traitors and opposite side of the government. The meaning of act of terror has changed again by 1900s; it was depicted as the act of mass violence and repression employed by dictatorial states and leaders such as Benito Mussolini in Italy and Joseph Stalin in Russia in a straight line against

their own civilians as Social Hygiene and the Great Purge (1936–1938) representatively. (Goldstein, 2001). Following the Second World War until today, the term act of terror have begun to take the definition which is widely accepted today as the reference to the violent action by the nationalist, religious and specific political non-state movements. In recent, according to United Nations Security Council Resolution defines the act of terror as following:

Criminal acts, including (those) against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death,..., with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government.

(United Nations Security Council, 2004)

As such, Terrorism has been changing from time to time and thus, subjectively political labeled, creating the fear of terror amongst civilians in the state and substantially constraining them in a state of fear. Many scholars have defined the use of terror and fear as a political tactic and strategy (Laqueur, 1978; Genel, 2006; Pasi, 2012). According to Hoffman (2006), terrorism is labeled as an act of violence perceived to be against society; whether it involves antigovernment activities, organized crime syndicates or mob riots. Likewise, Laqueur (1978) also states, terror represents the most common feeling of wars in the last four decades. Therefore, the term terror in its most widely accepted contemporary usage seems to be fundamentally and inherently political. Consequently, the main argument of this paper is to discuss to what extent the concept of biopower can explain the use of terror as a political tactic for controlling and governing citizens. The paper determines to clarify the creation of terror and fear as one of the political instrumental and psychosocial weapon over the bodies and populations. The paper divides into sections; each consists of objectives, methodology, finding and conclusion respectively.

## 2. Objectives

The paper consists of a set of objectives that the readers can understand through the set of construal structure. The objective of this research paper is to look at the use of ‘terror’ as a political tactic in an alternative viewpoint. The paper aims to analyze this argument by mainly employing Michel Foucault along with his post-structural concept. By employing the usage of ‘biopower’ and ‘biopolitics’ as political techniques in the conception of governability, which in this paper analysis, this alternative theory gives more explanations than the mainstream IR theory. In this respects, this paper sees to details the important compliments in which biopolitical power could play a role in term of political tools and strategies used to wage the fear of terror to govern over the populace.

## 3. Materials and methods

This section provides detail of method used in a replication of the study. In the introduction part of the paper, researcher lays the fundamental formula uses for the whole work. It includes the background of the study, the statement of the problem, research questions and hypothesis, research objectives, and scope and limitations. The working approach draws both parallels of the mainstream political and the alternative literature from various cities throughout the state and from all levels of analysis. From the knowledge generated by this study, other scholars also derive proposals, in addition to those formulated by the researcher for further systematic research and theoretical refinement.

At the outset, the paper tracks back to the mainstream political thought of sovereignty, power, and fear in the work of Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, following with introduction of Michel Foucault theory of governmentality and the explanation of biopower as a tactic used in governmentality. The political framework of these thinkers is set to be compared and analyzed theoretically. Also, the paper emphasizes how biopower is reproduced by introducing three conceptualizations; as a technique shaping good elements from bad, biopolitical territorial borders, and the biopolitical framework of representability. As a result, it concludes with the ultimate tactic of biopolitics in exercising power to control the populations.

#### 4. Results

The paper opens with Machiavelli and Hobbes's statements as they both recognize that fear is the source of political power over people's life to maintain the ruler's sovereignty in the state. Machiavelli posts, one can govern and hold the power of sovereignty by emphasizing fear and love. Hobbes in along with Machiavelli posts in his theory of social contract whereby citizens should be governed by the hand of fear excising by the head of states. In contrast, Foucault goes further and develops these ideas beyond mainstream political theory. Fear, instead of in a great extent is used to indicate one's preference in a particular matter by the state government. It is exposed in the name of disciplinary power by the state over the civilians. As the result of the research, this paper concludes, fear is created, constructed as a form of a modern strategic biopolitical model of power beyond the level of the state itself, however, exists to constitute over the population's lives.

#### 5. Discussion

##### 5.1 Machiavelli, Hobbes and Foucault on Sovereignty, Power, and Fear

The relationship between sovereignty, power, and fear in political thought has been addressed by many thinkers over the centuries (as cited in Tickner, 2003). More than any other philosophers, Machiavelli's and Hobbes' basic assumption is to study the role of the government and the nature of morality in society. Both thinkers revolutionize political thought by introducing the use of fear in governing. In the first outset of the paper, it will first explain Machiavelli's and Hobbes's ideas before exploring the political ideas of Foucault.

During the 16<sup>th</sup> century the concept of the 'will of the prince' was introduced by Machiavelli as an absolute form of sovereignty to govern people in the state (Maurizio, 2010). As Machiavelli puts it, the Prince as the ruler of the 'state' is to secure the future of the 'state' using all means necessary. Machiavelli endorses the certain kind power of the state to exercising over its people as such killing, violence, and cruelty toward the greater good. Secondly, the Prince does not have to be concerned with model social and human behavior because bad behavior is excusable when done for the public good (Coyle, 1995). Machiavelli tackles the question of using fear to control citizens. He emphasizes that policy of using violence create fear. Fear is a means that can justify an end. Fear is a tool of prince's governing. Fear is a means of ensuring the security of the ruler and the common good. While, Machiavelli proposes that a characteristic leader should be both loved and feared (Patapan, 2006). Affection and fear both are both powerful drives for rulers. Nevertheless, love, darling, and affection sometimes forge a bond of obligation whereby fear modestly encourages obedience. Fear is a strong component that motivates people to obey the laws, orders, and social norms. Without fear of those consequences, states will be in the chaos with nothing fences the line. Thus, rulers will have no power to control the people under their authority. Machiavelli emphasizes that fear will keep the leader in a much stronger position. Rulers who have gained power through exercising their ability to control the state are in the most secure position, maintaining respect and continually asserting their authority.

Instead of focusing from the top-down sovereignty like Machiavelli, Hobbes believes that by analyzing the human instincts in 'state', one could design a system of government that meets the needs of its citizens and would promote good behavior and counteract bad behavior. Hobbes bases his argument on an articulated view of the state of nature as the condition of war of everyone against everyone (Hobbes, 2012). To avert a descent into the state of nature men must enter into a social contract submitting to the authority and protection of a sovereign. The reason people would surrender their freedom to an absolute ruler is that life in the state of nature is dangerous, so people will do whatever is necessary to secure survival. Likewise, Hobbes emphasizes the determining power of fear in the state of nature. Fear, according to Hobbes, suffuses and shapes human life (Blits, 1989). Hobbes considers fear to be the most powerful force in human life. At once the principal cause of war and the principal means to peace, fear is the basis both of man's most urgent plight and his only possible escape. Hobbes contends that a government is born as a result of a social contract, the result of fearing to feel fearful in the state of nature. The government will only exist if everyone agrees to give up his or her rights to sole sovereignty. However, the first difference

between these two philosophers lies in their belief where they place the role of sovereignty. Machiavelli points out what conduct he considers to be correct for a ruler to be able to exercise the power of fear to control his people. Hobbes, in contrast, believes that a ruler can do anything since every man has given up his freedom in exchange for his survival in the state of nature. Secondly, Hobbes' philosophical framework regarding the origin of government is more complete and correct than Machiavelli's version. The role of government in Machiavelli's philosophy is about creating a guideline for a ruler to acquire and to maintain political power. Machiavelli does not underline the origin of government in his work, whereas Hobbes tries to understand the formulation of a government by conceptualizing a world without a government to trace the roots and the reason why the government is important (Danaher, 2000). Although these two theorists explore the question of government and human nature slightly differently, they both agree that fear is a source of political power and that people are in a constant state of fear in the absence of political society.

Sovereignty underwent a transformation from Machiavelli to Hobbes, finding a more limited account of the sovereign right of death and power over life as conditioned by the defense of the sovereign (Dean, 2010). Although Hobbes and Machiavelli agree in terms of sovereignty in that the state has the power over one's life, their mechanism of sovereignty still distinguishes between the state and people within the state (Genel, 2006).

Consequently, Foucault criticizes mainstream political philosophy for its reliance on the notion of formal authority and its insistence on analyzing mechanisms of sovereignty. Foucault firstly states his thinking and theory during his lecture at the Collège de France during 1977-1978. In Foucault's work, he examines relations of power in such a way as to challenge the dominant state-centered understanding of power. The power rather than being centered on the state is diffused across a great many micro-sites throughout society. In Foucault's perspective, the state is the expression of the structures and configuration of power in society rather than controlled by individual sovereignty. Hardt and Negri (2000) have also supported Foucault and argue that there is a new worldwide 'network of power'. Here now, power is no long defined by the power of nation-states but instead by supranational organisms (Reid, 2005; Dean, 2007). Supranational organisms can be explained in term of the organ where members transcend national boundaries, or their interests are linked and shared among them. Within those supranational organisms, they neither use voting system nor legitimate power to exercise their order; instead, the power is exercised differently through governing over the body of its populace. This kind of governing is introduced by Foucault and called as "governmentality" (Foucault, 2008) Foucault introduced governmentality during his lectures on biopolitics at the College de France in 1979. The term governmentality is the combination of two French words; govern (governer) and mentality (mentalité), which can be succinct as the conduct of conduct. In other words, it has been known by another name as the art of governing. In deeper meaning, governmentality refers to the way of an individual's conduct is shifting away from a central authority such as states or institutions but being individually shaped and controlled among the populations. The concept of governmentality consequently focuses on the process of governing individuals on two reciprocal structures of power; forms of techniques and knowledge. Governmentality, in Foucault's eyes, is a hope to answer how individuals act, do and behave in the state and how they are expected to conduct themselves through obligating laws, norms, the expectation of social policies, institutions, and ideologies without noticing the state enforcement. Therefore, governmentality perspectives open up a new era of government.

Furthermore, Foucault's analysis of governmentality concerns the nature of sovereignty and highlights different kinds of power in society such as knowledge and the collection of techniques. Knowledge and social practice thus are linked to social power. He suggests that political theorists need to develop an approach to understanding power that causes changes in society. Unlike Hobbes who is only concerned with government in social contract form, Foucault specifies the relationship between sovereignty, discipline, and government. He suggests that it should be viewed as a "triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management, which have a population as its main target and the apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism" (Dean, 2013). To say, his analysis of governmentality can be understood, as the new entitlement of the modern nation state from "to let live and make die" as "to make life and let die" (Foucault, 2003a). His theory of govern with the mentality is a new way of understanding how the new formation of power dominates the states today.

Additionally, Foucault's analysis of governmentality allows more scope to identify a better answer to the relationship between fear and modern power (Debrix & Barder, 2011). Foucault poses that power passes through individuals (Foucault, 2003b). Foucault's concept of governmentality is different from Hobbes' because he poses that fear is not what the state lets people be free from. Instead, fear is actually what the governmental agent of the state reproduces over time to time to establish the control of the social body through preservation of life (Foucault, 2008). Foucault's governmentality points out that fear has to be made reproductively and continuingly within the society, in order to allow the sovereign state to mobilize death, fear and terror through "lives bodies in society" (Debrix & Barder, 2011). The development of disciplinary power over life is explained by Foucault who focuses on how the government uses fear to govern the population and to wage war in the name of life necessity. His primary concern is not with war understood as a source of modern institutions, discourses or practices but with war conceived as constitutive of specific types of modern power relations (Foucault, 2003b). Fear is thus a form of peace that takes place in modern societies realized through the war in which population conditions are variably manipulated and put to work in developing modern strategic models of power.

One example of governmentality as a way to control bodies lies in a designed prison 'Panopticon' by Jeremy Bentham. Panopticon is designed as a circular tower where there is an observation or inspection tower as in the center, and along with the main circular wall, it is divided into open cells with no fence facing to the observation tower. A single watchman serves as a guard in the tower where the prisoners are put into each cell and are unable to tell whether they are being watched by the person in the tower or not. The key point of Panopticon is that even though it is impossible for a single guard to observe all prisoners' cell at once, the prisoners are unable to tell whether they are being a watch. Accordingly, they must then act as they are being watched all the time. As a result, they must repetitively control their own behavior while staying in the cell. Foucault uses Panopticon as the grand metaphors to demonstrate how fear of terror and violence from a guard on duty can correct the prisoners' behaviors. They must behave, act and do well in order not to be punished. Nowadays, developing on Foucault's concept, the advanced technology has allowed for the deployment of panoptic structures emerged from Panopticon model, setting up throughout society. Surveillance by CCTV is an excellent example put into work as the government's observation tower of the populace.

As Foucault intimates, fear is what must be reproduced by governmental agents in order to establish control. It is indeed the case that, through a series of governmentalized techniques, fear has been made beneficial. Many scholars also state on this argument. Hobbes' model of the state of nature as a system of power and Schmitt's concept of enmity are premised upon the idea that a concentration of fear is examples of the political tactic of using fear (Schmitt, 2007). Therefore, in order to reproduce and use fear to target the population effectively, the government must have techniques of governing an anonymous mass of bodies rather than social institutions or individuals (Agamben, 2005). Among those forms of governing, biopolitics can be characterized as a political technique of governmentality for controlling and governing citizens.

## **5.2 Biopower and Biopolitics as the Use of Terror as Political Techniques**

The notion of biopower and biopolitics, for Foucault, are commonly used to describe a form of power over bodies and lives. These two concepts are closely related (Genel, 2006). The concept of biopower for Foucault is used "to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life" (Calhoun, Gerties, Pfaff, & Virk 2007). It is coined by the relations of a set power-knowledge reproduced by the government to manage people in a wider extent through state discipline. Foucault explains further as:

By this I mean a number of phenomena that seem to me to be quite significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the 18th century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species. This is what I have called biopower.

(Foucault, 2007)

Biopower thus underlines the practice of modern supranational organisms and nation states which uses to govern their populations through diverse of techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of entire populations. Biopower signifies the power or abstract force which is produced, exercised and realized through practices associated with the body and the mechanism of biopolitics such as strategies to affect particular things that depend on the human life in its biological dimension. The concept biopolitics, in return, signifies the specific set of techniques and knowledge by which one aims to produce the biological in a specific form of the techniques where biopower is exercised in its many forms of applications (Foucault, 2008). Foucault sees how the biopower being exercised through different kinds of series of techniques that control and circuitously operate within the societal body where the populations are victims. According to Foucault, he emphasizes governmentality method recreate individuals as docile of bodies to be reproduced and controlled by the political governing. Agamben (1998) also notes governmentality reproduces a “bare life” in which the species as a simple body becomes “what is at stake in a society’s political strategies”. Therefore, biopolitical techniques designate the way through which biopower is continually reproduced and sustained through life. Life here must be understood as a process comprising forces and desires by which the life of the species grows and reproduces. However, the actual structure of biopolitics is dependent upon particular political rationalities according to which one aims to rationalize the phenomena characteristic to the body of the population (Foucault, 2008). Biopolitics can be understood as three different ways to control and govern citizens: as a technique shaping good elements from bad, biopolitical territorial borders, and the biopolitical framework of representability.

Firstly, as Foucault claims, the biopolitical technique is designed “to make live and let die”, which later enabled a new form of governance (Foucault, 2003a). Instead of disciplining individual bodies, biopolitics seeks to maximize circulation, flows, and movement of people by shifting ‘goods’ elements of populations from ‘bad’ and giving a misidentification to people (Werbin, 2009). In the context of governmentalized power, the biopolitical production of fear features of the population became the target of political strategies. As Foucault claims, governmental agents always reproduce ‘fear’ in order to establish control. Through a series of governmentalized techniques fear has been made beneficial. For instance, biopower according to the concepts of Foucault can be seen in mass genocides of Jews during Second World War by Hitler and more recently in Sudan and Kosovo where the governments use the difference in beliefs and races to control the population by creating the fear of each other to destroy their enemy (Castells, 2004). Furthermore, the concept of biopower can explain the use of terror as a political tactic not only within its state but also the within the wide range of a continent (Marks, 2006) As can be seen in the studies of the aftermath of the Second World War, the discipline of security studies shares the standard interpretation of Second World War as a ‘good war’ where “the war is seen as a struggle between democracy and totalitarianism, freedom and tyranny, good and evil, in which the “good guy won.” (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006). During this period the tension between two competing sides also creates the fear that the citizens have framed in their mind (Butler, 2009). In a similar manner during the Cold War and Cuban Missile Crisis, Russia and Cuba are accounted for as evil and communist where they aim to take away the freedom from democratic countries (Columba & Vaughan-Williams, 2010). Furthermore, in the Vietnam War the state is divided into two sides: North Vietnam supported by the Soviet Union, China as a communist power and the government of South Vietnam supported by the US as democratic (Hardt & Negri, 2004). This type of biopower is justifiable according to the concepts of Foucault.

Secondly, biopolitical tactics also control people within the frame of ‘biopolitical border’. Biopolitics, as it has historically existed, has always had its border. On Foucault’s account, a biopolitical border is different to a geopolitical border, which is a territorial division between the land of one state and the land of another that divides the population (Kelly, 2010). An example of a biopolitical border can be seen particularly within the European Schengenland area (Walters, 2002; Salter, 2006). The territorial border can function as a place where people are categorized as to the populations that they belong to, however, the biopolitical covers both within and outside the state territory (Art & Waltz, 1999). People cross territorial borders without being allowed to join the population within that territory, just as they are allowed to leave that territory without being assumed to have left the population. For example, illegal migrants are in this position of having crossed borders without being able to surmount the biopolitical border. Likewise, the European migrant crises, with million Syrian migrants crossing into Europe since

2015, causes many EU countries to cope with this influx and what best to deal with these non-citizens in their countries (Walters, 2002). However, the EU citizens instead are the one who forces those migrants leaving their home countries, feeling fearful of the aliens entering their territory. At present, the old form of the nation-state is now declining, and there is an emergence of a new form of sovereignty (Hardt & Negri, 2004). It is the biopolitics that allows the government today to deploy sovereign power and maintain the degree of domination against people outside from getting inside. Therefore, people have been trapped within the framework of the biopolitical.

According to Foucault (2008), the subject-object of biopolitics is framed at the focal point of knowledge and power: the populations are characterized precisely by their ability to experience the terror that works together with survival mechanisms. Put otherwise, the state in the emergency form that replaces laws with norms should not be considered as the notion of exception (Schmitt, 2007; Agamben, 2005), which is defined as a feature of the modern state in totalitarian forms. It should be, instead, examined in its biological senses (Dillon & Reid, 2009). Dillon and Reid have stressed how biopolitics today maintains the kind of permanent state of emergency that promotes lives of the emergency of its emergence. This is implemented by administering life through contingency, which also encompasses fundamentally the promotion of death, more precisely, the death of those elements that threaten life's capacity for emergence.

Thirdly, the war images can be taken as evidence that there is a close kinship between biopolitics and war. It shows how the biopolitical framework is formed by governmentality tactics; creating and reproducing the very experience of fear is seen as essential to the life of the organism by recurring flashbacks or hallucinations that finally end up devouring external perception (Butler, 2004; Barkawi & Laffey, 2006). In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the live images of the twin towers collapsing have become the iconic visual representation of the 'War on Terror'. It has been interpreted as providing evidence of the link between terrorism and violence (Tripathy, 2013). The war photos show how our dominant cognitive interpretative structures delimit our vision and what fragments of reality are already interpreted for us. Peter van Agtmael, a well-known documentary photographer on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, also argues that war images not only demonstrate the constant complex relations between what reality of fear is produced and represented, but that it also displays a 'biopolitical frame of representability' that consists in facilitating and privileging modes of representation according to various forms of preservation, the enhancement of human lives and bodies, and human self-preservation (Debrix & Barder, 2011). For instance, the photo includes three different identifications between war victims, the soldiers, and terrorists, and we can see that there are lives being threatened while others are being the victors and also how life itself is being defined and regenerated. The image brings the notion that the body can be destroyed or killed through the operation of state sovereignty.

Taking Foucault's turn, (2003b), the biopolitical framework of representability also opens up two problems within the predominant perspective on political modernity. First, this framework intervenes at the level of sovereign power. Within the state, biopower seeks to build the new form of power, which is power over life that then leads to a reconsideration of a traditional model of centralized sovereign power by Hobbes and Machiavelli. Secondly, biopolitics indicates different relationships between sovereignty, violence, and death (Campbell, 2011). In the above example of war images, death does not disappear from the biopolitical frameworks. Instead, it functions within the relationship between life and fear of death. Therefore, the concept of biopolitics helps to bring into focus a series of strategies and interventions of power, authority, and control at the level of population life that connect life to the war.

### **5.3 Biopower in War on Terror**

War in modern society has now become the regime of exercising biopower, particularly the war on terror as "a form of a rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (Hardt & Negri, 2004). In order to preserve life from the disasters and atrocities of war, liberal regimes have to conduct wars or war campaigns by deploying strategies that must target not only the lives of enemies but also the lives of populations in need of preservation and protection (Hardt & Negri, 2004). Since the acts of 9/11 in Washington D.C., 3/11 train bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004, and 7/7 suicide bomb attacks in London on 7 July 2005, people in the West have come to the realization that they are now living in the terrifying experience of the fear of terror (Bauman, 2006).

In the context of the 'War on Terror', there has been a convenient excuse for Western states to authorize their power to intervene in other states in the name of an eradication of danger to the West. The US declaration of the War on Terror and invasion of Middle Eastern states invokes the state sovereignty that constitutes the strategy of power within the modern context. For instance, on September 2001, two passenger jets were flown into the twin tower of the World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York, and another plane crashed into the Pentagon in Washington DC. The deaths totaled 3500 people. Within a month, President in that uproar time George W. Bush, declared a global war against terrorism. The operation "Enduring Freedom" was launched against the Taliban government in Afghanistan and operation "Iraqi Freedom" against Saddam Hussein. In this analytical context, the current war on terror launched by the liberal states like the US after 9/11 is no different from all other liberal wars, wars being waged on life but also on behalf of life itself. They use the fear of terror as the defense of vitality.

Biopolitical concepts can examine the 'War on Terror' for two reasons. First, they place the war on terror within the historical liberal way of war in which the war on terror is the violence of the long liberal quest to wage war on life and to subject the population to be obsessed with winning wars. The US has been playing as the winner and holds the hegemonic power. The War on Terror is declared as a rhetorical device to alert the Americans to the dangers of terrorism, and it is their duty to stand against these evil acts (Guibernau, 2007). The government exercises the use of governmentality technique in which the biopolitical forces plays an integral role in the state's strategies that make the War on Terror possible. Thus, the 'War on Terror' is constructed as the use of the fear of terror as the defense of vitality and strategies of governmentalizing that typically seek to take control of life in the modern state. Second, the biopolitical sense fits perfectly with the war on terror case because it subsumes the logic of terror under the logic of war (Art & Waltz, 1999). As the paper has illustrated so far, terror is the name, which has been given to wars that threaten liberal ways of life. Therefore, to consider the fear of terror, it can be taken as the techniques of governmentality as the right to go to war and wage its name.

As could be seen through Machiavelli and Hobbes, they both recognize that fear is the source of political power as a power over people's life to maintain the ruler's sovereignty in the state. Foucault goes further and develops these ideas beyond mainstream political theory. Fear is rather used and continually reproduced by the government to govern the population in the name of the disciplinary power over life. Fear is thus a form of the modern strategic model of power. This strategy is not about the power or control of the one and only centralized sovereign but also beyond the level of the state itself. The use of fear in governmentalizing is all about diffusing micro-sites of power throughout the society which is designed to target the population's bodies rather than social institutions or individuals in order to preserve the territorial integrity of the state, its unity, and political identity. Biopolitics is a mechanism of power which exercises biopower that consists of techniques and practices to manage people as a group, insofar as it is concerned with regulating bodies and populations. It is usually distinguished from other techniques of governmentality in targeting a population as whole rather than specific individuals. On the contrary, biopolitics can be characterized as a technique of governmentality. The subject-object of biopolitics relies on knowledge in which the populations are characterized precisely by their experience of terror. This paper demonstrates three different examples of how biopower is used to control and govern lives in the state: a technique shipping good elements from bad, biopolitical borders and the biopolitical framework of representability. Thus, biopolitics can explain the ways in which the living bodies have become objects of government and have been strategically integrated into power relations in modern society. As Foucault (1978) says, biopolitical wars are no longer conducted on behalf of the old form of sovereign. Instead, they are now "waged on behalf of the existence of everyone".

## 6. Conclusion

The act of terror has been changing over time from French Revolution until recent. However, the concept does not change by itself, yet it has rather been relabelled by the form of political movement to suit with its objective. The paper answers how the concept of biopower can be used to analyse the use of terror as a political technique of controlling and governing citizens. The paper gives the analysis on the use of terror as a political tactic for controlling and governing citizens by demonstrating Foucault's concept of governmentality and the use of biopower as a tactic of governmentality. The biopower is reproduced

through three conceptualizations; technique is shaping good elements from bad, biopolitical territorial borders, and the biopolitical framework of representability. However, the paper concludes that the uses of biopolitics are one of the ways biopower can exercise the use of terror unexceptionally. Biopolitical framework opens up two problems within the mainstream theory. Primarily, it opens the solid level of sovereign power. While the sovereignty portrayed by Machiavelli and Hobbes, centralizes the idea on rulers and state government, the concept of biopower power highlights a new way of building a form of power as the relations of power-knowledge over the populace. Furthermore, biopolitics shows diverse relations between subject and object among power, individuals, and fear. It forms a reproduction series of strategy that government uses to control the population life by their experience of terror, fear, and death. As a result, the paper illustrates that biopolitics can explain how population lives can transform to be objects of government in a loop of power relations in modern society. As a final point, Foucault's writings on sovereignty, governmentality and biopolitics are very influential in social and political thought because his work allows scholars to recognize the biopolitics as the new paradigm power in term of the conduct of conduct over the populace. Foucault's idea of biopolitics forms one of the cornerstones of important techniques of social control by the state in a 21<sup>st</sup> century.

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## APPENDIX A

### RANGSIT JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES (RJSH)

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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## APPENDIX B

### RANGSIT JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES (RJSH)

#### NOTE FOR AUTHORS

##### 1. Aims and Scope

*Rangsit Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (RJSH)* is an international scholarly journal officially published biannually, in print and on-line. The months of publication are January and July. It is a multidisciplinary journal that aims to provide a high profile vehicle for publication of various new issues in different academic areas. The scope of the *Journal* encompasses, but is not limited to, social sciences, and humanities.

##### 2. Submission Deadline

Submissions are to be permanently open. A manuscript submitted between July 1<sup>st</sup> and December 31<sup>st</sup> will be considered for publication in the January-June Issue of the subsequent year whereas a manuscript submitted between January 1<sup>st</sup> and June 30<sup>th</sup> will be considered for publication in the July-December Issue.

##### 3. Categories of Articles

The *Journal* accepts the following types of articles:

1. **Research Articles:** A research article is a regular quantitative or qualitative article which aims to present new findings or interpretations.
2. **Notes or Address:** A brief record of something or speech written down that presents important issues.
3. **Review Articles:** There are two types of review articles: non-systematic (or journalistic) reviews and systematic reviews. Non-systematic or journalistic reviews provide a summary of evidence derived from primary studies that have been selected and synthesized according to the author's personal and professional perspective. Non-systematic reviews can cover a wide range of subject matter at various levels of totality and comprehensiveness. Systematic reviews, on the other hand, provide summaries of related primary studies that have been searched for, evaluated, and selected and reported according to a rigorous methodology.
4. **Innovations:** An innovation is an article which aims to present creative arts and designs, procedures or devices.
5. **Comments or Critiques:** A comment or critique is a short article that makes comments or replies to a comment on another article already published by this Journal.
6. **Book Reviews:** A book review is a short article that is written by a specialist and read by the general community. The aim of a book review is to give a brief summary of the book's strengths and weaknesses and to evaluate the book's overall usefulness to the audience it is intended for.

Research articles, review articles, and innovations should not exceed 15 pages of standard A4 paper using *RJSH* format. Notes, comments or critiques, and book review should not exceed 5 pages. Template for research articles is available at [www.rsu.ac.th/rjsh](http://www.rsu.ac.th/rjsh). All categories of articles must coincide with manuscript preparation instruction (see Manuscript Preparation Section).

##### 4. Editorial Policies

*RJSH* accepts only the work that has not been published; that is not under consideration for publication, elsewhere; and that its publication has been approved by all co-authors and the relevant authorities responsible at the institute where the work was conducted. Submission also implies that the authors have already obtained all necessary permissions for the inclusion of copyrighted materials, such as figures and tables from other publications. Previously published work will not be considered for publication. Submitting a copied piece of writing as one's own original work is considered plagiarism. The *Journal* is published by Rangsit University Press, Thailand. Contributions are in English. Copyright is by the publisher and the authors.

**Authorship:** *RJSH* expects that all of the authors listed on a manuscript have contributed substantially to the submitted paper. By submission of the manuscript, cover letter, and Copyright Transfer Agreement (CTA), the corresponding author affirms that all named authors have agreed to be listed as authors of the paper. Furthermore, by their signatures on the CTA, all authors affirm that they have both read and approved the manuscript, and that they take full responsibility for the content of the article.

**Review Process:** *RJSH* assumes responsibility for insuring that submitted manuscripts receive expert and unbiased reviews. *RJSH* strives to complete a peer review of all submitted papers and the publication of accepted manuscripts in a timely manner and to keep the authors informed of any problems with their manuscript. All submitted manuscripts are initially evaluated by the Editor-in-Chief in consultation with members of the Editorial Board before being sent for double-blind review. *RJSH* is under no obligation to submit every manuscript to formal peer review. Manuscripts that are judged by the editors to be inferior or inappropriate for publication in the *Journal* may, at the discretion of the Editor-in-Chief, be rejected without formal written reviews by referees. *RJSH* attempts to obtain at least two written reviews for each manuscript that is entered into the peer review process, although the Editor-in-Chief has the discretion to make final decisions about the disposition of a manuscript with fewer than two reviews. The reviewers' evaluations will be used by the editors to decide whether the paper should be accepted, revised or rejected. A copy of the referees' comments will be sent to the corresponding authors whose paper needs revision. All reviewers serve anonymously and their identities are protected by the confidentiality policy of *RJSH*.

**Confidentiality:** As is customary for the peer review process, *RJSH* holds the identity of authors and the contents of all submitted manuscripts in confidence until such time as the papers are published. This confidentiality extends to the comments of editors and reviewers that have evaluated the paper; these comments and reviews are released only to the corresponding author. Co-authors may have access to these documents either by obtaining them directly from the corresponding author or by submitting to *RJSH* a letter of request that has been signed by the corresponding author. Similarly, *RJSH* expects that editors and reviewers will maintain strict confidentiality of the authors' identities and the contents of manuscripts that they examine during the review process, and furthermore, will never disclose the contents (either orally or in writing) of documents related to the peer review of a manuscript. A violation of this policy is considered a serious breach of trust.

**Research Involving Animals or Humans:** Authors must state in the manuscript that the work was approved by, at least, their institutional ethical review board for any research involving human and animal subjects. These approvals are required for publication in *RJSH*.

## 5. Manuscript Preparation

**General Instruction:** Submit your manuscript in both PDF and MS word formats. Manuscripts are acceptable in both US and UK English, but the use of either must be consistent throughout the manuscript. Please note that the editors reserve the right to adjust style to certain standards of uniformity.

**Format:** Unless specified, type text with 10-point Times New Roman font on 12-point line spacing, with a 1.25 inch left margin, 1 inch bottom and right margin, 2 inch top margin, 1.2 inch header, and 0.6 inch footer. Main text is set in single column. First lines of paragraphs are indented 0.5 inch. For hard copy, use standard A4 paper, one side only. Use ordinary upper- and lower-case letters throughout, except where italics are required. For titles, section headings and subheadings, tables, figure captions, and authors' names in the text and reference list: use ordinary upper- and lower-case letters throughout. Start headings at the left margin. If you wish, you may indicate ranking of complicated section headings and subheadings with numerals (1, 1.1, 1.1.1). Try not to exceed three ranks. All pages must be numbered in the top right-hand corner.

**Title:** Use 11-point bold font on 12-point line spacing. The length of the title of the article must not exceed 2 lines. A title should be concise and informative. The alignment of the title is centered.

**Author Names:** Use 10-point font on 11-point line spacing. Centered alignment and leave one line space below the title of the article. Begin with the first name of the author followed by the last name. For more

than one author, separate each name by a comma (,), and identify each author's affiliation by superscript numbers at the end of the author's last name.

**Author Affiliations:** Use 9-point font on 10-point line spacing. Centered alignment and leave one line space below the author names. Include institutional and e-mail addresses for all authors. Place superscript numbers at the beginning of each affiliation accordingly.

**Abstract:** Use 10-point font on 11-point line spacing for heading and 9-point font on 11-point line spacing for abstract content. An abstract of up to 250 words must be included as and when appropriate. For research papers; the purpose and setting of the research, the principal findings and major conclusions, and the paper's contribution to knowledge should be briefly stated. For empirical papers the locations of the study should be clearly stated, as should the methods and nature of the sample, and a summary of the findings and conclusion. Please note that excessive statistical details should be avoided, abbreviations/acronyms used only if essential or firmly established.

**Keywords:** List up to 6 keywords and separate each keyword by a comma (,). The keywords should accurately reflect the content of the article. The keywords will be used for indexing purposes.

**Main Text:** Use 10-point font on 12-point line spacing. In the main body of the submitted manuscript the following order should be adhered to: introduction, methodology, results (if any), discussion (if any), conclusion, acknowledgements, and references. Please note that some article categories may not contain all components above. Tables or figures must be included in the text for the reviewing process. In addition, tables and figures must also be submitted individually in separate files. Refer in the text to each table or illustration included, and cite them in numerical order, checking before submission that all are cited and in correct sequence.

**References in the Text:** To insert a citation in the text use the author-year system, i.e., the author's last name and year of publication. Examples are as follows: "Since Johnson (2008) has shown that..." or "This is in agreement with results obtained later (Benjamin, 2010)". For 2-3 authors; all authors are to be listed, with "and" separating the last two authors, for more than three authors, list the first author followed by et al. The list of references should be arranged alphabetically by authors' names. All publications cited in the text should be presented in a list of references following the text of the manuscript. The manuscript should be carefully checked to ensure that the spelling of authors' names and dates are exactly the same in the text as in the reference list. Responsibility for the accuracy of bibliographic citations lies entirely with the author(s). Citation of a reference as "in press" implies that the item has been accepted for publication. Authors are responsible for the accuracy of the content of the references.

**List of References:** *RJSH* uses the American Psychological Association (APA) referencing style, details of which can be found at <http://www.apastyle.org/>. References should be listed at the end of article, arranged alphabetically according to the last names of the authors and then chronologically. The following are examples of the APA referencing style:

#### **Abstracts**

Author./ (Year of publication)./Title of Abstract (abstract)./Journal Title./Volume(Issue)./Page number.

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Clark, D.V., Hausen, P.H., & Mammen, M.P. (2002). Impact of dengue in Thailand at the family and population levels (abstract). *Am J Trop Med Hyg*, 67(2 Suppl), 239.

#### **Books**

Author./ (Year of publication)./Book Title./Edition (if any)./Place of publication:/Publisher.

#### **Example:**

Goodwin, C.J. (1995). *Research in psychology: Methods and design*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

#### **Book Articles**

Author./ (Year of publication)./Article Title./Book Title (Page Numbers)./Edition (if any)./Place of publication:/Publisher.

**Example:**

Holland, J.L. (1973). Making vocational choice. *A theory of career* (pp. 43-49). New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

**Conference and Seminar Proceedings**

To cite proceedings that are published regularly, use the same format as for a journal article. To cite proceedings that are published in book form, use the same format as for an article in a book.

**Dissertation or Thesis**

Author./ (Year of publication)./ Title of dissertation or thesis./ Type of Thesis./ Awarding Institution.

**Example:**

Norasingha, A. (2009). Expression and distribution of mucorinic receptors in hepatic composite of the cirrhotic rats. A thesis for the degree of Master of Science in Biomedical Sciences. Rangsit University.

**Editorials**

Author./ (Year of publication)./ Title of Editorial (editorial)./ *Journal Title*,/ *Volume*(Issue),/ Page numbers.

**Example:**

Fisher, R.I. (2003). Immunotherapy in Non-Hodgkin's lymphoma: Treatment advances (editorial). *Semin Oncol*, 30(2Suppl 4), 1-2.

**Journal Articles**

Author./ (Year of publication)./ Article Title./ *Journal Title*,/ *Volume*(Issue),/ Page numbers.

**Example:**

- Leelawat, S., Leelawat, K., Narong, S., & Matangkasombut, O. (2010). The dual effects of delta 9-tetrahydrocannabinol on cholangiocarcinoma cells: Anti-invasion activity at low concentration and apoptosis induction at high concentration. *Cancer Investigation*, 28(4), 357-363.
- Polk, A., Amsden, B., Scarrtt, D., Gonzal, A., Oknamefe, O., & Goosen, M. (1994). Oral delivery in aquaculture. *Aquacult. Eng*, 13, 311-323.
- Seals, D.R., & Tanaka, H. (2000). Manuscript peer review: A helpful checklist for students and novice referees. *AdvPhysiolEduc*, 22, 52-58.
- Srichandum, S. & Rujirayanyong, T. (2010). Production scheduling for dispatching ready mixed concrete trucks using bee colony optimization. *American J. of Engineering and Applied Sciences*, 3(1), 823-830.

**Letters**

Author./ (Year of publication)./ Title of Letter./ *Journal Title*,/ *Volume*(Issue),/ Page number.

**Example:**

Enzensberger, W., & Fisher, P.A. (1996). Metronome in Parkinson's disease (letter). *Lancet*, 347, 1337.

**Notes**

Author./ (Year of publication)./ Title of Note./ *Journal Title*,/ *Volume*(Issue),/ Page number.

**Example:**

Haier, R.J., Schroeder, D.H., Tang, C., Head, K., & Colom, R. (2010). Gray matter correlates of cognitive ability tests used for vocational guidance. *Biomed Central*, 3, 206.

**Unpublished/In Press Articles**

Author./ (In press Year)./ Article Title./ *Journal Title*./ (in press).

**Example:**

Veena, B. (2004). Economic pursuits and strategies of survival among Damor of Rajasthan. *J Hum Ecol*. (in press).

**Internet periodicals**

Author./ (Year of publication)./ Article Title./ *Journal Title*,/ *Volume*(issue),/ page numbers./ Retrieved mm dd, year, from the full URL of the web page

**Example:**

Adams, P.J. (2000). Australian economic history. *Journal of Australian Economics*, 5(2), 117-132.  
Retrieved June 12, 2001, from <http://jae.org/articles.html>

**Internet non-periodicals**

Author./(Year of publication)./Article Title./Retrieved mm dd, year, from the full URL of the web page

**Example:**

Lemire, D. (n.d.). Write good papers. Retrieved July 1, 2010, from <http://www.daniel-lemire.com/blog/rules-to-write-a-good-research-paper>

**Illustrations and Figures:** All illustrations should be provided in a file format and resolution suitable for reproduction, e.g., EPS, JPEG or TIFF formats, without retouching. Photographs, charts and diagrams should be referred to as "Figure(s)" and should be numbered consecutively in the order to which they are referred. In addition to placing figures with figure captions into the main text, **submit each figure individually as a separate file.**

**Line Drawings:** All lettering, graph lines and points on graphs should be sufficiently large and bold to permit reproduction when the diagram has been reduced to a size suitable for inclusion in the journal. Do not use any type of shading on computer-generated illustrations.

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Caption

**Color:** Where printed color figures are required, the author will be charged at the current color printing costs. All color illustrations will appear in color online, at no cost. Please note that because of technical complications which can arise when converting color figures to grayscale, for the printed version should authors not opt for color in print, please submit in addition usable black and white versions of all the color illustrations.

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## 7. Manuscript Revision and Re-submission

There are four editorial decisions: Accept, Accept with Minor Revision, Resubmit with Major Revision, and Reject. A Reject decision is definitive and authors may not submit a new version of the manuscript to the *RJSH*. A Resubmit with Major Revision requires a major re-write of the manuscript and/or inclusion of significant new data, and thus the creation of a new manuscript, which will thus be assigned a new submission date. An Accept with Minor Revision decision implies that the paper can, in principle, attain the required standard of the *Journal* without major change. Editors may or may not have a revised manuscript reviewed (generally, by the original reviewers), in order to ascertain whether changes to the original manuscript adequately responded to the criticisms. If changes made do not result in a paper of the required standard, the revised manuscript will be definitively rejected. If a revised manuscript of "Accept with Minor Revision" is accepted, the original submission date will be retained.

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Once a manuscript is accepted for publication, authors will be required to sign a Copyright Transfer Agreement form (CTA). CTA is available at <http://www.rsu.ac.th/RJSH/CTA/>. Signature of the CTA is a condition of publication and papers will not be passed for production unless a signed form has been received. Please note that signature of the Copyright Transfer Agreement does not affect ownership of copyright in the material. Please submit the completed form with the final version of the manuscript back to the Editor-in-Chief.

## 9. Further Reading

The following resources will provide valuable guidelines for the preparation of manuscripts.

Anonymous. (n.d.). How to write abstract. Retrieved January 17, 2011, from

[http://www.journal.au.edu/au techno/2006/jan06/vol9num3\\_howto.pdf](http://www.journal.au.edu/au techno/2006/jan06/vol9num3_howto.pdf)

Anonymous. (n.d.). How to write an abstract: Links and tips. Retrieved January 17, 2011, from

<http://research.berkeley.edu/ucday/abstract.html>

Koopman, P. (n.d.). How to write an abstract. Retrieved January 17, 2011, from

<http://www.ece.cmu.edu/~koopman/essays/abstract.html>

Lemire, D. (n.d.). Write good papers. Retrieved January 17, 2011, from <http://lemire.me/blog/rules-to-write-a-good-research-paper/>

Plonsky, M. (n.d.). Psychology with style: A hypertext writing guide. Retrieved January 17, 2011, from <http://www.uwsp.edu/psych/apa4b.htm>

Seals, D.R., & Tanaka, H. (2000). Manuscript peer review: A helpful checklist for students and novice referees. *Adv. Physiol. Educ*, 22, 52-58.

Jones, A., & Pham, H. (n.d.). Basic Referencing using the APA System, Teaching and learning unit, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, The University of Melbourne. Retrieved February 15, 2011, from <http://www.scribd.com/doc/57603066/A-Pa-Style>

## APPENDIX C

### RANGSIT JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES (RJSH)

#### *Research Article Single-Column Template*

Please note that the paper size is standard A4 size (approx 8.27 x 11.69 in)

**Type your title here using 11-point Times New Roman bold font on 12-point line spacing.  
The length of the title of the article must not exceed 2 lines.**

Author Names (Use 10-point Times New Roman font on 11-point line spacing.

Begin with the first name of the author followed by the last name. For more than one author, type 'and' before the last author's name. For more than two authors, also separate each name by a comma (.). Identify each author's affiliation by superscript numbers at the end of the author's last name.)

Author Affiliations (Use 9-point Times New Roman font on 10-point line spacing.

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Submitted date month, year; accepted in final form date month, year (To be completed by RJSH)

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#### **Abstract (10-point bold font on 11-point line spacing)**

For abstract content, use 9-point Times New Roman font on 11-point line spacing. First line is indented 0.5 inch. An abstract of up to 250 words must be included. Include your major findings in a useful and concise manner. Include a problem statement, objectives, brief methods, results, and the significance of your findings.

**Keywords:** List up to 6 keywords and separate each keyword by a comma (.). The keywords should accurately reflect the content of the article. The keywords will be used for indexing purposes.

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#### **1. Introduction**

The actual manuscript will be published in a single-column style in the RJSH journal. This single column template is adopted as a user friendly format. Thus, with this template, the main text is set in a single column. Type text with 10 point Times New Roman font on 12 point line spacing, with a 1.25 inch left margin, 1 inch bottom and right margin, 2 inch top margin, 1.2 inch header, and 0.6 inch footer. First lines of paragraphs are indented 0.5 inch. Please note that the paper size is standard A4 size (approx 8.27 x 11.69 in). In MS Word, select "Page Layout" from the menu bar, and under Paper Size select A4 Size.

The introduction should put the focus of the manuscript into a broader context. As you compose the introduction, think of readers who are not experts in this field. Include a brief review of the key literature. If there are relevant controversies or disagreements in the field, they should be mentioned so that a non-expert reader can find out about these issues further. The introduction should conclude with a brief statement of the overall aim of the experiments.

To insert a citation in the text use the author-year system, i.e., the author's last name and year of publication. Examples are as follows: "Since Johnson (2008) has shown that..." or "This is in agreement with results obtained later (Benjamin, 2010)". For 2-3 authors; all authors are to be listed, with "and" separating the last two authors, for more than three authors, list the first author followed by et al. The list of references should be arranged alphabetically by authors' names. All publications cited in the text should be presented in a list of references following the text of the manuscript. The manuscript should be carefully checked to ensure that the spelling of authors' names and dates are exactly the same in the text as in the reference list. Responsibility for the accuracy of bibliographic citations lies entirely with the author(s). Citation of a reference as "in press" implies that the item has been accepted for publication. Authors are responsible for the accuracy of the content of the references.

## 2. Objectives

The objectives of the study should be specified explicitly.

## 3. Materials and Methods

This section should provide enough detail to allow full replication of the study by suitably skilled investigators. Protocols for new methods should be included, but well-established protocols may simply be referenced.

## 4. Results

The results section should provide details of all of the experiments that are required to support the conclusions of the paper. There is no specific word limit for this section. The section may be divided into subsections, each with a concise subheading. The results section should be written in past tense.

Tables must be cell-based without vertical lines. They should be produced in a spreadsheet program such as Microsoft Excel or in Microsoft Word. Type all text in tables using 9-point font on 10-points line spacing. Type the caption above the table to the same width as the table.

Tables should be numbered consecutively. Footnotes to tables should be typed below the table and should be referred to by superscript numbers. Submit separate files of tables in their original file format and not as graphic files in addition to incorporating in the main text. Tables should not duplicate results presented elsewhere in the manuscript (e.g., in graphs).

**Table 1** Table caption

C1	C2	C3	C4
R1			
R2			
R3			
R4			
R5			
R6			


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**Figure 1** Figure caption

**Table 2** Table caption

C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7
R1						
R2						
R3						
R4						
R5						
R6						
R7						
R8						
R9						
R10						



**Figure 2** Figure caption

## 5. Discussion

The discussion should spell out the major conclusions of the work along with some explanation or speculation on the significance of these conclusions. How do the conclusions affect the existing assumptions and models in the field? How can future research build on these observations? What are the key experiments that must be done? The discussion should be concise and tightly argued. Conclusions firmly established by the presented data, hypotheses supported by the presented data, and speculations suggested by the presented data should be clearly identified as such. The results and discussion may be combined into one section, if desired.

## 6. Conclusion

The Conclusion section restates the major findings and suggests further research.

## 7. Acknowledgements

People who contributed to the work but do not fit criteria for authorship should be listed in the Acknowledgments, along with their contributions. It is the authors' responsibility to ensure that anyone named in the acknowledgments agrees to being so named. The funding sources that have supported the work should be included in the acknowledgments.

## 8. References

RJSH uses the American Psychological Association (APA) referencing style, details of which can be found at <http://www.apastyle.org/>. References are arranged alphabetically according to the last names of the authors and then chronologically. The first line of each reference is aligned left. Use hanging style of 0.5 inch after the first line of each reference. The following are examples of the APA referencing style:

### Abstracts

Author./ (Year of publication)./Title of Abstract (abstract)./Journal Title./Volume(Issue)./Page number.

#### **Example:**

Clark, D.V., Hausen, P.H., & Mammen, M.P. (2002). Impact of dengue in Thailand at the family and population levels (abstract). *Am J Trop Med Hyg*, 67(2 Suppl), 239.

### Books

Author./ (Year of publication)./Book Title./Edition (if any)./Place of publication:/Publisher.

#### **Example:**

Goodwin, C.J. (1995). *Research in psychology: Methods and design*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

### Book Articles

Author./ (Year of publication)./Article Title./Book Title (Page Numbers)./Edition (if any)./Place of publication:/Publisher.

#### **Example:**

Holland, J.L. (1973). Making vocational choice. *A theory of career* (pp. 43-49). New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

### Conference and Seminar Proceedings

To cite proceedings that are published regularly, use the same format as for a journal article. To cite proceedings that are published in book form, use the same format as for an article in a book.

### Dissertation or Thesis

Author./ (Year of publication)./Title of dissertation or thesis./Type of Thesis./Awarding Institution.

#### **Example:**

Norasingha, A. (2009). Expression and distribution of mucorinic receptors in hepatic composite of the cirrhotic rats. A thesis for the degree of Master of Science in Biomedical Sciences. Rangsit University.

### Editorials

Author./ (Year of publication)./Title of Editorial (editorial)./Journal Title./ Volume(Issue)./Page numbers.

#### **Example:**

Fisher, R.I. (2003). Immunotherapy in Non-Hodgkin's lymphoma: Treatment advances (editorial). *Semin Oncol*, 30(2Suppl 4), 1-2.

### Journal Articles

Author./ (Year of publication)./Article Title./Journal Title./ Volume(Issue)./Page numbers.

#### **Example:**

- Leelawat, S., Leelawat, K., Narong, S., & Matangkasombut, O. (2010). The dual effects of delta 9-tetrahydrocannabinol on cholangiocarcinoma cells: Anti-invasion activity at low concentration and apoptosis induction at high concentration. *Cancer Investigation*, 28(4), 357-363.
- Polk, A., Amsden, B., Scarrtt, D., Gonzal, A., Oknamefe, O., & Goosen, M. (1994). Oral delivery in aquaculture. *Aquacult. Eng*, 13, 311-323.
- Seals, D.R., & Tanaka, H. (2000). Manuscript peer review: A helpful checklist for students and novice referees. *Adv Physiol Educ*, 22, 52-58.

Srichandum, S. & Rujirayanyong, T. (2010). Production scheduling for dispatching ready mixed concrete trucks using bee colony optimization. *American J. of Engineering and Applied Sciences*, 3(1), 823-830.

#### **Letters**

Author./ (Year of publication)./ Title of Letter./ *Journal Title*./ Volume(Issue),/ Page number.

#### **Example:**

Enzensberger, W., & Fisher, P.A. (1996). Metronome in Parkinson's disease (letter). *Lancet*, 347, 1337.

#### **Notes**

Author./ (Year of publication)./ Title of Note./ *Journal Title*./ Volume(Issue),/ Page number.

#### **Example:**

Haier, R.J., Schroeder, D.H., Tang, C., Head, K., & Colom, R. (2010). Gray matter correlates of cognitive ability tests used for vocational guidance. *Biomed Central*, 3, 206.

#### **Unpublished/In Press Articles**

Author./ (In press Year)./ Article Title./ *Journal Title*./ (in press).

#### **Example:**

Veena, B. (2004). Economic pursuits and strategies of survival among Damor of Rajasthan. *J Hum Ecol.* (in press).

#### **Internet periodicals**

Author./ (Year of publication)./ Article Title./ *Journal Title*./ Volume(issue),/ page numbers./ Retrieved mm dd, year, from the full URL of the web page

#### **Example:**

Adams, P.J. (2000). Australian economic history. *Journal of Australian Economics*, 5(2), 117-132.  
Retrieved June 12, 2001, from <http://jae.org/articles.html>

#### **Internet non-periodicals**

Author./ (Year of publication)./ Article Title./ Retrieved mm dd, year, from the full URL of the web page

#### **Example:**

Lemire, D. (n.d.). Write good papers. Retrieved July 1, 2010, from <http://www.daniel-lemire.com/blog/rules-to-write-a-good-research-paper>

## APPENDIX D

### RANGSIT JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES (RJSH) MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION FORM

Type of submitted article: [Mark (✓) the appropriate choice]

- Research article  
 Review article

- Note  
 Innovation

- Comment/Critique  
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**Section 1: Instructions.** A copy of this form, with signatures included from ALL authors on the manuscript, must accompany every new manuscript submission before it will be considered for publication. Please fully complete to eliminate delays in submission. Use an additional form if there are more than 9 authors. Please scan this completed form and attach it electronically during the submission process. If you are unable to do so, fax the completed form to the Editorial Office at 02-997-2222 ext.1027.

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All author names (in order of appearance on the manuscript title page):

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Corresponding author name & contact information: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**Section 3: Acknowledgments.** By signing below, I acknowledge my acceptance to and/or certification of the following information:

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•**Authorship Contribution:** I have participated sufficiently in the work to take public responsibility for all or part of the content, and have made substantive intellectual contributions to the submitted work in the form of: 1) conception and design, and/or acquisition of data, and/or analysis of data; and 2) drafting the article, and/or revising it critically for important intellectual content. I have identified all persons, and their employer(s), that have contributed or have substantively edited the submitted work.

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## APPENDIX E

### RANGSIT JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES (RJSH) Copyright Transfer Agreement (CTA)

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